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Summary 
 
This thesis is based upon ethnographic fieldwork carried out in and around three 
secondary schools and Tahrir Square in urban Cairo between October 2009 and 
December 2011. It explores the lives of young Egyptians at the time of their 
secondary schooling and the Arab spring through examining the contradictions and 
ambivalence of the coming of age for middle class young people inside the school 
and in the wider everyday life in urban Cairo. This thesis seeks to understand, by 
examining the social theory on the tension between structure and agency, the way 
through which disciplinarian interventions enable youth’s articulation of critical 
dispositions and forms of resistance.  
This thesis, whilst it embarks by looking at the deterioration of the formal schooling 
system in Egypt after thirty years under Mubarak’s rule, examines the extent to 
which the everyday educational studentship circumstances had constrained the sorts 
of subjects that Egyptian youth could become and which would constitute them as 
young and educated in contemporary Egypt.  Whilst education, in its broader 
meaning, emerged as being undeniably crucial for young Egyptians’ project for social 
mobility, secondary schools are presented not as venues for socialisation or 
reproduction of inequalities but rather as an ambivalent and contradictory resource.  
The young Egyptians who were the subjects of this thesis negotiated meritocratic 
aspirations at the intersections of their transversal educational circumstances, and 
the norms of patriarchy and subordination of their wider everyday life.  The forms of 
exclusion and tension about the future have affected young Egyptians’ articulation of 
their critical dispositions of hopelessness and ambivalence.  Their engagement in the 
Tahrir riots and occupational actions and demanding their right to the city, 
manifested their emerging political consciousness and capacity to produce new 
spatial meanings and practices. 
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Glossary 
adadiya preparatory stage 
adalaa igtimaaia social justice 
afeed el balad benefiting the country 
asalam alikom  peace be upon you 
asha the last evening prayer 
ashwaiyyat Informal settlements 
awez aseeb el-balad w asafer bara  wanting to leave the country and go abroad 
barak allah fek/feke  God bless you 
be-ism allah elrhaman elrahim  in the Name of God the Merciful 
be-ism allah mashallah  thank God 
b-izn allah God willing 
el-balad bad situation 
el-balad de msh mehtagalna  this country doesn't need us 
Al-kofar the infidels 
elsahwa al eslamia Islamic revival 
fekh Islamic principles 
hadith Speeches by the Prophet Mohamed 
haram forbidden by religion 
hijab veil 
horia freedom 
ibada practices of piety 
ibtidaa’iya aama primary leaving certificate 
iddarra educational district office 
ied feast 
iesh prosperity 
iftar Ramadan breakfast 
infitah open economic policies 
insha allah / b-izn allah God willing 
intifada uprising 
karama insania human dignity 
kefaya enough 
koshary an Egyptian dish of rice, macaroni and lentils  
9 
kotab a small school, attached to the mosque, that mainly 
teaches the Quran and basic literacy skills 
kufr blasphemy 
mabrouk congratulations 
mawa’d el rahman Ramadan charity meal 
mohbat frustrated 
moltzmeen committed 
monaqaba wearing a neqab  
motaharera / motahareren being free from strict religious obligations 
moltazima a good Muslim young woman 
mosharkety fel syasa engagement in politics 
neqab a veil that covers the whole body including the face 
nizam regime 
sankaha fooling around 
sohor Ramadan last daily meal before fasting 
taghyeer change 
tahkik-elzat self-realisation 
takreem honouring 
tanwiri enlightened 
taraweeh Ramadan night prayers 
tarbeya upbringing 
tatheer  cleanse 
thanaweya-aama General Secondary Education Certificate Exam 
umma the Muslim community or people 
wa Islamaah A famous book of Arabic literature on the Islamic 
history 
wa alykom esalam wa rahmet allah 
wa barakato 
peace be upon you too and God’s mercy and 
blessings 
wallahi Elazim  I swear to God the Almighty 
wasta nepotism 
wnabi  for the Prophet's sake 
ya ngeb haohom ya nmot zayouhom Either we avenge their rights or we die like them 
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Notes on transliteration 
Since almost all Arabic words in the text are Cairo spoken colloquial expressions, I 
have chosen a transliteration system that reflects local pronunciation, following the 
system adopted in A Dictionary of Egyptian Arabic by El-Said Badawi and Martin 
Hinds (Beirut: Librarie du Liban, 1986). I have however simplified the transcription of 
the Arabic alphabet, in order to make it more easily accessible to readers who are 
not familiar with Arabic. I thus use: 
• [a] for ا and ع 
• [b] for ب 
• [t] for ط and ت 
• [th] for ث 
• [g] for ج 
• [h] for ح and ه 
• [kh] for خ 
• [d] for د and ض 
• [z] for ز, ذ, and ظ 
• [r] for ر 
• [s] for س and ص 
• [sh] for ش 
• [d] for ض 
• [k] for ق and ك 
• [gh] for غ 
• [f] for ف 
• [l] for ل 
• [m] for م 
• [n] for ن 
• [w] for و 
• [y] for ى 
• [’] for ء 
 
Long vowels are represented by double vowels (e.g., aama); double consonants are 
similarly represented by double consonants in the transcription. Proper names and 
place names have been written according to their usual spelling in English. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction, rationale and argument 
It was early morning in December 2009 when I headed to the Al-Haditha1 
experimental school2 in the nearby Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam neighbourhoods in 
southern Cairo, one of the three schools where I conducted the core part of my field 
work upon which this thesis is based. I passed through the school gate and signed in 
the visitors’ log. The morning assembly was about to start, so I stood on the side 
with a group of teachers and the school’s deputy who was assigned to supervise my 
time and interaction with the students and teacher in this particular school. The 
morning assembly programme was the one followed in all Egyptian state schools, 
starting with a chanted reading from the holy Quran by a male student, and ending 
with everyone singing the national anthem, and saluting the flag. Students attending 
the morning assembly were mostly primary stage (grade 1 to 6) and preparatory 
stage (grade 7 to 9) students, as well as a few secondary stage grade 10 students, 
fewer 11 graders, and no students from grade 123. Most students attending 
experimental schools belonged to middle class families who chose to register their 
children in schools of this type, hoping for a better quality education as compared to 
the general state schools. 
 
After the morning assembly and shortly after arriving in the principal’s office, the 
school deputy asked me if I could take charge of one of the 11th grade classes to 
                                                          
1
 Throughout the thesis, I have anonymised the names of all schools and the private tutoring center. 
2
 Experimental schools are state schools in Egypt that charge some fees and offer instruction in some 
subjects (mainly Mathematics and Science) in English. 
3
 Students' ages range from 5 to 11 years for primary stage, 12 to 14 for preparatory, and 15 to 17 for 
secondary. 
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replace an absent teacher4. The school deputy walked me to the class and informed 
the students who had met me before that I was replacing their absent teacher. By 
then, students were engaged in different activities, which made me decide not to 
interrupt them, but rather observe. There were about fifteen female and male 
students sitting in a class space that was designed for forty students. A group of five 
female students were sitting together studying mathematics; another group of about 
six male students were gathered in the corner of the class watching a sports video on 
a laptop and laughing and yelling from time to time, while the rest of the students 
were sitting on their own, busy with either their mobile devices or MP3 players.  
 
However, there were a couple of male students (Shawky5 and Mohamed) whom I 
had met before in the school, sitting in the front row of the class where they were 
playing an astonishing game. From their moves it seemed that they were playing 
darts.  Moving closer I found that they were using Mubarak’s photo, that was hung 
on the wall, as a dartboard and were throwing the darts at Mubarak’s face. They 
kept playing and laughing until I approached them and asked what they were doing. 
“We are bored and just passing the time by playing darts,” Mohamed said while 
smiling. Trying to understand what they had in mind, I said “But you are throwing 
darts at the president’s photo!” They looked at each other and seemed unsure how 
to answer my question, then Shawky said “Yes, what’s the problem? We [referring to 
all the students] are used to it. If you look carefully at the photo you will find many 
holes in it.” I looked at the photo and noticed that Shawky was right. It was not the 
first time I had encountered this group of students, and I think both young men 
realised that I wanted to know more. After some silence and hesitance, Mohamed 
said “He [referring to Mubarak] deserves it.”  Shawky added: “Yes, he deserves it; 
can’t you see what he did to the country?” I asked them why they thought Mubarak 
deserved their anger. “You don’t know? He is the reason for the entire bad situation 
in Egypt. Why does a president stay for almost 30 years?!” Shawky asked nervously.  
                                                          
4
 Replacing absent teachers throughout my field research provided me with opportunities to interact 
with students. 
5
 Throughout the thesis, I have anonymised the names of all my informants. 
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Mohamed added: “Because of all the corruption that happened during his time we 
are not sure of our future, even if we pass the thanaweya-aama [general secondary 
leaving certificate] successfully”. Whilst both young men were willing to talk more, I 
realised that by having such a conversation in public I could be exposing them (and 
myself) to trouble. Both Shawky and Mohamed come from educated families living 
in Sakr Qurish. It is one of the new residential areas established close to the Al-
Basatin, Dar-elsalam, and Maadi areas. Both had been enrolled in the Al-Haditha 
experimental school from grade one onward. Their darts game was the first 
encounter, during my field research, with young people’s critical political stance.  
 
In February 2011, not too long after the darts game incident, I was in Tahrir Square 
in the middle of a large crowd of Egyptians of all ages and social strata. The main 
demand of the crowd was that Mubarak should resign the presidency and that the 
entire “regime” (nizam) be removed. By then I had just finished twelve months’ 
fieldwork in three secondary schools and the neighbourhoods of Al-Basatin and Dar-
elsalam. Drawing upon all the details of my twelve months’ fieldwork of group 
discussions, interviews and observations inside the schools and in the narrow lanes 
of the informal neighbourhoods, I resumed my field work. The second part of my 
fieldwork was not in the Cairo secondary schools, which were closed for the rest of 
the academic year, but in and around Tahrir Square. 
 
The above extracts from my field work, starting at the morning assembly, then the 
students’ darts game, and ending with the crowd in Tahrir Square, reflect the major 
themes covered in this thesis: school discipline and the failure thereof, young 
Egyptians, and their aspirations and engagement in taghyeer (changing) the political 
regime. The incident of the darts game revealed the extent to which young people 
while navigating the contradictory and ambivalent circumstances of their coming of 
age and aspirations had developed a critical stance against Mubarak’s regime. 
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This thesis is based upon ethnographic fieldwork carried out in and around three 
secondary schools and Tahrir Square in Cairo between October 2009 and December 
2011. It explores the lives of young Egyptian secondary school students before and 
during the Arab spring. It is an exploration of these young Egyptians’ experiences, 
practices, values and aspirations as these intersect with the school structure, and the 
nation state. 
 
 
1.1.1 The thesis argument  
It is due to the increasing volume of educated unemployment and the growing 
socioeconomic disparities among Egyptian youth, that the Egyptian politicians, 
intellectuals and researchers (El-Bialawi 1996, Badran 1996, 2009, Esmat 2008) had 
debated the meaning of education for the new Egyptian generations and the role of 
the schooling system in contemporary Egypt. This debate intensified during the last 
few years of the Mubarak regime, as despite the notable improvement in the labour 
market conditions and Egypt’s recent economic revival since 2004 (Assaad and 
Barsoum 2007), the youth continued to be the most disadvantaged group in terms of 
unemployment and lower earnings. With the considerable socioeconomic and 
cultural changes in Egypt from the late 1970s onwards, education became even 
more perceived by the state as playing a significant role in preparing the modern 
citizen who can contribute to Egypt’s neoliberal project (El-Bialawi 1996) and in 
maintaining the country's national security (Baha-Eldin 1996). Islamic revivalists 
wanted schools to play a significant role in maintaining an Islamic identity for the 
new generations (Herrera 2006), which made the state adopt a rather strong official 
Islamic discourse (Starrett 1998). For the majority of Egyptians, education continued 
to be the means for competing for a good job, achieving financial stability and 
personal independence, forming a family, and even for social mobility and better 
living standards (Hoodfar 1997, Barsoum 2004, Singerman 2007).  
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I argue in this thesis that education has been, in various modalities, at the centre of 
Egypt’s nation-building projects6 and, later, of its economic and democratic reform 
projects7.  This has gone alongside the increased islamisation of education.  Despite 
the schooling system’s strong disciplinarian, nationalist and Islamic orientation, I 
argue that the lack of investment, together with the lack of employment for 
graduates, has undermined the educational structure. Young people navigate, 
amidst tension, forms of exclusion and ambivalence, a schooling system that they no 
longer have faith in, and meritocratic aspirations that they have become hopeless 
about. As a result, I argue, young Egyptians carve out spaces of disaffection and 
critique, whilst at the same time they maintain some commitment to the value of 
education as a tool for social mobility (albeit recognising the importance of wasta8 
[nepotism] and the limitation it poses).  
 
The argument I develop throughout the thesis falls within the theoretical debates 
concerned with the tension between structure and agency (Bourdieu 1974, 1977, 
1984, 1986, 1990; Foucault 1979, 1981; De Certeau 1984; Lefebvre 1991, 1996; 
Butler 1993, 2006) and the ways in which disciplinarian interventions might facilitate 
the articulation of critical dispositions, political consciousness, and resistance (Scott 
1985, Adu Lughod 1990, Mahmood 2005, Bayat 2009). Whilst I am grounding my 
research in the educational field, it is not my aim to explore how schools in Egypt 
serve as venues for socialisation or how notions about meanings of nation, gender, 
religion, and other affiliations are transmitted through formal schooling, as most 
accounts about Education in Egypt have endeavoured to do. Instead I follow analyses 
(Levinson and Holland 1996, Kaplan 2006, Jeffery et al 2008) that show the extent to 
                                                          
6
 Schooling in post-colonial Egypt has been deployed towards building the modern nation and 
achieving social mobility (Starrett 1998; Hoodfar 1997; Pratt 2005). This role of the state school 
system constituted a significant element of the Nasserist nationalist project, to which mobilising 
previously marginalised groups (Bier 2004) and ensuring government-guaranteed employment for all 
graduates (Barsoum 2004) were central. 
7
 In order to achieve “sustainable growth of the economy and consolidat[ion of] democracy and 
freedom, as well as a successful dialogue and competition with other countries in an era of 
knowledge-based economies and globalization” (MOE 2007: 16). 
8 Wasta is argued (Barsoum 2004, Assaad 1997) to play a vital role in the Egyptian job market. 
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which the education field in the global south and schools in particular could be a 
source of “ambivalence” and “contradictions” (Jeffrey et al 2008:198).  
 
The “secondary school” in the cities of the global south and in the Egyptian context is 
an urban phenomenon9 (MOE 2011) representing an important element in the 
state’s economic reform project, as an attempt by the state to prepare citizens who 
can fit with the requirements of the labor market.  Despite the significance of the 
secondary school to the state’s economic reform project, no real attention has been 
dedicated by social scientists to the secondary school in the Egyptian context. For 
this reason, I focus in my thesis on the educational sites of state secondary schools in 
urban Cairo’s Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam informal neighbourhoods. Thanaweya-
aama (grades 10 to 12) students who are enrolled in secondary schools in those 
particular neighbourhoods belong to lower-middle and lower-income families 
supporting their young people to achieve high scores in the thanaweya-aama exams 
and reach the college of their dreams.  Since the massive expansion of the Egyptian 
education system in the 1970s, the thanaweya-aama exams and certificate have 
represented a bottleneck for Egyptian youth aiming to access higher education and 
obtain the university degree that is supposed to qualify them to join the labour 
market.   
 
The government of Egypt had been talking for years about reforming education 
towards supporting the requirements of the post-liberalisation era. My ethnography 
shows that despite the official reformist discourse, secondary schools while 
reflecting the state’s disciplinarian politics are incapable of fulfilling the state’s 
agenda in preparing young Egyptians for a neoliberal market economy. As a result, 
schools are experiencing an increase in student rates of absenteeism, and the 
flourishing of strong private tutorial practices. 
                                                          
9
 According to the Egyptian MOE’s 2011/12 statistical book, urban secondary school classrooms 
represent around 77% of the country’s total number of such classrooms. 
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The secondary school students’ absenteeism and the flourishing of private tutoring 
are essential themes in this thesis for understanding the structural conditions of 
secondary schooling. My ethnography shows that while students’ school attendance 
dropped to approximately 15% and even less in grades 11 and 12 in Al-Basatin and 
Dar-elsalam secondary schools, all students enrolled in private tutoring classes that 
emerged as the main alternative pedagogical possibility. As such, schools turned into 
venues for registering for exams and the whole of the teaching and learning 
processes were done outside school venues. With the significant deterioration in the 
secondary schools’ performance and the flourishing of private tutoring, students and 
families chose to drop school attendance and pay the extra cost of private tutors. 
The informal private tutoring system has also emerged as the informal market for 
the poorly paid teachers employed by the government to earn a better income. 
Private tutoring has been mainly provided through home-based arranged groups of 
students or through tutoring centres established by groups of teachers or local 
businessmen.  
 
My interest in the state school lies in the fact that it is not only intended by the state 
as a utility for discipline and at the same time a ground for supporting economic 
reform, but is also a site for cultural production of particular subjectivities. With the 
Egyptian students’ everyday opposition to state schooling and the flourishing of the 
private tutoring market, “complex interworkings of historically changing structures 
of power” (Abu Lughod 1990: 53) are at play within the site of the school, striving to 
thrust the entire education system towards more inclusion and less hegemony. My 
thesis, whilst exploring the deterioration of formal schooling in Egypt after thirty 
years under Mubarak’s rule, particularly examines the extent to which the 
thanaweya-aama everyday educational circumstances had constrained the sorts of 
subjects that Egyptian youth could become and in the meantime constituted them as 
young and educated in contemporary Egypt. My thesis examines the complexity of 
the coming of age for middle class young Egyptians inside the secondary school and 
in the wider everyday life, exploring various young people’s experiences, practices, 
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values and aspirations in navigating their life chances, challenges and meritocratic 
possibilities. 
 
The thanaweya-aama students’ ambition to succeed in passing these exams was 
inherently paired with despair and frustration because of their uncertainties and 
fears of failing. In the meantime, young people’s aspirations for success and self-
realisation had “developed into teleologies of the subject in their own right in a 
world where notions of progress and consumption increasingly frame people’s 
economic and personal horizons of expectation” (Schielke 2009: 172). With 
hopelessness about achieving future success, young people have engaged in a 
political position through an obviously cynical attitude in discussing inequity and 
corruption.  As such, what is being increasing contested is whether education as a 
resource can continue in its current form in order to constitute a ground for 
achieving neoliberal economy. 
 
In short, this thesis aims to show that disciplinarian practices and deterioration of 
the schooling system, tensions about the future, and forms of exclusion had affected 
young Egyptians’ sense of ambivalence and hopelessness, and enabled the 
articulation of critical dispositions, and for some of them, triggered engagement in 
the Tahrir riots and occupational actions, demanding their “right to the city”. 
 
The following section presents a brief but critical discussion of the theoretical and 
conceptual approaches around the themes central to this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
20 
1.2 Theorising schooling and agency 
Looking at the history of educational anthropology, while the world was preparing 
for the 21st century, Levinson and Holland (1996) note that it “grew largely out of 
culture-and-personality studies, and thus lacked a legacy helpful for conceptualizing 
the effect of history, power, and social structure on educational processes” 
(1996:20).  Bénéï (2009) maintains that political anthropology had abandoned 
education as a process of social control and reproduction. Such abandonment 
started a shift in the 1990s with the renewed anthropological interest in the nation-
state: 
Formal education was envisaged as one of the most potent state institutions 
penetrating everyday life, operating as both a prerequisite for its stability and a 
powerful means of national integration. This close relationship to, and bearing 
on, notions and practices of nationality and citizenship in turn generated a 
dynamic field of studies of education among anthropologists (2009: 45). 
Bénéï (2009) asserts that within the renewed anthropological research trend, 
schooling has emerged as a crucial political theme that is subjected to competing 
views and monopolisations by different political stakeholders within a given nation-
state.  Whilst the theoretical and conceptual approach of this thesis embarks with an 
overview on socialisation and reproduction theories of schooling, it mainly benefits 
from the renewed anthropological interest in the tension between structure and 
agency within the field of education. As argued by Levinson and Holland (1996): 
“schools have proven themselves a contradictory resource for those who would fit 
the young into a particular vision of society. Not surprisingly, schools and education 
often become sites of intense cultural politics” (1996: 1). Similarly, the Jeffreys 
(2008) draw attention to the importance of moving beyond the binary choices 
propagated in contemporary social science and development literature as to 
whether or not education reproduces social inequality, supports democratisation, or 
transforms societies. The Jeffreys call for the need for more attention to “the 
ambivalent, contradictory and partial social change” (Jeffrey et al 2008:198) in the 
nature of schooling. 
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I start the discussion of the theoretical and conceptual approaches of this thesis with 
the social theory that viewed schools first as venues for cultural transmission and 
social mobility, and second as venues for the reproduction of class inequality. 
 
1.2.1 Schooling from socialisation to reproduction 
From an anthropological perspective, the field of "education" is much broader than 
schooling. While education, in its broadest meaning, refers to the entire formal and 
non-formal experience of the person,  "formal education" means intended 
instruction through formal learning experiences, and schooling is a formal 
educational practice that is usually carried out in a separate confined place away 
from ordinary life and conducted by someone who is usually specialised in whatever 
s/he is expected to teach (Anderson-Levitt 2005: 989). This separate place is 
generally called “school”, and the state school that is being examined throughout 
this research is what Levinson and Holland (1996) referred to as the “state organized 
or regulated institution of intentional instruction” (1996: 2). 
Both schooling practices and the school institution were analyzed until the early 
1980s by sociologists, anthropologists and educationalists as a significant means of 
socialisation and social production. In this view, schools were perceived as 
determinants of accessibility to socially valued knowledge, economic success and 
social status. Margaret Mead, in her classic “Coming-of-age in Samoa” (cited in 
Hemmings 2006) perceived state high schools as prime sites for adolescent coming-
of-age.  Levinson and Holland (1996) with reference to Durkheim (1956) suggest that 
schools as institutions of intentional instruction in their different forms around the 
world were assumed to be instrumental to the shaping of young generations and the 
establishment of the modern state. 
I have been personally involved for years in efforts supported by international 
donors for improving the quality of and access to pre-university state education. 
Such perspectives and efforts in the global south have always been influenced by 
commitments to ideals that state education should be accessible and of quality, 
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assuming schools to be sites of cultural transmission and upward mobility. During 
the 1970s, sociologists of education such as Althusser (1971), Apple (1979), Bourdieu 
and Passeron (1977) and several others called for a radical critique of the social 
effect of schooling. By the end of the 1970s the “reproduction theory” had emerged 
to explain how schools served to reproduce rather than transform existing structural 
inequalities (Levinson and Holland 1996:6-7). 
 
Althusser (1971), referenced in Giroux (1983), suggests that schools represent an 
essential and important social site for reproducing capitalist relations of production.  
For Althusser, the school carries out two fundamental forms of reproduction: the 
reproduction of skills and rules of labour power, and the reproduction of the 
relations of production. Thus, the subject for Althusser is the “individual’s self-
consciousness as constructed” (Ashcroft et al 1981: 221) by the state’s institutions, 
notably the school. 
Althusser's theory of ideology on one side emphasises the material aspect of 
ideology as manifested in the architectural features of school buildings and the daily 
material practices through which individuals within the school carry out their daily 
experiences and embody aspects of the social division of labour. On the other side, 
ideology for Althusser is distinct as values and representations concretely 
manifested in school practices that constitute the unconsciousness of students and 
persuade them of the limitations and conditions of their existence (Giroux 1983). 
 
While Althusser’s ideology was more concerned about the economic or material 
elements of reproduction, Bourdieu emphasises the importance of social networks 
along with cultural capital and symbolic capital in the analysis of the role of 
schooling, and provides a set of conceptual tools for understanding structures that 
attempt to shape young people’s strategies. Cultural capital might be in the form of 
“long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body” referred to by Bourdieu as an 
“embodied state” (Bourdieu 1986: 243). It is mainly linked with the process of 
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embodiment, the acquisition or cultivation of characteristics. It is a process that 
requires time, effort and investment by the person. The state of embodiment can be 
understood through the school discipline practices that I explore in Chapter 3, so 
that students might embody certain disciplinary and gendered dispositions as a 
result of being for a long time in the schooling space, practices and rituals. Cultural 
capital, for Bourdieu, can also exist in formal educational qualifications, defined as 
the “institutionalized state”, as in the case of thanaweya-aama. Adopting Bourdieu’s 
notion of cultural capital might mean that by passing through thanaweya-aama to 
higher education and obtaining a university degree, students may acquire tastes and 
styles distinct from other young people who have not been able to obtain similar 
educational credentials.  
Those who join and graduate from the top ranking schools, according to Bourdieu, 
acquire the capacity to define and legitimize high-culture genres such as engineering 
or medicine, and other highly valued genres (cultural, moral, artistic standards and 
styles), and may have high degrees of symbolic capital, whereas graduates of other 
genres may enjoy little symbolic capital (Anheier et al 1995).  Notions of cultural and 
symbolic capital might be useful for understanding the reasons for continuous 
investment in education, and the over-estimation of the transformative power of the 
school (Jeffery el al 2005:3-4) in spite of its poor outcomes for the young people’s 
employability and potentials for social mobility. This analysis might apply in the case 
of secondary schooling discussed in this thesis. Despite the rapidly increasing rates of 
unemployment, families in Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam paid the high cost of private 
tutoring in order to support their young people to pass the thanaweya-aama 
bottleneck and go on to higher education. 
Schooling, within Bourdieu’s works (1974, 1977, 1984, 1986, 1990), exercises a kind 
of “symbolic violence” on non-elite students (Levinson and Holland 1996:6). 
Symbolic violence means the way in which individuals contribute towards creating 
their own socioeconomic limitations and “subordination by gradually accepting and 
internalizing those very ideas and structures that tend to subordinate them” 
(Connolly and Healy 2004: 513). Recipients of such symbolic violence develop a 
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sense of the limits of their social position. As these limits become embodied in a 
person’s “habitus”, he or she learns to act according to those limits. The notion of 
habitus means that, with the effect of socialisation and embodied history, individuals 
consciously or spontaneously self-censor their actions according to the structural 
expectations. Bourdieu argues that “no doubt agents do have an active 
apprehension of the world. No doubt they do construct their vision of the world.  But 
this construction is carried out under structural constraints” (Bourdieu 1989: 18).  As 
described by King (2000), “for Bourdieu, social agents are ’virtuosos’ (1977:79) who 
are not dominated by some abstract social principles but who know the script so 
well that they can elaborate and improvise upon the themes which it provides and in 
the light of their relations with others” (King 2000:419). This thesis’s discussion of 
the non-elite thanaweya-aama students’ actions, aspirations and dispositions does 
not confirm their entrapment to limitations that were predetermined by their 
habitus. 
The concept of social space for Bourdieu’s “cultural reproduction theory” is linked 
with social hierarchy and how it is inscribed in the physical world (1989: 13). 
Representations and practices determined by agents’ habitus act for Bourdieu as a 
basis for establishing his concept of social space; as it displays one’s place and allows 
for acknowledging the places of others in the physical milieu. Social space for 
Bourdieu is also conceptualised as the symbolic relations of power through which 
cultural and social capital are recognised and mutually acknowledged among agents.  
As such, the structure of the school’s social space is constituted through the 
reinforcement and reproduction of these symbolic relations of power between 
students and teacher and among students coming from different social backgrounds. 
Hence, the school’s social space is a set of relations which manifests itself in physical 
space, taking the shape of a distinct organisation of agents and assets (1989: 12). The 
different elements of the school’s physical space and the positioning of the different 
agents in relation to one other and to the physical elements are appropriated by the 
state authorities according to how such authority wants these symbolic relations of 
power to function within the school institution.  The discussion in Chapter 3 
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concludes that the physical details of the three schools of the Al-Basatin and Dar-
elsalam area were organised by the Egyptian educational authorities to transmit 
specific nationalist and religious meanings aimed at reproducing the disciplined loyal 
Muslim citizen. 
The cultural reproduction theory is critiqued (Levinson and Holland 1996:7) as 
relying on highly deterministic models of structure and culture, as well as presenting 
a simplistic view of the state and how schools (as structures) are used as a utility for 
control. A further critique lies in the fact that “subjects were imagined as beings 
’interpellated’ by ideology and without agency” (Levinson and Holland 1996:14).  
 
Bourdieu’s notions of symbolic violence and habitus became very influential in the 
analysis of the role of the school and the schooling culture in influencing and even 
framing young people’s trajectories. The Culture of Arab Schooling (Herrera and 
Torres 2006) presents a number of school ethnographies through which Egyptian 
schools’ culture of oppression and despotism is a reflection of an oppressive state 
(Saad 2006, Naguib 2006). Egyptian state schools in the The Culture of Arab 
Schooling ethnographies are oppressive institutions as manifested through the 
authoritarianism of the school management and “breeding the personality of the 
oppressed” (Naguib 2006: 77-79) through teachers’ behaviour and the authoritative 
school culture. Herrera and Torres argue that there are too many problems of 
structural pressures, lack of resources, and deteriorating material conditions for 
Egypt’s schools to provide what they term “humanistic education” (2006: 191). The 
ethnographies of The Culture of Arab Schooling are critical of the Egyptian schooling 
system, teachers and education policies. Whilst advocating that schools following 
the Freirian framework (Freire 1970) should be the sites where young people “can 
dream, express intellectual curiosity, form community, and prepare for the future” 
(Herrera and Torres 2006: 13), students in these studies have no real voice.  
Other studies on the Egyptian and Turkish state education systems (Cook 2000, 
Starrett 1998, Pak 2004; Kaplan 2003, 2006; Herrera 2006) suggest that policies, 
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curricula and actual instruction are translations of what kind of knowledge is 
deemed legitimate by the state. In both cases, the state has deployed Islam in ways 
that serve its existence and legitimacy. In Egypt, religious instruction has ensured 
“the values of loyalty to the nation and to its goals, which correspond to the goals of 
religion and its struggle in opposition to imperialism” (Starrett 1998:67).  In Turkey, 
“Islam is equated with the Turks, and Islamic civilisation becomes a mirror image of 
Turkish history (Kaplan 2006:116).  
The Egyptian state incorporated Islam as an academic subject into the school 
curriculum in an attempt to manage public religious morality. It is a process that 
Starrett (1998) has described as the “functionalisation” of religion by which religion 
becomes packaged and delivered to the public. Islamic reformism’s engagement 
with education in Egypt has taken various forms, from involving students and 
teachers in various revival acts (Herrera 2006), to involvement in the everyday 
schooling rituals and religious practices (Saad 2006: 97), to establishing Islamic 
private schools (Herrera 2006), to establishing social networks for provision of 
educational services between other services (Ismail 1998), and to involvement in 
Islamic pietism and ethical self-fashioning practices (Mahmood 2001).  
Starrett argued that the state’s attempt to control religious revivalism through 
religious studies within schools did not work; rather, it created public discontent and 
criticism of the state, and at the same time worked as a point of departure for 
further exploration of religious resources, particularly those away from the state’s 
control (Starrett 1998:179).  
 
1.2.2 Schooling and social transformation  
The post-colonial history of Egypt confirms a forceful project of reproduction 
through a massive expansion of schooling, and the significant connection between 
youth and students within which notions of the role of education to reproduce 
students as the youth and the future of the nation were central (Aamar 1992, 
Abdalla 1985, Wickham 2004). As such, schooling in Egypt has become an important 
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element in the state’s project of modernization (Aamar 1992, El-Bialawi 1996, 
Badran 1996, 2009).  
Several critical social and educational studies (Mickelson et al 2001, Jeffrey et al 
2004, Ganguly-Scrace 2007, Jeffrey et al 2008) have explored how education and 
schooling practices intersect with the emergence of the modern state. Mickelson et 
al (2001) are particularly interested in understanding the effect of education 
expansion on the status of women in Israel and South Africa as multiethnic nations. 
They conclude that there is an absence of a deterministic relationship between 
schooling expansion and an improvement in equitable living standards. Mickelson et 
al (2001) explore different theoretical approaches to education, gender and the 
state’s neoliberal project. Most relevant to this thesis are first, the “functionalist or 
modernization theories” (Mickelson et al 2001: 3), highlighting the significant 
contribution by education to economic growth and political stability; and second, the 
“fragile state theory” (Fuller 1991 cited in Mickelson et al 2001:5), emphasising the 
state’s attempts to appear modern and responsive to the needs of the masses 
however reluctant they may be to cut the benefits of the elite.  Mickelson et al 
(2001) with reference to Fuller (1991) state that in the context of the fragile state, 
schooling is fundamentally structured to serve the legitimacy and stability of the 
regime rather than an equitable provision of education. As a result, education might 
be broadly accessible, but of low quality and with no genuine willingness to serve the 
needs of the most vulnerable groups (2001:5). 
 
In “Education and Empire”, Herrera (2008) is interested in the international 
educational reform trends in Egypt, focusing on post-liberalisation notions of 
democracy, child rights, global citizenship, participation and gender equity. Herrera 
concludes that the education sector, including its teaching profession, is in crisis: 
Yet global educational reforms have been mired in conflicting visions for 
economic and social reform and entrenched in seemingly irresolvable paradoxes 
of simultaneously promoting democracy, free markets, and security. When 
children and their parents bypass the school for private educational services, 
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when the teaching profession is tainted with criminality, when curriculum reform 
for global citizenship education stirs public outcry and fuels conspiracy theories, 
when schools enforce exclusionary Muslim-only policies, and when policies are 
enacted to appease national security and war on terror prerogatives , no matter 
the cost to democracy, one cannot help but conclude that the education sector, 
including its teaching profession, is in crisis. (2008: 370-371) 
Ibrahim (2010), in examining the ways in which foreign assistance and international 
stakeholders have historically influenced Egyptian education, argues that: 
Today Egyptian education reflects the influences of all these transformations. It is 
characterized by a series of schisms: between modern secular education and 
religious education, and between traditional teaching and learning modes, an 
extreme version of French centralisation, a deformed version of British 
inspection and exams, a socialist legacy of “free” and equitable access to 
education,  and Western capitalist (neoliberal) notions of privatisation and 
active-learning pedagogies. It is no surprise that Egypt has no clear educational 
philosophy but a collection of contradictory policies and practices. (2010: 510) 
Both Herrera and Ibrahim are sketching a hopeless image of Egypt’s education and 
its reproduction goals.  On the one hand it is severely affected by the syndrome of 
the fragile state with a deteriorating education quality, a situation that calls for 
international interventions; and on the other  hand it is suffering, due to the latter 
[international interventions], from considerable fragmentation and contradiction. 
Private tutoring is one of the most debated phenomena as a symptom of Egypt’s 
educational “crisis”. Several studies on Egyptian education have become interested 
in the private educational services or “private tutoring”, which is the educational 
market where students are the clients and teachers are the service providers 
(Herrera 2008). Herrera wonders whether this is the end of education and of the 
teachers’ profession. Due to the Egyptians’ heavy investment in private tutoring, the 
World Bank 2002 reported that 9% of the total Egyptian Growth Domestic Product 
(GDP) went to education (Bray 2006). Hartmann saw it as an informal practice that is 
materialising within the formal education system.  It is an expansion of the market 
rules of competition between service providers that may contribute to a better 
quality service. However “where the logics of the market pervade all spheres of life, 
the incidence of blackmailing and venality rises, especially when underpaid civil 
servants are desperate for additional sources of income.” (Hartmann 2007: 13). 
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The private tutoring practice has been addressed in other parts of the world (Bray, 
2006; Bray, 1999) as “private supplementary tutoring”, “out-of-school education”, or 
“shadow education”.  As in Egypt’s case, it exists in other countries because of the 
mainstream education system and follows it (Bray, 2006: 515).  It becomes more 
prominent at transition points when students are about to move to the next 
educational stage; however, it applies to all students regardless of age and grade. 
Different practices of private tutoring are seen as connected to future life chances 
for students. These practices also affect and shape the livelihood of the tutors 
themselves since it becomes the main source of their income. Private tutoring 
practices involve the contradiction of being illegal and sometimes criminalised, yet it 
is still not banned and is even acknowledged as an unavoidable practice.  In other 
words, the fragile state education system publicly denounces the illegality of private 
tutoring, yet informally allows this as the only possible solution, due to its own 
incapability of filling the gaps that led to the emergence of private tutoring in the 
first place. Private tutoring practices in fact create employment for a large number of 
people who are out of work, and are considered the main source of income for many 
poorly paid teachers.  
 
Another important symptom of the fragile state education system, with the rapidly 
increasing rates of educated unemployment, is the failure to meet the promise that 
schooling eventually leads to social mobility and equality. Accounts on the move 
from school to work and young people’s transition to adulthood (Herrera 2010, 
Shielke 2009a, Singerman 2007, Barsoum 2004) emphasize the extent to which the 
less privileged youthful cohorts of Egyptians “remain excluded, alienated, 
economically vulnerable, and perpetual adolescents” (Singerman 2007: 5).  Barsoum 
(2004) argues that Egyptian young women coming from poor families receive a 
cheaper quality of pre-university education. They consistently obtain low scores in 
the thanaweya-aama exams, and therefore receive a lower ranking in their higher 
education. Consequently, they are less privileged in the labour market. Singerman 
(2007) discusses the phenomenon of “waiting unemployment,” by educated young 
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people. Many young people in Egypt experience “waiting adulthood” or “waithood” 
as they negotiate their prolonged adolescence and remain single for a long period of 
time while trying to save money to marry. Employment and marriage are negotiated 
simultaneously, and decisions and plans for one of these affect the other. 
“Waithood” places young people in an adolescent, liminal world where they are 
neither children nor adults” (Singerman 2007:6). Being in this liminal state, young 
people are financially dependent on their families who are also carrying the financial 
burden of unemployment and delayed marriage. Young people at this stage are 
subjected to pressures to live by the social norms and morality of their families, 
which expose them to fraternised relationships, and hence expose them to more 
alienation “as they live a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ reality” (2007: 6). Shielke (2009a), 
similarly, argues that young Egyptians’ ambitions for success and self-realisation, for 
wealth and power, are paired with despair and frustration due to their challenging 
circumstances and because their individualistic ambitions can come into conflict with 
local trajectories and with communal and familial values. Herrera (2010) discusses 
young people modest yet hopelessly out of reach goals of employment and forming 
a family (2010: 141).  Forms of injustice manifested in unfair schooling and wasta 
(nepotism) in employment, and the absence of political and economic policies for 
addressing youth exclusion are leading to unbearable pressures on young Egyptians.  
 
Several studies cited in Jeffery et al (2008) claim that in the 1990s and early 2000s 
increased investment in education in the global south has been combined with a 
considerable jump in educated unemployment among both urban middle class 
young people and those coming from poor backgrounds. Whilst governments in the 
global south, following the conditions of the economic adjustment programs, 
decreased government jobs, they failed to generate employment opportunities for 
educated young people. The fact that young men are more affected than young 
women by educated unemployment, as suggested by studies discussed in Jeffery et 
al  (2008), significantly manifests the “gendered schooling and employment 
strategies” (2008: 746) in the global south. Jeffery et al argue for the diversity of 
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“young men’s trajectories and cultures” (2008: 746) in negotiating unemployment, 
and maintain that the habitus of the various forms of social inequality “do not 
determine” (2008: 746) the ways young men undertake such negotiations. However, 
young men’s ability to negotiate their economic circumstances is shaped by their 
individual social, racial and/or religious histories and contexts. 
 
Despite the significance of the secondary school to the Egyptian state’s economic 
reform project, limited attention has been dedicated by social scientists to 
secondary schooling. I discuss in Chapter 4 the fragility of the Egyptian schooling 
system, after thirty years under Mubarak’s rule, which was manifested in high rates 
of student absenteeism and the flourishing of the private tutoring market. By 
arguing that the secondary school is an important model of governance as part of 
the state’s economic and democratic reform projects, I signal the contestation facing 
the Egyptian state secondary school and the centrally led reform efforts.  The Arab 
Spring images of street actions declared the failure of the efforts of reforming the 
existing state’s models of governance (Fawaz 2009).  Bayat cites what he describes 
as a “strong argument” by Ayeb (2011) and El-Mahdi and Marfleet (2009), suggesting 
that “neoliberal policies have played a key role in the revolutionary dissent” of the 
Arab spring (2012: 112).  
In Chapter 7, I explore the February 2011 protests by the Egyptian students (from 
Cairo’s informal neighbourhoods) in front of the Egyptian state’s Ministry of 
Education (MOE), demanding their “right to the city”10 (Lefebvre 1996) and to quality 
education. Such an image in front of the MOE proclaimed the failure of Egypt’s neo-
liberal state education system. Young Egyptians had brought to Tahrir and the MOE 
protests their disappointment with state schooling, frustrations about forms of 
subordination, and their sense of hopelessness about the future.  Notions of 
“cultural production” and “production of space” that I explore in the following 
                                                          
10 The concept of the “right to the city” was first presented by Henri Lefebvre in the 1960s in the 
context of the claiming of citizens’ rights to produce and appropriate urban spaces, through access, 
occupation and use, in ways that would meet their needs (Fawaz 2009).   
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section are useful theoretical approaches for analysing and understanding the scene 
of young people protesting in front of the MOE. 
1.2.3 Schools as venues for cultural production 
Paul Willis’s (1977) Learning to Labour, by introducing the notion of “cultural 
production” “signalled a break from mechanistic ‘social reproduction’  ... towards a 
new appreciation of the role of cultural processes” (Gordon 1984: 105). Willis 
conducted an ethnography of working class “lads” in a town in the West Midlands 
which he referred to as “Hammertown” and through which he studied a group of 12 
working-class boys during their last year and a half in secondary school and their first 
few months at work.  While Willis’s analysis of the “lads” strategies does not dismiss 
the view of schools as sites of the reproduction of class inequality, it rejects the 
structuralistic mechanical notions of such reproduction (Gordon 1984).  Willis (1981), 
in defending the notion of “cultural production”, argues that it means that agents 
within the school can creatively use the different aspects of school culture in 
navigating and occupying new positions, and becoming involved in oppositional 
actions. Willis (1983) confirms the lads’ agency by arguing that:  
Cultural production, then, insists on the active, transformative nature of 
cultures, and on the collective ability of social agents, not only to think like 
theorists, but act like activists (1983: 114). 
Accordingly, the notion of cultural production allows for a more in-depth 
understanding of youth trajectories and strategies in reacting to and negotiating the 
school, familial and communal discourses, circumstances, relationships and 
obligations. Building upon Willis’s insights, Levinson and Holland (1996) and Jeffrey 
et al (2008 and 2005) argue that education is a contradictory resource: “while 
opening up opportunities to undermine established power structures, it drags 
marginalised young people more into structures and ideologies of dominance” 
(Jeffrey et al 2008:210). While acknowledging Willis’s useful emphasis on the notion 
of cultural production, Dimitriadis argues that “yet the young people in his world 
remain largely faceless. We have little sense of particular life courses, or of valued 
local social networks, or of the institutions young people traverse” (2001: 30).  
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In the context of this thesis, the notion of “cultural production” is particularly useful 
in understanding students’ navigation of schooling discipline and their penetration of 
the daily routine. As I have shown, paying attention to young people’s negotiation of 
their future aspirations and uncertainties, as I do in Chapter 5, and to their 
navigation of forms of exclusion, as seen in Chapter 6, allows one to understand 
their sense of hopelessness, ambivalence and engagement in oppositional actions.  
 
Lefebvre (1991) critiques the reproduction theory for perceiving space as a “static 
object”, a “void”, a “container” or a “platform” for social relations (Brenner 1997: 
140).  Lefebvre instead is interested in space as a spatiality product that is linked 
with societal coexistence and historical experiences (Lefebvre 1991: 416-17). For 
Lefebvre, space is the observable base upon which all human activities must take 
place. Lefebvre (cited in Aitken and Herman 1997) is concerned about the 
“production of space”, by emphasising that it is “a social morphology that is 
integrally tied to lived experience” (1997: 65).  
Following Lefebvre’s concept of space, schooling spatiality in the context of this 
thesis is filled with tensions and competition over what the school space should be. 
Such competition is not over a physical space, but about the reality represented by 
such space (Molotch 1993: 888).  As explored in Chapter 3, the school spatiality is 
perceived by the Egyptian state as an official space being produced as an “abstract 
space” (Lefebvre 1991) that, like other abstract spaces, should represent the state’s 
“triumph of homogeneity” (1991: 337). However, chaotic behaviour, absenteeism 
and unruliness, which were explored in Chapters 4 and 6, manifest young people’s 
actions for redefining the meaning of the space of the school so as to reflect their 
disappointment and frustrations.  It might be suggested, following Lefebvre, that the 
space of the school is neither a venue for cultural transmission nor one for the 
reproduction of citizens, but an interwoven set of factors of “geographic form, built 
environment, symbolic meanings, and routines of life” (Molotch 1993: 888), 
produced through the coexistence and lived experiences of the various agents 
involved.  
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Levinson, Foley and Holland’s (1996) critical ethnographies, in examining the notion 
of the cultural production of the educated person, show how the meaning of 
education is always negotiated by human agency within and around the school and 
in the meantime decentres the privileged elitist conception (1996: 23-24). For 
example, in an ethnography of Taiwanese junior high school students, Shaw (1996) 
examines how the school’s authoritarian culture comes into conflict with the 
subjectivities of young people within the capitalist and cosmopolitan everyday urban 
life. Taiwanese students have emerged to dismiss the schooling discipline and 
challenge its hierarchy, measuring it against their own radical subjective criteria 
which are constituted within urban youth subcultures.  
Levinson’s study of the Mexican junior high school discusses how the appropriated 
school identity has been affected, “blurring the recognition of class and ethnic 
differences in regional popular culture, and reconfiguring local perceptions of 
difference according to the distinction between “schooled” and “unschooled” 
(Levinson and Holland 1996: 28). The ethnography, however, has noted that some 
students have developed a cynical and ambivalent position towards the exclusionary 
schooled identity that promotes the state versus their intimate local cultures.  
Other ethnographic studies (Demerath 1999, 2003; Jeffery et al 2008) in other 
contexts11 in the global south reaffirmed the value of education for young people as 
a basis for social advancement, civilised behaviour, social recognition and respect in 
a modern age, and also that education provides youth with “self confidence to 
overcome forms of inequality”. However, the same ethnographic works also 
recognised the ambivalent nature of education. Youth, mostly in recognising their 
educated “modern selves”, would try to distant themselves from manual work, 
associated with “dirt and dust”. Schools were found to be reflective of the larger 
political regime’s authoritarianism and tended to reproduce a “culture of surrender, 
dishonesty, and hopelessness”, leading to the production of a new form of “youth 
culture of distrust and violence”. By denying youth their subjective lives and 
determining their success or failure, schools were found to be “alienating youth” and 
                                                          
11
 India and Papua New Guinea. 
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contributing to the production of individualists and oppositional subjectivities. 
Schools were found to be incapable on their own of enabling young people to 
compete for employment opportunities either in government offices or in the 
privatised job market.  
In the two ethnographies on the Taiwanese and the Mexican contexts, schools are 
conceptualised as venues for the cultural production of the educated person by 
highlighting the students' oppositional, cynical and ambivalent subjectivities. 
Similarly, in this thesis, I explore in Chapters 4 and 6 the thanaweya-aama students’ 
chaotic and unruly behaviour, and sense of hopelessness about their future 
potential. The Nepalese and Turkish cases that I discuss next, are more concerned 
with how the school venue is turned into a site for competing political and 
ideological differences, and hence represent the school not as a site for socialisation 
but rather as a resource for contradiction and ambivalence.  
 
The Nepalese school system (Caddell, cited in Bénéï 2005) emerged as an instrument 
for state legitimisation through promoting its development model (Bénéï 2005: 77). 
In the meantime different ethnic groups use the school for promoting alternative 
agendas. The Turkish centralised educational system (Kaplan 2006) was targeted, 
following the 1980 coup, by religious nationalists, secularists, and the military. The 
three interested parties in Turkey worked to introduce their competing views 
through the school curricula (Kaplan 2006: xvi).  However, in the Nepali context, 
Caddell argues that the prominence of the school comes from perceiving it as a 
venue linked to notions of development and progress. Hence as competing 
development reforms or revolutionary-oriented groups work on winning the public 
support to their views, the school in Nepal, as in the Turkish case, becomes an 
unavoidable venue for manifesting those competing views and relations with the 
state. Kaplan examines the emergence of children’s subjectivities and novel subject 
positions due to exposure to everyday schooling politics in the Turkish context 
(2006). Such complex interaction between competing nationalist and 
developmentalist discourses and interest groups within the Nepali and Turkish 
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school affects ambivalent and contradictory schooling practices and cannot be 
regarded as a disciplining venue for what can be perceived as the ideal citizen. 
Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 3, Egypt’s state secondary schools were turned into 
sites for competing discourses of the official Islamic view manifested through 
curricula and schooling practices versus a powerful reformist Islamic morality. 
The Egyptian state’s attempts to control public religious morality went beyond 
controlling the content of text books and religious instruction. Herrera (2006) gives 
an example of response by the female students (in one of Cairo’s Islamic private 
schools) to the heavy-handed state security actions to reinforce the new state policy 
for school female students’ uniforms (1994)12. Some female students at the 
preparatory stage (age 12 to 14) decided to take this matter, in their school, into 
their own hands by organising demonstrations, mobilising their parents to file court 
cases against the state, challenging the authority of their own school, and insisting 
on discussing who has the right to have the final word on how they should practise 
their religious morality (Herrera 2006:41-49). This last example of female students’ 
contestation to the schooling discipline represents a viable link to discussing the 
theoretical framework for agency and resistance. 
 
1.2.4 Agency and resistance: Between hopelessness and ambivalence 
Foucault’s theory of “Subject and Power” suggests a theoretical frame for 
understanding the students’ agency within the schooling institution. In his early 
work, “Discipline and Punish” (1979), Foucault is particularly interested in the 
modernising shift away from the “sovereign power” of old regimes to the 
“disciplinary power” of modernity (Caldwell 2007: 774) whose concern is “not to 
punish less, but to punish better; to punish with an attenuated severity perhaps, but 
in order to punish with more universality and necessity; to insert the power to 
                                                          
12
 In 1994, a new policy was issued by the Egyptian Minister of Education prohibiting primary school 
girls from wearing headscarves (hijab) inside the school and obliging every older girl (in preparatory 
and secondary stages) to provide a written note to the school signed by her guardian approving her 
wearing of the headscarf inside the school (Herrera 2006).  
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punish more deeply into the social body” (Foucault 1979 cited in Leask 2012: 59). In 
this view, the school, as the main disciplining and modern institution, resembles the 
“carceral continuum that constitutes the contemporary disciplined society” 
(Foucault 1979:297), teachers are assigned the roles of “technicians of behaviour” 
and “engineers of conduct” (Foucault 1979: 294), and “the individual subject is a 
reality fabricated by ... discipline” (Foucault 1979:194).  
In this view, it appears that Foucault separates agency and power (Caldwell 2007) 
and in effect creates a powerless image of the human subject and its potential. “The 
subject is therefore a diffused historically constituted entity, a site of power within 
discourse, always subsumed or determined by power and apparently unable to step 
outside itself to unmask or deface this power” (Hayward 2000 cited in Caldwell 2007: 
775). Hence, human agency is reduced to acts of resistance and characterised as a 
counter-action to power while being locked within predetermined discourses of 
power (Caldwell 2007).  
Foucault at a later stage became particularly interested in the ambiguous meaning of 
“subject”, pointing out that individuals are both subject to and the subject of power 
and suggesting that in this double sense of being subject, individuals find an 
enduring form of power. 
Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates or makes subject 
to (Faubion, ed. 1994: 331). 
Subjectivities, following Foucault’s dual sense of subject, have come to reflect both 
the activity and passivity of human experience. As rational human beings we are 
supposed to act; however, as individuals marked by our identity we become 
subjected to scrutiny and discipline by the authority (Middleton 2005:479). 
Foucault’s later notions of governmentality and multiplicity of power relations came 
to dismiss the oppressive top-down nature of power and emphasised the subject 
who takes actions and is engaged in strategies as an “immanent cause” rather than a 
complete effect of “some transcendental power” (Deleuze 1988 cited in Leask 2012: 
64). The subject in this view is conceptualised as “self-fabricated” and agency is 
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shown to be “ontologically central” (Leask 2012:64). However, Foucault’s theory of 
power continued to be critiqued that as long as the self is constituted within 
dominant discourses, it is unlikely that an alternative notion of the self can develop 
(Caldwell 2007). 
 
The concept of the everyday has been used to counter “uni-directional” (McNay 
1996: 61) theories of determination and reproduction “and also the legacy of post-
structural thought that evacuates agency through positing its dispersal across 
various discursive positions” (McNay 1996: 62). De Certeau in The practice of 
everyday life (1984) “was explicitly critical of both Bourdieu and Foucault, that they 
view subjectivity as a reflex of broader structural processes – discourse, habitus – 
that determine subject position and generate action independently of the reflexive 
subject” (Mitchell 2007:91). The notion of “everyday” rejects subjects’ submission to 
traditional dominant determining norms and highlights their capacity and creativity 
(McNay 1996). 
When I investigate young Egyptians’ navigation of forms of patriarchy and 
subordination of their wider everyday life in Cairo, I build on De Certeau’s notion of 
“tactics” that he describes as “an art of the weak” (1984: 37). De Certeau is 
interested in micro-level actions and measures which individuals deploy every day 
for subverting disciplining powers. He claims that everyday life is made up of 
“tactics” that are activated by the absence of power and must play within the 
imposed territory and therefore manoeuvre “within the enemy’s territory” (De 
Certeau 1984:37).  Through the notion of tactics, De Certeau provides hope of a 
rescue from the heaviness of the panopticism of modern society (Napolitano and 
Pratten 2007: 9).  Apparatuses of surveillance in De Certeau’s account are in the 
“cracks between panoptic procedures [through which] that he sees hope for 
redemption” (Mitchell 2007:93). De Certeau suggests that everyday tactics on the 
one hand make use of the existing “cracks” within the given structures of power, and 
on the other hand cause “cracks” in the very foundations of these structures (De 
Certeau 1984: 37-39). 
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Mitchell (2007) suggests that De Certeau’s notion of everyday “must be seen in the 
context of an overall pessimism about modern society, modernist projects and 
modernity more generally” (2007: 91). Mitchell maintains that the “everyday” notion 
does not generate an articulate theory of agency, resistance and subjectivity and 
that it suggests a theology for redemption rather than a social theory (2007: 91). 
McNay further suggests interpreting the “everyday” notion as a utopian concept that 
is understood as a “metaphor for the essential indeterminacy of society” (McNay 
1996). 
Whilst Bourdieu views agency as being constrained by the existing structures and 
their given temporal and spatial conditions, and Foucault treats agency as an indirect 
effect of discourse of power, De Certeau treats agency “as transcendent features of 
the person, conceived as an eternal soul, endowed with the capacity for agency in 
the very essence of their being” (Mitchell 2007: 102). Mitchell concludes that De 
Certeau seems to suggest the “agency of tactics as not only a realisation of human 
nature, but also as actions that are morally good” (Mitchell 2007: 103). De Certeau is 
critiqued for an essentialised view of agency which suggests that the tactics of the 
morally good resist the strategies of the immoral powerful structure (Mitchell 2007). 
However, De Certeau is suggested as offering a framework that is helpful in 
understanding the survival tactics that are found in “the practice of governance, 
since his analysis shows how the “weak” make use of the “strong” and create for 
themselves a sphere of autonomous action and self-determination” (Napolitano and 
Pratten 2007: 9).  
De Certeau’s notion of “everyday tactics” provides this thesis with a useful 
theoretical frame for examining everyday young people’s oppositional acts at the 
school venue. I explore students’ everyday opposition through which they subverted 
the school disciplinarian system by both making use of the existing cracks and 
causing further cracks in the old collapsing body of the schooling system. Moreover, 
the notion of “everyday tactics” is particularly useful for understanding young 
people's everyday oppositional actions throughout their engagement in the Arab 
40 
Spring Tahrir riots during which young people employed numerous individual and 
collective tactics of resistance.  
 
Similar to De Certeau’s notion of “everyday tactics” or “art of the weak” (1984: 37), 
Scott’s (1985) elaboration of “weapons of the weak” also opens up the possibility of 
seeing the operation of power in everyday practices (Mitchell 2007). According to 
Scott, powerless people rarely have the resources or opportunity to resist structures 
of power openly, and thus massive protests movements are not likely to occur. 
Instead, more common everyday forms of resistance emerge through the acts and 
ordinary weapons of the powerless, such as “foot dragging, dissimulation, false 
compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so forth” 
(Scott 1985: 29). It is also worth emphasising Abu-Lughod’s (1990) important 
contribution of warning against romanticising resistance by suggesting attention 
should be paid to “the existence of a range of specific strategies and structures of 
power” (1990:53), and arguing for understanding resistance as a “diagnostic of 
different forms of power” (1990:42) which allows moving beyond the binary of 
resistance/subordination.  
 
Post-structuralist feminist thought has contributed significantly to theorising agency 
and the constitution of subjectivities. Judith Butler suggests the concept of 
“performativity”, through which she argues that the repetition of norms “is not 
performed by a subject; this repetition is what enables a subject and constitutes the 
temporal condition for the subject” (Butler 1993 cited in Kohli 1999: 321-2).  Kohli 
(1999) argues that Butler’s notion of “performativity” works against the feminist and 
liberal-humanist traditions that honour the taken-for-granted orientation of the 
autonomous and rational self. Kohli further argues that the notion of performativity 
“offers critical educationalists an opportunity to better understand how educated 
subjects come into being – how the body is ‘schooled’ into particular identities, 
subjectivities – even as they may be resisted or transformed” (Kohli 1999: 321-2).  
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Butler further develops the notion of the historical agency when she asks: “Is it 
possible to inhibit the norm in order to mobilize the rules differently?” (Butler 
2006:532).  In other words, the subject can strategically submit to the norm in order 
“to make room for an alternative agency” (Butler 2006:533).  Such a strategy was 
suggested by Butler as a “creative deployment of power” by arguing that “there are, 
after all, other things to do with rules than simply conforming to them. They can be 
recrafted” (Butler 2006:533). Butler’s notions of “performativity” and creative use of 
power, by escaping the taken-for-granted sovereignty, allows for a nuanced 
theorising of the human subject and agency. It is particularly useful in this thesis for 
analysing cases of young people’s everyday ambivalence that was manifested in 
simultaneous submission and opposition to social norms and schooling discipline and 
how such ambivalence contributed to their constitution as subjects.  
 
Saba Mahmood (2005), whilst suggesting that Adu Lughod (1990) was still locked 
within the same terminology of subordination and resistance, argues that even 
passivity and docility may be a form of agency (Mahmood 2005). Mahmood suggest 
that the binary model of subordination and subversion imposes an analytical 
framework of progressiveness that becomes hard to escape towards understanding 
different forms of agency that do not fall naturally within the boundaries of such 
progressiveness (2005:13). She conceptualizes agency not as a reflection of 
resistance to relations of domination but as a capacity for actions founded and 
activated by particular relations of subordination (2005:18). Thus Mahmood suggests 
that it is crucial to separate the notion of agency from goals of progressive politics 
(2005:14). 
Mahmood has suggested, in her study of the Mosque movement in Cairo, that “the 
liberatory goals of feminism should be rethought in light of the fact that the desire 
for freedom and liberation is a historically situated desire whose motivational force 
cannot be assumed a priori, but needs to be reconsidered in light of other desires, 
aspirations, and capacities that inhere in a culturally and historically located subject” 
(2001:223). Accordingly, Mahmood argues that the terminology of the Western 
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liberal framework is not sufficient to analyse the ethical self and moral subjectivities 
among Muslim women of the mosque movement (2003: 859). Mahmood argues for 
the importance of examining the conceptual relationship between the body, self and 
moral agency as constructed in its local context instead of relying on a progressive 
frame of analysis (2001: 223). Mahmood further argues that in order to examine 
certain moral practices, it is crucial to consider the desires, motives, obligations and 
goals of those to whom these practices are important (2001: 225).  Mahmood 
(2009), in her critique of the liberal notion of agency, has emphasised the “exercise 
of critique” and the extent to which “critique” is truly "an achievement of secular 
culture and thought” (2009: 861).  Mahmood “tried to pull apart some of the 
assumptions that secure the polarisation between religious extremism and secular 
freedom wherein the former is judged to be uncritical, violent, and tyrannical and 
the latter tolerant, satirical, and democratic” (2009: 861). 
 
Schielke (2009b) finds that whilst Mahmood offers inspiring directions for the 
anthropological study of religion and morality, and that moral subjectivity is 
important, “there is a risk – especially when morality and piety come together – of 
favouring the complete, the consistent, and the perfect in a way that does not do 
justice to the complex and often contradictory nature of everyday experience” 
(Schielke 2009b: 526). Bayat (2003, 2007) and Schielke (2009a, 2009b) examine 
young people’s engagement in piety, morality and ethical self-fashioning practices, 
and the involved ambivalence and fragmentation. They explore how young people 
negotiate notions of Islamic ethical practices and modernity and note the 
ambivalence of young people in Egypt between religious moralities and their 
subjectivities as youth. While wanting to be good Muslims, young people fantasize, 
build expectations and develop disappointments related to aspirations for wealth, 
success and excitement (Schielke 2009a:172). They “swing back and forth from 
partying to prayers” (Bayat 2003:1). Youth navigate their way through the conflicting 
liberal and Islamic discourses by creating their own “hybrid identities and realities as 
demonstrated by their new cultural forms and expressions” (Bayat 2003:1).  
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Through his exploration with young Egyptians in rural Egypt and his interest in 
subjectivities and morality, Schielke (2009b) argues for the ambivalence and 
fragmentation of the modern self.  In this sense, different orientations of the self 
occupy the same culture and are manifested in the life experience of the individual 
either simultaneously or periodically. Schielke suggests that “an anthropological 
study of morality and ethical subjectivity has to take this inherent ambivalence as a 
starting-point. Rather than searching for moments of perfection, we have to look at 
the conflicts, ambiguities, double standards, fractures, and shifts as the constitutive 
moments of the practice of norms” (2009b: 537). 
 
The emergence of young people’s spatial strategies is evident in several studies cited 
in Jeffery et al (2008) to be influenced by the opportunities arising for movement 
and networking. Studies by Simone (2001) and Osella and Osella (2000) discuss the 
extent to which “young people’s efforts to rescale their strategies often involves 
reaffirming rather than rejecting ‘traditional’ solidarities based on family, kinship, or 
religion”(Jeffery et al 2008: 751). Simon and the Osellas suggest that, with increased 
rates of unemployment and the prolonged state of “waithood”, young people in 
West Africa and India are capable of drawing upon kinship relations and religious 
networks in negotiating entry into new economic networks where the potential for 
employment and social mobility exist. In Chapter 5, I discuss young Egyptians’ 
negotiations of future potential opportunities through capitalising on available 
relationships and networks. Despite being strongly critical of the influence of 
“wasta” in affecting their chances for equitable employment opportunities, they did 
not deny that they might themselves seek “wasta” to find a job. They also expressed 
their hopes of finding a job in one of the Arabian Gulf countries with the help of 
relatives already living and working there. 
 
The role played by educated unemployed young men from poor backgrounds in the 
process of political change is evident in studies explored in Jeffery et al (2008). 
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“Rather than being apathetic prisoners of their habitus, as Bourdieu’s theory rather 
suggests, young men from marginalised backgrounds often win significant victories 
through their political activity, and occasionally their actions and strategies 
undermine powerful structures” (2008: 749). Cole (2004) cited in Jeffery et al (2008) 
emphasizes gender politics among the educated unemployed in arguing for the 
distinctive capacity of young people in challenging structures of power.  
Social scientists (Herrera 2012, 2011, Schielke 2011, Hirschkind 2011, Ibrahim and 
Hammelman 2011) have embarked on documenting what they describe as youth 
engagement at a pivotal moment in Egypt’s history; that is, the 25th January 
revolution which I also document in Chapter 7 through the voices of three young 
revolutionaries. Before, during and after the 18-day Tahrir occupation, young people 
were engaged in public spaces through virtual forums, real-time street protests, 
occupational practices, and innovative artistic expression. Young people’s 
engagement in Egyptian history-making from January 2011 onwards poses critical 
questions requires further exploration in order to understand the dynamics of such 
engagement, potential future development, and impact. Herrera (2012) concludes 
that “in the absence of critical and collaborative educational endeavors, the fear is 
that a dreaded counterrevolution, with its regressive and antidemocratic tendencies, 
may very well prevail in Egypt” (2012: 349). I discuss in Chapter 7 the notion of 
counter-revolution that became a public discourse among young revolutionaries and 
activists shortly after the fall of Mubarak. 
 
 
1.3 Thesis structure 
After this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 sets the context for the ethnographic 
chapters of this thesis by first providing a historical overview of the education system 
in contemporary Egypt from Nasser’s nationalist state, and Sadat’s science and faith 
one, to Mubarak’s economic adjustment policies. It then looks briefly at the Egyptian 
education system. The third section of the chapter looks at the political economy of 
Cairo and also at the Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam neighbourhoods. The fourth and last 
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section describes the various methods of data collection which I used during the 
fieldwork. 
 
Chapter 3 considers the Egyptian school’s nationalist and economic reform agenda 
under the Mubarak regime. I specifically look at the secondary school system of 
discipline and embedded citizenry, and Islamic discourses towards production of the 
loyal Muslim citizen. The school space and everyday practices are discussed on the 
one hand as a product of the dominating state attempting to maintain an Islamic 
flavour, and on the other hand as a means to subordinate young people with the aim 
of producing citizens for the neoliberal market. The chapter pays attention to the 
extent to which the school space is gendered particularly towards producing the 
good Muslim girl. 
By continuing inside the boundaries of the secondary school, Chapter 4 looks at the 
downfall of the schooling system from three angles. First: with a highly hierarchal 
and authoritative education system and at the same time less investment on the 
part of the state, schools and teachers are out of control and no real teaching is 
happening in the schools. Second: students’ everyday practices of chaotic behaviour 
and carelessness about the school are creating cracks in the old dysfunctional body 
of the school. Third: absenteeism through which students voice their disappointment 
with the schooling system and contribute to the commodification of education. 
However, the fourth part of this chapter crosses the physical boundaries of the 
school into the private tutorial centres that are emerging as an alternative system 
and as a sign of the dysfunctioning of the school and in the meantime a 
manifestation of the commercialisation of the education system through which 
teachers are selling their services and students are emerging as customers in the 
education market.  
 
Partially stepping outside the school into the wider everyday life of young Egyptians, 
Chapter 5 explores how students negotiate meritocratic aspirations and 
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hopelessness about the future due to the unfair market conditions, corruption and 
wasta networks. The notion of hopelessness and the fact that they are not taken 
seriously (the notion of uselessness) turns the ideas of some young people into 
aspirations for changing (taghyeer) the system itself.  
 
Chapter 6 looks at young people’s gendered responses, beyond dysfunctional 
schooling, to forms of discipline, patriarchy and subordination, and how they live 
with such everyday complexities inside and outside the school. I am particularly 
looking at cases of boys’ unruliness and girls’ ambivalent positions. I consider how 
young people negotiate age and gendered hierarchies and explore opportunities for 
claiming their youthfulness through everyday tactics. 
 
Chapter 7 explores notions of resistance through the fascinating narratives of three 
young people’s involvement in the street actions of Egypt’s uprisings of 25th January 
and beyond.  In particular, the chapter discusses young people’s emerging political 
consciousness and their production of new spatial meanings and practices. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Historical overview, the socioeconomic context, and research methods 
 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter sets the context for this thesis by first briefly exploring the history of 
education as part of the political project of post-colonial Egypt from Nasser’s 
nationalism to Mubarak’s economic reform. Following this, in order to set the 
socioeconomic context for this research, I discuss the political economy of Cairo and 
its middle-classness and informality, particularly that of the Al-Basatin and Dar-
elsalam districts. I then explore the current state schooling system in Egypt, and its 
relevance to this thesis. Finally, in the last section of this chapter I describe the 
various methods of data collection which I used during the fieldwork. 
 
The contemporary characteristics of the Egyptian education system can be better 
understood if we take into consideration its evolution over many years. The intricacy 
and fragility of today’s education system have a long tradition in the modern history 
of Egypt. The following historical overview does not aim at giving a fully-fledged 
historical account of state schooling in Egypt. Rather, it has two distinct aims: first, to 
emphasize how education and the massive expansion of schooling continued to be 
utilised for supporting legitimacy of the ruling regime, political stability, and the 
state’s modernisation project; second, to trace the emergence of students as a 
target of state appropriation and control, and in the meantime as significant players 
in the anti-regime actions and movements. 
 
With the British colonial rule of Egypt (1882) that followed a harsh financial crisis, 
schooling was organised only to meet the needs of the British colonial 
administration. The limited number of secondary school leavers had guaranteed 
employment as civil servants (Cochran 1986). The majority of Egyptian children, due 
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to the limited education budget and the reluctance of the colonial authorities to 
expand access to education, continued to attend the kotab (a small school attached 
to the mosque that mainly taught the Quran and basic literacy skills)  (Starrett 1998). 
Foreign and private language schools flourished, for educating the Egyptian elite 
(Barsoum 2004). Students played a pivotal role in the 1991 anti-colonial strikes and 
marches that eventually led to independence in 1922 (Starrett 1998).  The 
establishment of the Western-style schooling system, while significantly minimising 
the role of religion in education, nonetheless supported the diffusion of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB), which was established in 1928 (Langohr 2005). With the 
incomplete independence of 1922, Egypt restored control over its educational 
system:  firstly, by reversing the Anglicisation of the public school curricula (starting 
from the 1890s) back to Arabic as the main language of instruction (Cochran 1986), 
and secondly, by gradually abolishing school fees (Barsoum 2004). By 1950, all pre-
university state schooling had become free for all Egyptian citizens (Hartmann 2007).  
 
 
2.2  From Nasser’s nationalism to Sadat’s “science and faith” 
State schooling in post-colonial Egypt was deployed by the Nasserist regime, 
following the 1952 coup, towards achieving its nationalist goal of reproducing 
Egyptian national identity13 and hegemonic notions of citizenship (Pratt 2005). 
Central to the Nasserist post-colonial project to reshape the Egyptian national 
identity were “attempts to re-order gender and class relations by mobilising 
previously marginalised groups, such as women, peasants and the urban poor” (Bier 
2004:100). The expansion of education was one of Nasser’s instruments in the 
pursuit of these goals. 
                                                          
13
 A national identity that entailed embracing the Nasser (1954 – 1970) regime’s ideologies of socialist 
economy, pan-Arabism, and the battle for territorial sovereignty. It was a largely gendered, class and 
religious process seeking to produce an essentialised and homogeneous national identity, entailing 
the control of internal differences within the nation.  It had an anti-imperialist and anti-western 
national identity (Starrett 1998). 
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All Egyptians under the Nasser regime were granted the opportunity to advance to 
higher education by achieving the primary leaving certificate or ibtidaa’iya aama, 
and entering the new “preparatory” stage or adadiya, which could then lead them 
through the thanaweya-aama, and hence into guaranteed government jobs. The 
thanaweya-aama exams emerged as the bridge to social mobility, and Egyptians 
rushed into education in the hope of upward mobility. Thanaweya-aama also 
emerged under the Nasser regime, due to its objective nature, as a reinforcement of 
the legitimacy of the regime as it was arranged to ensure equal opportunity for all 
state secondary school students to transition to higher education (Hargreaves 2010). 
Education, complemented by Nasser’s policies of guaranteed employment by the 
state for all graduates, became a vehicle for social mobility, and educational 
achievement led to increases in the standard of living of individuals (Hoodfar 1997: 
43). The considerable expansion in the number of state schools after the 1952 
revolution (Starrett 1998) was followed, in 1962, by a considerable expansion in 
higher education (Barsoum 2004, 31).  
In order to achieve its goal for reproducing the Egyptian national identity and 
notions of citizenship, Nasser's regime worked on controlling all forms of religiosity 
and political activism. In 1954, Nasser gave orders for the Muslim Brotherhood14 to 
be dissolved and for thousands of its members to be arrested (Munson 2001:490). 
From the 1960s, Al-Azhar15, which throughout its history represented a traditional 
view of Islam and mostly stood against religious reform (Abaza 1999), became fully 
controlled by the state and went through a massive state-led reform in 1961, and 
then a dramatic expansion of its institutions across Egypt, particularly for pre-
university religious schooling in the 1970s (ACPSS 1995:27-58). Despite the anti-
                                                          
14
 The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in March 1928 as a small youth movement. It grew 
dramatically to become the largest organisation in Egypt towards the late 1940s. During the 1930s 
and 40s the brotherhood started to play a significant role in mobilising the public towards supporting 
the Palestinians and the withdrawal of the British troops from Egypt. The Brotherhood has since 
spread to every state in the Islamic world and claimed the allegiance of millions of people from 
virtually every segment of society (Munson 2000) , thus becoming the most influential modern Islamic 
reformist movement in the Islamic world throughout the last seventy-five years (Rashwan 2000). 
15
 The Al Azhar Institute was founded in Egypt in the eleventh century by the Fatimid. It is the world's 
oldest Islamic “Sunni” university for formal training of the Sunni Ulama, to serve as teachers, 
preachers, judges, scholars and administrators not only for Egypt but for the entire Islamic Sunni 
community (ACPSS 1995:27-58). 
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colonial role played by students prior to the 1952 revolution, the Nasser regime 
worked on depoliticising the students’ movement, and political activism became 
completely dominated by the state’s youth organisations.  However, the Egyptian 
army’s 1967 defeat put an end to such domination. In 1968, university students and 
workers demonstrated against the corruption within the Egyptian army which had 
led to the 1967 defeat and had obliged Nasser to penalize several high ranking 
military officers, thereby allowing for a narrow margin of political liberalisation 
(Abdalla 1985). 
 
The motto of Sadat (Nasser's successor) was “Science and Faith” (Starrett 1998), 
which launched the Egyptian historical combination of modernisation with 
religiosity.  The hope was that Sadat’s project would enable Egypt to become 
incorporated into the international market while at the same time projecting an 
Islamic identity. Starting with Sadat’s Infitah (1974) (open economic policies), the 
rushed neo-liberal economic policies were manifested everywhere, from imported 
commodities to lucrative construction including high-rise buildings that served as 
homes for the middle class, as well as for business space, and hotels (Amin 2000). 
With the rise of oil prices in the mid-1970s, Egyptian labourers travelled to 
neighbouring countries (most importantly Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Iraq). The 
earnings of these labourers in the oil countries provided the main financing for a 
fast-growing construction development of informal areas (Sims 2003). By the early 
1980s, more than 100 squatter communities16 had developed, with some six million 
inhabitants, signifying the starkest side of the growing socioeconomic disparity in 
Cairo since Sadat’s Infitah in 1974 (Bayat 1996:3).  
With this Infitah, which encouraged private and foreign companies, the education 
system reflected “a mixed economy and divided culture” (Hargreaves 2010: 251). 
                                                          
16
 According to the Global Report on Human Settlements (2003), the demographic growth of Cairo did 
not stop, despite the weak post-war economy. Migration from other parts of Egypt to Cairo 
continued, and the natural expansion of Cairo reached its highest levels. Significant agriculture and 
desert areas around Cairo were subdivided and sold during the 1967 – 1974 period. These include 
Dar-elsalam, Basatin, Embaba, Boulaq el Dakrour, Amrania - South Giza, Zawia el Hamra, and others 
(Sims 2003). 
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Graduates of the re-established private language schools were employed by foreign 
companies, which offered salaries about twice as high as local private firms. At the 
same time, graduates from state schools took low-paid jobs. The thanaweya-aama 
mechanisms used by Nasser “to meet aims of national social conformity were used 
instead by Sadat, to meet aims of national economic improvement” (Hargreaves 
2010: 251). 
 
While the middle and upper-middle class Egyptians enrolled in different types of 
private schools17, the intensified demand by the majority of Egyptian families for 
formal education, from Nasser’s time onward, soon became a burden for the state. It 
became worse in the 1970s, with the increased demand due to a fast growing 
population and a very weak post-war economy (Amin 2000). Consequently, an 
increasing deterioration in the quality of schooling started to manifest itself in 
unqualified teachers, insufficient facilities, high class-density, and multiple-shift 
schools (Hartmann 2007; Barsoum 2004; Cochran 1986). Private tutoring came as 
the main strategy for about 60% of students, to fill the gap left by the deteriorating 
quality of teaching and learning in state schools (Hartmann 2007; Assaad and 
Elbadawy 2004).  
 
Youth activism, reactivated in the late 1960s, gained momentum in 1972–1973, and 
leftist university students’ demonstrations demanded that Sadat should fight to 
reclaim the occupied Sinai (Abdallah 1985).  In 1970, Sadat returned the Muslim 
Brotherhood to public life (Wickham 2002:113), and encouraged the university 
student Islamic activists as a strategy to diminish the university students’ leftist 
movements (Wickham 2002:43). The Islamic militant groups (Al-Gam’a Al-Islamia 
and Jihad), who were against what they perceived as an unfaithful corrupt state, 
                                                          
17 
Private schools in Egypt flourished under the British rule and continued after the revolution to serve 
elitist Egyptian families. These private schools included general language schools, Islamic private 
schools and international schools following different foreign schooling systems (Cochran 1986; 
Herrera 2006; Hartmann 2008). 
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emerged from within the Islamic university students’ movements in the late 1970s18. 
These militant groups, inspired by Shiekh Omar Abdel Rahman, mainly challenged 
the legitimacy of the state for not being an Islamic state and not following the 
Islamic Sharia’a that represents for them the only legitimate rule of God on earth19 
(ACPSS 1995, Bayat 1998, Zeghal 1999, Wickham 2002).  
 
Leftist university students worked very closely with worker movements to prepare 
for the January 1977 bread riots, the largest that Egypt had seen since 1952. 
Opposition to the Sadat regime by both the leftist and Islamist groups began to 
increase after the Camp David Accords and the peace treaty with Israel. In 1979, 
university administrations were allowed to interfere in student elections and to 
establish, with the Egyptian police, the “university guard” which was given the 
authority to operate inside university campuses to ensure their security. The real 
function of the “university guard” forces was to control students’ political activism. 
The voices of student opposition were even more firmly silenced following Sadat’s 
assassination in October 1981 (Abdalla 1985). 
 
 
2.3  Mubarak’s economic reform 
Starting in the early 1980s, “when the growth of the public sector wage bill became 
unsustainable, ….the government responded by eroding real public sector wages and 
extending the waiting period for government jobs” (Assaad 1997:85) in compliance 
with the conditions of the economic structural adjustment programmes. The gradual 
withdrawal of the government from fulfilling the commitment of the guaranteed 
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 University student Islamic activists were encouraged by the state, in the early 1970s, as a strategy 
to diminish the university students’ leftist movements (Starrett 1998; Wickham 2002). 
19
 The confrontation between the militant groups and the state was heightened in the aftermath of 
the assassination of Sadat (1981) and dramatically continued during the early 1990s. In addition to 
the state, the militant groups also attacked non-Muslims, tourists and secular Tanwiri Islamic thinkers 
(Wickham 2002, ACPSS 1995, Bayat 1998, Zeghal 1999). 
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employment for graduates, with the increased demand for higher education, soon 
contributed to a drastic jump in the unemployment rates for educated people (Galal 
2002). Between 1981 and 1991, rural poverty doubled and urban poverty increased 
more than 1.5 times. By the early 1990s more than half of Cairo and adjacent Giza 
were classified as either “poor” or “ultra-poor” (Bayat, 1996:3). 
 
In the aftermath of Sadat’s assassination in September 1981, Mubarak’s regime and 
the militant Islamists started a fierce war which lasted until the mid-1990s (Bayat 
1998:155). During that period, the Islamic militants attempted to control the 
universities and secondary schools. In 1993, the state launched a series of acts of 
suppression against Islamic militants and the Muslim Brotherhood and denounced 
the latter as an illegal organisation (Wickham 2002:214). By the early 1990s, upon 
realising that the schools and colleges of education were falling into the hands of 
Islamic militants, the state pursued a harsh strategy to regain control over national 
schooling. The state pursued a strategy aimed at the screening and scrutiny of 
students at education colleges who were being prepared as teachers, and removing 
Islamist teachers and administrators from schools (Herrera, 2006:25-32).  
 
In the meantime, in order to maintain an Islamic façade the state had tolerated the 
Al-Azhar senior Ulama’s censorship, which was targeted at the intellectual 
production of many of the tanwiri 20 (enlightened) figures,21 which exposed them to 
accusations of blasphemy (kufr) by the militant Islamists (Abaza 1999). Mubarak’s 
regime also allowed what is described as a “parallel Islamic sector” (Wickham 2002) 
in the form of “private mosques, Islamic voluntary organizations, and Islamic for-
profit commercial businesses” (Wickham 2002:97). 
                                                          
20
 The tanwiri (enlightened) trend emerged with the early modernisation reformist wave of Al-Azhar 
in the 19
th
 century with the Azharite scholars who studied in Europe from Sheikh Rifa’a Al-Tahtawy 
(1801 – 1873) to Taha Hussien (1889 – 1973) who became the Minister of Education during the 1950s 
(Abaza 1999, ACPSS 1995). The tanwiri Islamic trends in contemporary Egypt are mostly concerned 
with the total separation between state and religion, and the modernisation of the religious discourse 
to better suit the requirements of modern society. 
21
 Farag Fouda, Naguib Mahfouz, El-Ashmawi, Nasr Hamed Abu-Zied, and El-Qmni among others. 
54 
In order to put its reformist22 agenda to work and despite being officially banned, 
the Muslim Brotherhood pursued a variety of strategies aimed at the “Islamisation of 
social arenas and the appropriation of the public sphere” (Ismail 1998:200) through 
joining the parliamentary elections, controlling the professional syndicates, and 
establishing social-service networks (Ismail 1998:200-01). Members of the 
Brotherhood and other Muslim investors influenced by the brotherhood reformist 
agenda established Islamic private schools from the mid 1970s. While these schools 
provide the same educational services as the state schools do, they were keen to 
create an Islamic schooling environment, and to reinforce a powerful Islamic identity 
(Herrera 2006:33-49). 
Egypt also started, from the mid 1990s, to experience a forceful trend towards 
Islamic pious practices, or what some literature calls “the piety movement” 
(Mahmood 2005). It is a reformist trend that claims to be a reaction against the 
belief that religiosity and Islamic knowledge have become inferior in everyday 
practices in favour of modernisation and secularisation. Islam, within this trend, is 
mainly an adoption, both individually and collectively, of pious religious morality 
while maintaining a consistent and clear stance on the everyday life aspects such as 
proper behaviour, outlook, fun, charity, relations, and use of money (Mahmood 
2001:204). It is a trend that is manifested in the practices of the women's mosque 
lessons (Mahmood 2001), listening to recorded religious sermons (Hirschkind 2001), 
and other pious practices including increased attendance at mosques and collective 
prayers, the widespread use of the headscarf as the standard way of dressing for 
almost all Muslim girls and women from all social strata, and the public powerful 
discourse of the prominence of Islam in all aspects of life and everyday practices 
(Schielke 2009a). This pious Islamic trend, which attracted most Egyptian Muslims, 
represented a forceful discourse within the field of education. The schools' everyday 
rituals, practices, festivals, and symbols manifested the compelling pietistic discourse 
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 The primary reformist agenda of the Brotherhood is focused on opposing the corrupt Western 
influence, and promoting the wellbeing of Muslims, and the proper Islamic morality in everyday 
actions (Munson 2001). The Brotherhood’s reform of society is a bottom-up reform that begins with 
the awakening of the faith of the individual, the family, the local community, and the entire society, 
so that it will be just a matter of time until the whole state “become truly Islamic” (Wickham 2002). 
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and of the prominence of Islam. For example, unofficially, veiling became 
unquestionably the female students’ uniform and the very few unveiled students 
were advised by their peers and teachers to wear a veil.  
 
Reading the history of the complex relationship between Egypt’s post-1952-
revolution state and religious revivalism reveals that one of the top priorities of the 
state was to handle religious revivalism in a way that would support the regime’s 
legitimacy. Between religious revivalism and the growing demands and challenges 
for improved services, education in Egypt became – from the mid-1970s – one of the 
central debates associated with the influence and the appropriate role for Islam and, 
in the meantime, neo-liberal education reform.  The expansion of private Islamic 
schools (Herrera 2006) and the increased role of Islamic NGOs and civil society 
entities in the provision of non-formal education programmes and subsidised tutorial 
services in Egypt (Ismail 1998) all coincide with Egypt’s neo-liberal trends in 
reforming its state education system which are aimed at “preparing all children and 
youth for healthy and enlightened citizenship in a knowledge-based society, under a 
new social contract based on democracy, freedom, and social justice” 23 (MOE 2007). 
 
Under Mubarak’s regime, education, especially primary education, was meant to 
show the extent to which Egypt was responsive to global expectations, hence 
educational discourses focused on achieving economic improvement and 
strengthening democracy. The goals of universal access to basic education and 
literacy had been inspired by the Jomtien 1990 “Education for All” programme 
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 The Egyptian state’s vision statement within the current  five-year strategic plan (2007-2012) shows 
that the Ministry of Education in Egypt is committed to reforming the pre-university education system 
in Egypt, in order to promote equity and to serve as an innovative model in the region, through: (1) 
providing high quality education for all, as a basic human right; (2) preparing all children and youth for 
healthy and enlightened citizenship in a knowledge-based society, under a new social contract based 
on democracy, freedom, and social justice; and (3) adopting a decentralizsd educational system that 
enhances community participation, good governance and effective management at the school level as 
well as at all administrative levels (MOE 2007). 
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(Zaalouk 1995). Mubarak’s regime claimed it was emphasising quality of education 
as well as equitable access to basic education. Increased dialogue with Europe and 
the US necessitated an emphasis on foreign languages, which led to the boom in 
private language and international schools.  
Despite the jargon of social justice repeated by Mubarak education reformist 
discourse, a 2010 survey of young people in Egypt found that the university was 
dominated by urban middle class young people. Those coming from poorer 
households represented a smaller proportion of university students. Less than 60 
percent of the young people surveyed believed they would be able to find a place in 
the labour market as a result of their education. Whilst poorer young people tended 
to enrol in religion and law, those coming from wealthier families joined the schools 
of engineering, economics and commerce (Population Council 2011). 
 
The second Palestinian Intifada in the year 2000 triggered students’ political activism 
that had been silenced for over a decade.  Such reactivation continued to gain 
momentum as a result of the American invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2002 and 
2003. Tens of thousands of Egyptian students demonstrated in Tahrir Square against 
the Iraq war on 20th and 21st March 2003 in the largest demonstrations that Egypt 
had seen since the bread riots of 1977. The Kefaya24 movement, which emerged in 
2004, demanding an end to the Mubarak regime and rejecting the preparations that 
were under way for Gamal Mubarak to succeed his father as president, attracted 
hundreds of Egyptian youth. For the first time, with significant youth participation, 
the kefaya demonstrations demanded that Egypt’s president should step down. 
“When Kefaya held its first demonstrations, at the end of 2004, a handful of bloggers 
both participated and wrote about the events on their blogs” (Hirschkind 2011: 1). 
Subsequently, hundreds of young bloggers started to attract both official and 
general public attention to their blogging on the corruption and brutality of the 
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 In August 2004, a petition was circulated which demanded fundamental constitutional and 
economic reforms, but most importantly direct presidential elections with competing candidates. The 
300 signatories of what became Kefaya’s founding declaration called for democracy and reform. 
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regime. The call for a national strike on 6th April 2008 in solidarity with the textile 
workers25 in al Mahala al Kobra26 was picked up by bloggers, and was joined by an 
astonishing number of workers and students across Egypt. The strike turned into the 
largest anti-regime mobilisation in years, and led to violence in Mahala al Kobra and 
the arrest of several young activists (Hirschkind 2011, Shehata 2008).  
 
To conclude this historical overview: since 1952, Egypt’s education system has been 
deployed by the three consecutive regimes as a means of confirming their legitimacy 
and supporting their political agendas. During such a critical period in Egypt’s history, 
its youth emerged as a significant element of the Egyptian equation, either by being 
a target of appropriation and control or as a significant player in the anti-regime 
oppositional actions. Massive expansion of schooling following the 1952 coup came 
at the expense of quality of education. Under Mubarak’s rule, schooling was left to 
the forces of a free market economy as manifested in the massive expansion of 
private schooling, the boom in private tutoring, the deterioration in the performance 
of the state schools, and a highly stratified admission to higher education. 
 
In order to set the socioeconomic context for this research, I discuss in the following 
section the political economy of Cairo and its middle-classness and informality, 
particularly that of the Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam district. 
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 It is one of the largest textile factories in Egypt with thousands of workers who have been 
instrumental since 2006 in the anti-government protests against the economic reform policies. 
26
 A city in the Gharbia governorate in lower Egypt. 
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2.4 Greater Cairo, middle-classness, and Ashwaiyyat27 
 
Figure 1: Map of Cairo Districts (Source: Central Department of Information and 
Communication Technology). 
 
Cairo is the capital of Egypt, and an important political and cultural focal point in the 
region. Cairo (al qahira, “the victorious”) is situated on the Nile at a point where the 
flat flood plain, constricted by desert hills both to the west and the east, begins to 
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 Informal settlements. 
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opens out into the Nile Delta. It was founded in the 10th century, adjacent to Fustat, 
an Islamic city established in the early days of Islam in the 7th century. By the 14th 
century, under the Mamluks, Cairo had become an unrivalled metropolis in the 
medieval world, controlling the regional trade and known for its concentration of 
wealth and luxurious palaces and mosques. From the 19th century, with the French 
invasion, the rule of Mohamed Ali and his successors, and the British colonial rule, 
Cairo began, to a large extent through dependence on Europe, to enter into a 
process of economic growth and modernisation. Following the July 1952 Revolution, 
Cairo’s expansion accelerated under Nasser’s socialist and highly centralised rule. 
Part and parcel of such accelerated expansion was the informal urban development 
that has become the main feature of Cairo’s growth since then (Sims 2003). 
 
Figure 2:  Informal urban Cairo.  (Source: Al Ahram Weekly, 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/4969/24/Living-on-the-edge.aspx ) 
Since the economic policies of the 1970s, urbanisation has started to diffuse 
throughout Egypt, mainly through inter-provincial migration. Greater Cairo at the 
end of the twentieth century was experiencing a trend in urbanisation that is 
inconsistent with the administrative definition of cities, a sort of unplanned 
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urbanisation of concentrations on its borders. Such an urbanisation pattern points to 
a shift from a universal, state managed and planned urbanisation to a more private 
and uncontrolled one. It denotes a diffusion of urbanity over a vast area beyond, but 
close to, greater Cairo, with the latter preserving its position as a highly centralised 
capital. With such a trend, Egypt was witnessing the contradiction of a massive 
urban diffusion and at the same time an economic and social polarisation of very 
poor concentrations and very rich gated communities (Bayat and Denis 2000).  
 
The unplanned urbanisation in Cairo represented not only concentrations of 
population but also the needs, concerns and potential urban-type conflicts which 
would directly involve the state. Unsurprisingly the state refused to acknowledge the 
existence of these informal concentrations as urban, since doing so would mean a 
commitment to provide expensive urban services such as sewerage, paved roads and 
running water. The strict official definition of what constitutes an urban unit and the 
invention of the concept of ashwaiyyat as a political category is meant to produce 
new spatial divisions which exclude inhabitants of over 20 per cent of all Egypt’s and 
half of greater Cairo’s population28, who reside in the ashwaiyyat, from urban 
participation and the right to the city.  The ashwaiyyat are the opposite to the 
“normal” city with its modern facilities and people who are somehow similar to 
those of the élite of the upper and upper middle class. Thus, Ashwaiyyat are those 
neighbourhoods where buildings have no permits, where streets have no formal 
names, where men wear traditional clothes, where women sit and socialize in front 
of their homes in the alleyways and where adults are largely active in the informal 
economy (Bayat and Denis 2000). 
 
                                                          
28
 According to the 2006 census, Cairo has approximately eight million inhabitants. The percentage of 
the Egyptian population living in Greater Cairo, which includes the governorates of Cairo, Giza and 
Qalyubiyya, increased by 2006 to 25 percent of the total population of Egypt, with approximately 
nineteen million inhabitants.  “The population of Cairo is characterized by its youth. Over 33 per cent 
of the population of Greater Cairo is under 15 years of age” (Sims 2003: 3). 
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From the 1970s, Cairo’s middle class had been the primary beneficiary of expanded 
public facilities and employment. The role of the state was redefined to manifest a 
significant decline and deterioration in the public sector and institutions in favour of 
a wide range of private alternatives dedicated to serving the middle class. Cairo’s 
middle class has become increasingly divided between those who are 
“cosmopolitan” and can afford to pay for private arrangements in all fields of life, 
and those who are “localised” and have no choice but to live with the declining 
public services and institutions. The labour market no longer awards middle class 
lifestyles to graduates of the state educational system. These more “localised” state 
educational institutions and degrees have their counterparts in the exclusive private 
institutions that provide cosmopolitan skills and qualifications, which represent 
crucial assets in the labour market. Graduates with languages, cosmopolitan capital 
and wasta are able to fit the jobs in the up-market spaces that have expanded 
rapidly during the 1990s. The upper-middle class professionals with cosmopolitan 
capital who joined internationally oriented workplaces fit these national narratives 
as mediators between local and global, and as representatives of an Egypt that is up-
to-date with the global (Koning 2005).  
 
The majority of young people I encountered during my research came from lower 
middle income families striving for social upward mobility. Most of these families 
and their young people were experiencing in their everyday life the stark 
contradiction of living in Cairo, and being involved in the economic and social 
polarisation between the very poor, deprived of basic services, and the very rich. 
Provoked by such polarisation, young people were longing for more equitable living 
conditions. In the following section I look more closely at Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam, 
where they lived. 
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2.4.1 Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam 
The Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam district has been one of Cairo’s southern region 
districts since 1993, with a population of about 700,000 residents according to the 
2006 census. The educational level, in both Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam, is mostly 
vocational secondary education or lower, and the literacy rate is 75%.  
 
Figure 3: Map of Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam District. (Source: WordPress.com, 
http://schritte.wordpress.com/ ) 
Al-Basatin or “the gardens” (previously part of the Maadi district) is named after its 
original nature: until the late 1960s it was a vast agriculture area of fruit and 
vegetable gardens on the southern outskirts of Cairo. The majority of Al-Basatin 
residents used to work in farming, while the rest worked in the quarries in the 
nearby hilly areas of Moqattam, Ein Elsera, Torah and Helwan. Families have been 
living and stable in Al-Basatin for decades, and the area is known for its craftsmen 
and owners of businesses such as marble and other construction materials. In the 
1990s, Al-Basatin started to experience a considerable population growth with 
migration from other areas in Cairo and the rest of Egypt, mainly by those wanting to 
buy a piece of agriculture land and build a house.  
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Dar-elsalam (previously part of the old Cairo district) is one of the largest informal 
concentrations in Cairo established over both agricultural and desert land. The 
majority of residents of Dar-elsalam are informal workers and artisans who work in 
the old Islamic Cairo and government employees with a mix of different 
socioeconomic levels. Dar-elsalam is known for being extremely crowded, with many 
market areas, narrow roads, limited infrastructure and insufficient services.  
 
The roads are crowded, noisy and dusty, with huge piles of garbage on both sides, 
with a stinking odour and thousands of flies. One has to pick one's way through the 
crowds of people and the heavy chaotic traffic of buses, cars, bicycles, motorcycles, 
donkey carts and horse-drawn carriages. On both sides there are coffee shops, food 
shops for koshary, fish and meat, and the loud noise of a mix of Quran chanting, TV 
programmes and Egyptian songs both old and modern. People of different ages find 
their way through the chaos, but women are the majority, or so it seems. There is no 
one building pattern in the area. A medium-sized old house of one or two stories is 
found besides a recently-built tall narrow six-storey building. Some houses are too 
old, deteriorated and ugly and others too poor to be called a house: they are no 
more than huts. Along the pavements, shops of different sizes are inserted into the 
ground floors of houses. The shops are run by men or women or both in some cases. 
Handcarts selling fruit and vegetables are pushed by country men who come from 
neighbouring governorates early in the morning and who will leave as soon as they 
are finished. At street sides and corners, women sit on the ground – sometimes with 
their children around them – selling vegetables and fruit, cleaning materials, or 
sweets and snacks for children. Some of those women, especially the fruit and 
vegetable sellers, have had a long journey, while others are from the 
neighbourhood. 
The front doors in the two neighbourhoods are open for most of the day. Most 
conversations take place in front of the houses. Men are usually away from the 
scene during the day and some of them reappear at night in coffee houses, smoking 
shisha and killing time. Women sit most of the time in front of their houses or at the 
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street corners selling their merchandise, chatting and sometimes eating together 
and other times quarrelling.  Bayat (2012) describes it as follows: 
Informal communities, slums and squatter settlements rely greatly on out-
door public space which inhabitants utilize as places of work, sociability, 
entertainment, and recreation. Simply, poor people’s cramped shelters, as in 
Cairo’s Dar-el-Salam neighborhood, for instance, are too small and 
insufficient to accommodate their spatial needs. With no courtyard, no 
adequate rooms, nor any spacious kitchen if there is any at all, the 
inhabitants are compelled to stretch and extend their daily existence onto 
the public out-doors spaces: to the alleyways, streets, open spaces, or roof-
tops. It is in such outdoor places where the poor engage in cultural 
reproduction, in organizing public events—weddings, festivals and funerals. 
Here, out-door spaces serve as indispensable assets in both the economic 
livelihood and social/cultural reproduction of a vast number of urban 
residents (Bayat 2012: 115). 
 
At the time of my research, Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam was being served by 196 
schools: 97 state schools and 99 private. Twenty two of these were secondary 
schools (16 state and 6 private) (MOE 2009). Enrolling in general secondary 
education entailed the parents bearing the cost of private lessons (an average of 
10,000 Egyptian pounds per student per year) for each of the three years of the 
secondary education cycle. With this high cost, the majority of the three secondary 
school students of my research came from families that at least could afford such a 
financial burden. Students from very poor families, as mentioned by three school 
social workers, were no more than 10%.  
 
 
2.5  The state education system in Egypt 
Basic national education in Egypt, consisting of 6 years of primary schooling and 3 
years of preparatory schooling, is compulsory and free. Retention of students in 
state schools has been an educational priority in Egypt. A few specific policies exist 
to encourage the flow and retention of students in the education system. For 
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example, in Egypt, in primary schools, students in grade 1 are automatically 
promoted to grade 2, regardless of how they perform in the final exam. Students in 
other grades of the primary schooling (grades 2-5)29 will be automatically promoted 
to the next grade if they fail twice in the final exam.  
From general preparatory, students’ transition to secondary school can be in one of 
two ways, based on their final year preparatory (grade 9) exam results:  1) those with 
scores above a cut-off point may opt to enter general or technical secondary or 
vocational secondary schools; 2) those with scores below the educational 
authorities' decided cut-off point must join technical / vocational secondary to 
continue their education. The technical / vocational track at secondary level is 
considered socially and educationally inferior to the general track.  
 
There also exist various types of private schools with tuition fees ranging from a few 
hundred to several thousand Egyptian pounds (LE) per year. Private schools’ 
buildings and facilities are in a better condition compared to those of state schools 
and they usually have smaller class sizes. The most popular form of private schooling 
among the wealthy urban middle class is “language schools” which focus on 
language teaching, usually in English or French (Hartmann 2007). Other than the so-
called international schools that offer foreign education (American Diploma, GCSE, 
IGCSE, French Baccalaureate, and German Abitur) all private schools teach the same 
national curriculum that is usually complemented by additional subjects. Private 
school students follow the same national examination system; however, they are 
also required to take tests in some subjects in the required foreign language. 
 
Students intending to join general secondary school must declare their desire to 
enter either the Science or Art stream when they take their basic education exit 
examination at the end of the 9th grade. Within the Art stream, five subjects are 
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 If a student in grade 6 fails the final exam twice, she or he will then automatically be promoted to 
vocational preparatory school. 
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mandatory to study: history, geography, philosophy, psychology and economics, in 
addition to one science subject which the student selects from the scientific stream 
subjects.  Within the Science stream, five subjects are mandatory: chemistry, 
biology, geology, mathematics and physics.  In addition, the student selects one Art 
subject from the Art stream’s subjects. The six subjects studied by students in each 
stream are called the O-Level subjects. They have the option to study an additional 
subject, with the aim of adding a grade to their thanaweya-aama scores, and this 
one is called an A-Level subject.30.  
The thanaweya-aama is the most important exam in the academic life of a student, 
as it serves as a university entrance exam. The score that the student receives on the 
thanaweya-aama is the only determining factor for university and faculty eligibility. 
Prestigious faculties such as medicine, pharmacy and engineering usually require a 
very high score.  As the number of available university places is much lower than the 
number of thanaweya-aama students, competition between such students is fierce, 
particularly with respect to joining the best faculty. The total score for each student 
on the exam is the sum of his/her scores in both the obligatory and optional 
subjects, for both the second and third year of secondary school, excepting national 
studies and religion. While every student needs to receive a pass grade for these two 
subjects, these scores are not included in the total score. 
If a student fails the exam in the first year he/she is eligible to take it, he/she has a 
second chance in the summer of that year to take the exam. If he/she passes the 
exam during the summer, only 50% of the total score achieved on the failed subjects 
is added to the total score. A student also has the option not to sit the exam in the 
first year and to postpone it to the following year. If a student chooses this option, 
then he/she will receive as an exam score the exact mark he/she achieves in the 
exam. Because of this, students who find themselves unprepared for the exam do 
not attend the first year and retain their right to pass the exam in the following year 
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 A-level subjects are selected from a limited list of subjects. Students scoring higher than 5 out of 10 
in such subjects are eligible to add points to their Thanaweya-amma score. 
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(receiving the full marks they achieved) instead of taking a chance on obtaining a 
good score in the first year.  
 
Following the launching of the five-year strategic plan (2007-12)31, the Egyptian 
Education authorities started a country-wide education reform process, with the 
support of a number of international stakeholders, by which all Egyptian schools go 
through an improvement process that leads to a state-required accreditation by a 
newly established educational accreditation authority against the endorsed national 
educational standards. The school improvement processes start by conducting a 
school self-assessment through which the school assesses its own performance 
against the educational national standard indicators.  The results of the school’s self-
assessment should lead to the development and implementation of a school 
improvement plan that aims at addressing the gaps in the school’s performance and 
to capitalise on its strengths.  
 
 
2.6 Research methods 
Taking my first steps into the field work, I was aware that ethnographic methods 
enact a dialectal balance between subjectivity and objectivity (Clifford 1986:13). 
Hence, I recognised that my personal position as a native Egyptian, and my 
experience as someone who has been in close contact with the field of schooling, 
were central to the research process and that I should watch my positionality 
carefully in order to ensure an objective distance and representation of the young 
people as the main informants and of other informants within and outside the 
schools.  
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 In presenting its National Strategic Plan for 2007-2012, the Egyptian state confirmed its 
commitment towards ensuring a modern pre-university education system that “promotes the 
sustainable growth of the economy and consolidates democracy and freedom, as well as a successful 
dialogue and competition with other countries in an era of knowledge-based economies and 
globalization” (MOE 2007: 16 of the Executive Summary).  
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My position starts as being a native Egyptian born into an Egyptian Christian family in 
a small city in Upper Egypt. Except for attending a Franciscan missionary primary 
school, I attended normal Egyptian education until grade 12. My thanaweya-aama 
scores did not allow me to join one of the top colleges. I chose, however, to study 
Education and English, and obtained my first university degree in Education and 
English language. I was employed by the government of Egypt in 1985 as a teacher 
for English as a second language in a middle school in Upper Egypt. From the age of 
sixteen I volunteered with different community, Christian and ecumenical activities 
and organisations serving marginal groups in Upper Egypt. I left my teaching job 
after one year and served at several local developmental and educational 
organisations in Upper Egypt before moving to Cairo (1995) when I started working 
for international organisations. My Masters in Anthropology and Sociology (2003) at 
the American University in Cairo was meant primarily to enable me to learn new 
skills and concepts that might help in my profession in the development field. My 
encounters with contemporary social theory and practice have taken me in a related 
but somewhat different direction, and made me genuinely curious about the nature 
of the work I am involved in as a development practitioner and the ways in which it 
impacts lives.  
 
In 2006 I joined the American Institutes for Research32 (AIR) as a member of the 
Egypt Education Reform Program (ERP) team that is funded by USAID and works in 
partnership with the MOE. The ERP was an integrated educational programme that 
worked to strengthen community participation, professional development, 
decentralisation, standard-based performance, and monitoring and evaluation in 
order to increase the quality of educational outcomes for Basic Education students 
(grades 1 to 9).  As a member of the ERP team, I was involved in the everyday issues 
related to educational policy and practice in Egypt both at the national and school 
level. My exposure to the schooling system in Egypt coincided with the decision to 
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 A behavioural and social science US-based not-for-profit organisation. 
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pursue my doctoral studies as an anthropologist and led me to explore the 
production of youth identities at schools in Egypt. 
 
With the help of a colleague in ERP, I met Mr. Gamal, the director of the Al-Basatin 
and Dar-elsalam iddarra (educational district office) in early October 2009 to explore 
the possibility of conducting my field work in schools located in the two 
neighbourhoods. Mr. Gamal, a 50 year old, was originally a social studies teacher and 
was recently promoted to his management position. He sat in a pleasant small office 
on the second floor of the iddarra building located in the new Maadi neighbourhood 
in southern Cairo and adjacent to Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam. I briefed Mr. Gamal 
about my research and handed him an Arabic translation of a brief about the focus 
of the research. Mr. Gamal, while not showing much interest in my research topic, 
acted very cooperatively due to the good relations he had with the programme and 
my ERP colleagues working with the iddarra. He called one of the key iddarra 
officials to join us to help in nominating schools as locations for my research. We 
eventually selected four secondary schools: a boys’ school, two girls’ schools, and a 
mixed experimental school, as these, according to Mr. Gamal, were representative of 
all the socioeconomic segments in the neighbourhood. Mr. Gamal called his 
secretary and asked her to prepare letters for his signature, one letter for each of the 
four nominated schools. I do not claim that the selection of the schools was done 
rigorously. While all the state schools were suitable insofar as both female and male 
students were represented, I was lucky that the iddarra officials were cooperative 
and allowed me to visit the schools despite the obvious tension they normally have 
about the presence of researchers in schools. Tension about such a presence in 
schools is mainly connected with the official suspicion about the eventual usage of 
the collected data by the researcher. 
 
The next day, I started visiting the nominated schools, accompanied by an official 
from the iddarra, to introduce myself, my research and my research methodology. 
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Mr. Gamal’s advice was that if on my first visit I was accompanied by an official from 
the iddarra, the schools’ principals would be less nervous. I visited both the Nasser 
School for Girls and the Haditha experimental school in one day. Mr. Ahmed (the 
iddarra official) introduced me “as the researcher” and in the meantime as a 
member in the ERP.  Both schools had heard about ERP but never participated in any 
of its activities as ERP did not work with thanaweya-aama schools. I made sure in 
this first visit to schools to stress that I was only in the schools for my research and it 
had nothing to do with my work with ERP. However, I made sure, while explaining 
my research methodology, to propose different schooling activities that I could 
support during my presence in the school if that would be acceptable. Both the 
Nasser School for Girls and the Haditha experimental were welcoming and 
cooperative and I chose both for my research. My first visits to schools and the 
security procedures involved, and particularly the insistence of one of the schools for 
me to obtain a security clearance, drew my attention early on to schooling 
disciplinary practices and how schools were treated by the state as disciplining 
venues through the everyday rituals and practices that I explore in Chapter 3. 
 
Writing field notes and data analysis started as early as my first meeting with the 
iddarra head, during which time I was allowed to go to the schools. After each 
meeting or visit, I went home where I live with my family in New Cairo (the western 
part of Cairo and about one hour's drive to Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam) and turned 
my field notes into typed or handwritten journals.  
 
Around mid-January 2010, I decided to add a third school (for boys), due to the high 
school students’ absenteeism rate in the experimental school. I visited the Moustafa 
Kamel Boys’ School in order to introduce myself.  However, I was informed that the 
questions I was raising through my research were connected with Egypt’s national 
security and that I could not do my research in the school unless I first obtained 
national security clearance for my research. They also confirmed that the district 
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director’s approval was no substitute for the security approval. While continuing my 
research in the other two schools, I worked on obtaining security clearance for my 
research.  
 
I submitted a request to the MOE’s security department which forwarded it to both 
the National Security and the military security authorities. Despite the fact that both 
authorities approved my research, I was told that since I was undertaking my 
research at a foreign university, I should obtain the approval of the Central Agency 
for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). I had to go to the latter and to 
explain that I was not handing out any questionnaires or collecting any statistical 
data. I was finally given a letter informing the MOE’s security office that I did not 
need their approval since I was not collecting any statistical information. I was called 
for an interview in February 2010 with the head of the MOE’s security department 
who issued a letter approving my research. The final letter addressed to the four 
schools confirmed that I was allowed by security authorities to conduct my research 
under the supervision of the school principal, the school security officer and the 
social work supervisor, and that I was not allowed to hand out questionnaires, 
collect statistical data, or be a distraction to the educational processes.  
 
During the first term (October to December 2009) I spent three days every week 
between the Nasser Girls’ School and the experimental school. The high rate of 
student absenteeism, particularly in the experimental school, represented a real 
challenge. It was difficult to stay connected with the same group of students on a 
regular basis and every time I went to one of the schools I saw new faces. In Chapter 
4, I explore the phenomenon of student absenteeism, through which I had learnt the 
extent to which students have given up on secondary school. During that period I 
focused on understanding everyday life within the two schools through classroom 
observation, observation of other schooling norms, participation in teachers’ 
meetings, and focus group discussions with students.  
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The ethnographic approach of Amit-Talai and Wulff (1995) on “how a situated group 
of young people create and circulate ephemeral yet powerful meanings that play a 
significant role in determining their educational experiences” (Demerath 2003:152) 
was a key ethnographic approach to understanding the schooling experience of 
young people in the three secondary schools in Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam.  I was 
attentive, following Amit-Talai (1995), not to become trapped in a simplistic 
romanticisation of young people as being free and safe from the real pressures of 
the adult world, but to acknowledge their diversity and differences in navigating the 
pressures from school, family and economic conditions.  
 
Tension about thanaweya-aama was a common theme from day one of my 
fieldwork. Students were desperate to talk about their struggle with studying, 
private tutoring, and everyday discipline at school. Gradually, some students started 
to develop an interest in talking to me individually, and some teachers started to 
seek my input into some of the activities they were responsible for. However, some 
students were hesitant to be in contact with me and some teachers remained 
suspicious about me and the reason for allowing a stranger into the school and 
granting him the right to be in contact with students.  
 
By December 2009 I became well connected with the schools, particularly the Nasser 
girls’ school. This school, which had recently been accredited by the first national 
educational accreditation authority, wanted to make use of my presence by 
involving me in extra-curricular activities. The leader of the school’s improvement 
team and the psychology specialist approached me to prepare a series of seminars 
on topics of interest to students. Larger events were organised by the school and 
were mostly attended by many students and teachers. Other smaller and more 
frequent events were organised for smaller groups of students. Topics of seminars 
concerned generational tensions, transition from school to work, time management, 
freedom versus norms and traditions, friendship and peer relations, and social 
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responsibility. I was also invited to attend other seminars that were organised by the 
Nasser girls’ school and other schools to which a guest speaker was invited. Such 
events helped me to connect with the students and were a venue for insightful 
discussions and debates. Through what I had learnt during the seminars I facilitated 
and others I was invited to attend, in the 3rd and 4th chapters of this thesis I explore 
students’ views of success, future aspirations, sense of hopelessness, and taghyeer 
(change) that developed as common themes during the seminars and discussions. 
 
During the first few weeks of school ethnography for my fieldwork I mainly focused 
on classroom observation. I went to one of the schools in the morning and was 
directed to attend an identified list of classroom lessons. I sat for hours at the back 
of classrooms observing teachers teaching Arabic language, history, biology and 
English language lessons. With the aim of teachers being to direct all classroom 
teaching to prepare students for exams and with the limited classroom interaction 
between teachers and students and also between myself and students, I soon 
realised that in addition to observing classroom lessons I should focus more on the 
“informal realm” of schooling (Amit-Talai 1995, Winkler 2011) in order to grasp the 
thrust and entirety of the schooling experiences of the young Egyptian.  
Such evolvement in my ethnographic approach happened gradually and was 
influenced by the mutual trust that I had established over time with students, 
teachers and other school staff.  I started to focus more on understanding students’ 
engagement in extracurricular activities, peer relations, student- teacher interaction, 
student networking and everyday actions, and the arena of private tutoring. All 
these informal arenas, despite being not formal schooling, are, however, “in tension 
with” (Winkler 2011: 13) and framed by it. Upon becoming too involved in the 
everyday life of the three secondary schools, I came to realize, given the structural 
conditions of secondary schooling in Egypt (to be discussed in details in Chapters 3 to 
6), that formal schooling under such conditions is likely to shrink, thereby giving 
more “informal realm” schooling space to the young people for “creating and 
sustaining intersubjective relations, and producing value” (Winkler 2011: 13). 
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At first students did not know what to call me or how to perceive my role in the 
school. With the ambiguity about my role and given the age difference, they kept 
calling me Mr. M.  I was keen not to be seen as another teacher and the role I was 
granted by the school administrations was helpful in this regard. I started to be 
asked by the school administrations either to fill the gap caused by an absent 
teacher, or to help in handling the chaotic situation, particularly in the boy’s school, 
by sitting with groups of students and helping to maintain discipline. Every time I was 
asked to do so, I was keen to act informally and with no disciplining authority. I was 
ready with a topic of discussion around one of my research themes which, while it 
was relevant and interesting to students, had never been the sort of discussion 
encouraged by their school teachers. Another role I was granted by the school 
administrations, as explained earlier, was to facilitate group discussions on topics of 
students’ choice. This role provided me with the opportunity to connect with 
individual students who wanted to further explore the topics individually with me. 
Whenever I walked into a class or a student gathering, I reintroduced myself and the 
topic of discussion and students were given the choice to stay or leave. In order to 
ensure informed consent by students, at the end of each informal or an organized 
discussion I left a blank sheet of paper with a volunteer (one of the attending 
students) so that any of the students who might wish to talk further to me 
individually could sign her/his name and indicate the days they would be at the 
school. Upon receiving the names of those interested to talk to me in person, I 
approached them directly and made sure that it was their choice to request to talk 
to me and that they were not pressured to do so. Some of the students, who first 
expressed an interest to talk to me person, later either changed their minds or 
stopped appearing at the school. As time passed, however, relationships were 
gradually established with a number of students.  
 
Mr. Youssef (a biology teacher at the Nasser girls’ school) became very interested in 
my research and helped me to go beyond the school to the local community. We 
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(Youssef and I) developed the idea of holding a camp for students during the mid-
year break, which was an excellent opportunity to connect with students and 
teachers away from the rigid everyday school schedule. After the mid-year break 
during the second term (from mid February 2010) and upon obtaining my security 
clearance, I started to focus on the Moustafa Kamel boys’ school in addition to the 
Nasser girls’ school. Once I had started to spend more time in the Moustafa Kamel 
School and experienced how chaotic the school was, I realised the degree of 
deterioration which schools had reached. I explore in Chapter 4 what I had observed 
of the forms of everyday student opposition to the schooling system, and in Chapter 
6 the unruly tactics they deployed while navigating forms of exclusion. 
 
In order to understand the everyday wider context of young people’s lives, my 
fieldwork went beyond the school boundaries. After several attempts with no 
success, finally during the second term I was able, with Mr. Youssef’s help, to spend 
time in the El-Eman private tutorial centre. Building stronger relations with students 
and teachers within the schools had granted me access to other sites such as coffee 
houses, as well as going on long walks and attending night gatherings with teachers 
and parents. Through spending time at the private tutoring centre, and night 
gatherings at coffee houses, in the 4th chapter I explore the theme of the collapse of 
the Egyptian schooling system and the failure of the education reform which was 
considered an important element in Mubarak’s economic reform. 
 
With the coming of a new Minister for Education and the application of stricter 
measures concerning student absenteeism, a few more students started to attend 
the two schools, and I was able to hold a series of interviews with a number of 
students. Through interviews with Hadia, Noura, Amina and Ahmed, I explore in the 
5th chapter young people's negotiations of their fears of failure and risk of exclusion, 
and in the 6th chapter their sense of ambivalence. In late summer 2010, I spent 
several Ramadan nights in Al-Basatin and Dar Elsalam which were most insightful in 
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relation to the complexity of young people's lives in the informal urban 
neighbourhoods. With the start of the academic year 2010/11, I went for quick visits 
to both schools to see the students and teachers who generously shared with me 
their experiences and aspirations.  
 
I thought I was coming close to the end of my fieldwork. However, with the 25th 
January protests and then the occupation of Tahrir Square, the downfall of Mubarak, 
and the incidents that followed, I went back to my fieldwork. At first, particularly 
when I was in the Square during the 18-day occupation, I had my family with me, and 
it was not very clear whether I was there as a researcher or a protestor. Despite not 
meeting the familiar faces of the young people of the Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam 
schools, there were many other young faces. The day after the removal of Mubarak, 
we all worked together to clean the Square. I created accounts on both Facebook 
and Twitter to stay connected with events. The thanaweya-aama students’ 
Facebook page (“the thanaweya-aama students’ revolution”) and their call for 
protests in front of the MOE acted as a link between my research and Tahrir. I joined 
the Facebook page and followed all the preparations for the protests and joined 
their march from Tahrir to the MOE and spent the day with them. 
 
I kept joining most of the events that followed the downfall of Mubarak in and 
around Tahrir until the bloody clashes of Mohamed Mahmoud Street in November 
2010. I met many new faces from all ages and social strata. I connected with three 
young people: Amro, a thanaweya-aama student; Karim, a student at a private 
secondary vocational school; and Mona, a university student and film maker. I had a 
series of interviews with the three of them, who generously shared with me, as I 
explore in the 7th chapter, their aspirations as well as their experiences and values in 
engaging with the revolution. Both Amro’s and Karim’s narratives as thanaweya-
aama students enriched the themes of young people’s hopelessness and 
ambivalence which I explore in the 5th and 6th chapters. 
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Throughout my fieldwork I was attentive to the fact that my familiarity with the field 
as a native Egyptian and knowledge of the Egyptian education system and Egyptian 
society would be both supportive and challenging at the same time. It was the same 
struggle that all native anthropologists face in entering the field and situating 
themselves in a way that will ensure the proper representation of all informants and 
research circumstances.  The fact of being familiar with schools in Egypt and inside 
bureaucracy was an important factor to keep in mind.  
 
In the following chapter, through exploring the three schools of my research, I look 
closely at the secondary school physical space and the system of discipline, as well as 
the embedded citizenry and Islamic discourses attempted by the state for the 
production of the loyal Muslim citizen.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Re/production of the loyal Muslim citizen 
 
3.1 Introduction 
I arrived at the principal’s office of the Moustafa Kamel School for boys after passing 
through the school gate and signing the visitors’ log. It was a morning in December 
2009, one year before the eruption of the Egyptian revolution actions in January 
2011 that resulted in the downfall of Mubarak’s regime. After greeting the principal 
and another person who happened to be present in the office, I handed the principal 
a letter from the head of the Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam “Iddarra”, introducing me 
as a researcher from one of the universities in the UK. The principal looked sceptical 
while reading the letter. He handed the letter to the other person, who introduced 
himself to me as a history teacher at the school. Upon reading the letter, the history 
teacher started to interrogate me about my research and the reasons why I had 
decided to do my PhD abroad, and whether it was true or false that all the 
information I would learn about during my research would be placed in the hands of 
a foreign university. The teacher’s advice to the principal, based on that quick 
interrogation, was that allowing me into the school would be a matter of “national 
security”, which meant that I would have to go back and seek the approval of the 
national security authorities, otherwise I would not be allowed into the school. The 
history teacher’s statement was an early insight into my field work, that issues and 
information related to schools and schooling in Egypt at that particular time were a 
matter of “national security”. 
In this chapter I explore the Egyptian school space and everyday life during the 30th 
year of the Mubarak regime before its fall in January 2011.  In particular, the chapter 
looks at how the state secondary schools within the Egyptian context were spatially 
and temporally produced by the Egyptian state as “abstract spaces” (Lefebvre 1991) 
functioning as a disciplining system (Foucault 1979) that would attempt to 
re/produce the loyal Muslim citizen for a neoliberal economy within Egypt.  In 
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looking at the secondary school space, therefore, my intention is to understand the 
extent to which the school's physical and social space is a retranslation of the 
claimed invisible reproducing of relationships of power (Bourdieu 1971) within the 
school – or whether perhaps it actually manifests at least in some aspects a different 
set of emerging power relations – and the extent to which it is somehow ambivalent 
(Jeffery et al 2008: 209) in nature. 
I would like to look first at the notion of “national security” that was raised by the 
history teacher in the Moustafa Kamel School. The other two schools had allowed 
me to enter them while knowing that I was working on obtaining a security 
clearance.  However, the boys’ school insisted that I should obtain this before I could 
be allowed into the school. I therefore had to go to the Security Department of the 
Ministry of Education to apply for security clearance. Upon receiving it, I was told 
informally that my application had been sent and cleared by a military authority and 
two national security authorities. A first interpretation of the notion that “issues and 
information about schools are a matter of national security” was that exposing 
information about schools constituted a threat to the country.  
Understanding the notion that “schooling is a matter of national security” should 
take into consideration how the upbringing role of the state’s mass education had 
evolved within the post-colonial state of Egypt, from the Nasserist Egyptian national 
and pan-Arab identity, to Sadat’s state of “science and faith”, to Mubarak’s emphasis 
on the Muslim citizen who is capable of fitting into the state's economic reform 
agenda. The one common theme between the three consecutive political regimes 
related to the schools' upbringing goal was that of preparing the loyal citizen for the 
regimes’ political twin agendas of “religious legitimacy and political authority” 
(Starrett 1998:6). Mubarak’s state of emergency started working towards achieving 
its educational agenda under politically volatile circumstances between the state 
security forces and the Islamist militants. Facing the claims that high schools were 
being used for recruiting members for Islamist militant groups in southern Egypt, 
Baha Eddin33 “introduced the concept of education as a cardinal component of 
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 Minister for Education under Mubarak’s rule from 1991 to 2004. 
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national security, on [a] par with the military” (Herrera 2006: 27). Following the 
introduction of this concept, the government pursued a forceful campaign aimed at 
controlling every element of schooling. Thirty years later the notion of “national 
security” is still remembered and used. Whether this notion is still valid or not 
remains to be explored in the sections that follow in this chapter, and in the 
following chapter. 
 
In this chapter I am specifically looking at the secondary school system of discipline, 
and embedded citizenry and Islamic discourses. The school space and everyday 
practices are discussed on the one hand as the product of a heavy-handed 
authoritarian state, and on the other hand as a means for subordinating young 
people, with the aim of producing citizens for the state’s economic reform. The 
chapter pays attention to the extent to which the school space is particularly 
gendered towards producing the good Muslim young woman. In doing so, I am 
exploring life within state secondary schools in the Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam 
neighbourhoods. I am looking at school and classroom daily practices and rituals, 
students' and teachers' narratives, actions, events, discussions, and chats.  
Three state schools in Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam neighbourhood were the entry 
gates to this research: Moustafa Kamel General Secondary School for boys; Nasser 
General Secondary school for girls; and Al-Haditha (modern) mixed (girls and boys) 
experimental school.  
 
The young people enrolled in the three schools were from families that had received 
some education. They could, however, be the first or the second generation in their 
families to go to secondary school with the ambition of continuing on to higher 
education. Some of the parents had achieved university level education, while the 
majority had reached a secondary vocational education. Most of these families 
either could or were willing to make the sacrifice to pay the cost of general 
secondary education that entails also paying for private tutoring.  
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3.2 Secondary school: the physical space  
The Moustafa Kamel School for Boys was the largest boys’ General Secondary School 
in the area, in the sense of the size of the campus (43 classrooms), serving around 
2,140 registered students, and 147 teachers and administrators. The school was 
formed of several old and new buildings surrounding a wide open space that 
included a football field. I found that the school was always noisy, many classes were 
not really functioning, and many students (mostly 10th grade students) were in the 
playground, on the stairs, and in the corridors all the time, shouting and running. 
Teachers assigned for daily supervision were chasing students to bring them back to 
their classrooms and trying to find solutions for classes without teachers. In many 
cases, I was an easy solution to the problem of an absent teacher. In the middle of 
such a chaotic situation, in fact, standing in for a teacher was the only way for me to 
come into direct contact with students.  
 
The Nasser Secondary Girls’ School was another large school in the neighbourhood, 
consisting of three main buildings (with a ground and 3 upper floors) forming a U 
shape around a large playground. The school included 48 classrooms, over a hundred 
staff, and around 1,600 students. It was divided into sections, each of which was 
dedicated to a particular subject area. Each section included a number of class 
rooms, a teachers' room and relevant facilities for the specific subject, such as 
science labs or a computer lab. In addition to the subject-related sections, there 
were rooms for the library, the education quality team, the social workers, the 
psychology specialists, administration staff, deputies, and the school principal.  
In terms of discipline, I found that the Nasser school was much more disciplined and 
quiet compared to the Moustafa Kamel School. The former was ranked high on the 
Iddarra level and had a good reputation.  
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Figure 4: Nasser 
Girls’ Secondary 
School. Photo of 
one of the main 
buildings of the 
School, taken by 
a student and 
posted on the 
school’s 
Facebook page.  
 
Both the Nasser and Moustafa Kamel schools are located in the middle of the New 
Maadi area, a lower middle class neighbourhood which on one side is close to the Al-
Basatin and Dar-elsalam informal areas, and on the other side is adjacent to the 
luxury Maadi neighbourhood with its villas and towers overlooking the Nile. Students 
living in the Al-Basatin area had to walk for an average of 20 minutes to reach their 
schools. Dar-elsalam students had to use public transport or otherwise walk for 
around an hour. Some students lived in the New Maadi area where the two schools 
are located. 
 
The Al-Haditha experimental school was a large state language school for both girls 
and boys. It included all three educational stages: primary, preparatory and 
secondary, serving a total of 1,650 students. Being different from normal state 
schools, it teaches more advanced English language, while both Maths and Science 
are taught in English, and it requires the students to pay annual fees. It belongs to a 
category of schools called experimental schools, established by the government as 
language schools. It was formed of two big buildings and a large playground located 
on the motorway opposite the new Maadi area. Most of the students enrolled in the 
school were from the educated families of the new Maadi neighbourhoods and a 
small percentage came from the Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam areas. While life in the 
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secondary section of the school was not as chaotic as the Moustafa Kamel School, I 
found that still the teaching and learning processes had mostly been put on hold.  
 
The three schools had many common physical features. All the schools had been 
built on a wide piece of land and consisted of several large buildings surrounding a 
wide courtyard and overlooking the residential area. Recalling the Foucauldian 
notion of the “carceral continuum that constitutes the contemporary disciplined 
society” (Foucault 1979:297), each of the school’s buildings and open spaces were 
surrounded by a high concrete and brick fence and gated by two huge iron gates 
which were guarded. One gate was for students and the other for school staff and 
visitors, with a security checkpoint at the latter. School visitors were required to sign 
in the record book kept at the security checkpoint. They had to record the visitor’s 
name, ID number, telephone number, profession, and the purpose and time of the 
visit.  
Another common feature was the football area – or volley ball court in the case of 
the girls’ school. Students spent their break-time in such sports areas, either playing 
or just enjoying the open space. A few teachers and other school staff could be seen 
in the middle of the crowd during the break, watching the students. In some 
instances, the teachers were taking part with the students in a sport match or joining 
groups of students for a chat.  
It was more common to see male students practising sports than female students. 
Contrary to the state's vision for reforming and modernising education (MOE, 2007), 
female students’ participation in sports, and other activities such as music and 
dancing, was generally surrounded by concerns about consistency with Islamic 
modesty and morality (Herrera 2006, Starrett 1998). Physical education classes for 
girls were mostly turned into other taught subjects, or the girls were mostly sitting in 
the shade in a corner of the playground doing nothing.  
The school’s small mosque was another common place in all schools where some 
teachers and a few students would go for prayer. While the school timetable was not 
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arranged to accommodate the prayer times, nonetheless the school mosque was 
considered to be an important element of the school's physical structure. Both the 
local community and some of the teachers were keen to provide for the needs of the 
school’s mosque, such as carpets, furniture, and regular cleaning. 
The classrooms in all three schools looked almost the same. They were mostly wide 
with large windows on the two side walls, and a blackboard occupying the wall 
facing the students. The wall at the back was usually used to hang some of the 
students’ works. The experimental language school had better furniture, cleaner 
walls and fewer broken windows, and ceiling fans had been installed in the 
classrooms. Due to the scarce resources allocated by the government for school 
maintenance, the wall paint, board paint, windows, lighting and furniture in the 
other two schools were in a poor condition.  
At the Nasser Girls’ School, following the school improvement recommendations in 
relation to applying active learning, the students’ desks were arranged into small 
squares, a U shape, or two rows facing each other. Teachers said that arranging 
furniture in these ways allowed for more interaction between students. Small 
squares allowed students to be divided into smaller groups, while the U shape and 
the facing rows allowed for interaction between all the students instead of just 
following the teacher. When 11th grade students were discussing the rearrangement 
of the classroom, they said: “teachers continue the same way of teaching without 
allowing interaction between us (students). Sitting this way looking at each other 
prevents us from following the teaching and we get very distracted”. In contrast, the 
other two schools were keeping students' desks arranged in normal rows facing the 
blackboard. 
 
The arrangement of the girls’ school into sections or departments allowed female 
students to move from one section to another, according to their daily schedule. 
When the bell rang at the girls’ school announcing the five minutes break between 
two school periods, the school was noisy while most of the students were outside 
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the classrooms, in the corridors and on the stairs, heading towards their next 
destination.  Ten minutes later, after all the students had reached the destination of 
their next class, the school was quiet again. The case was different in the other two 
schools (the boys' one and the experimental mixed school) where the administration 
had decided to keep students in fixed locations, whereby they spent the whole day 
in the same classroom, while teachers from different subjects moved between 
classes. Despite the strict arrangements in the boys’ school, the school was noisy all 
the time regardless of whether it was class time or a break.  
 
3.2.1 Mr. President in the classroom 
The first thing one noticed in all the classrooms in the three schools, above the 
blackboard, was the “iconographic” (Kaplan 2006: 181) representation of a large 
photograph of Mubarak, flanked by the Egyptian flag and the national oath. A 
student commented: “This picture of Mubarak must have been from a photo taken 
30 years ago because he looks very young”. The young man’s observation on 
Mubarak’s photo was not without sarcasm on how the state had wanted to promote 
a youthful image of the old president who had been ruling Egypt for the last 30 
years. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Photo of Mubarak in the classrooms flanked by the Egyptian flag and the 
national oath. 
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The national oath stated:  
I swear to God to be loyal to the Arab Republic of Egypt, and, to the best of 
my ability, to preserve and defend it against every enemy and invader, and to 
be a good model in my ethics and actions. 
Following the 2005 Egyptian presidential elections, the government stamped every 
effort by the state as being part of the elected president’s programme. The 
educational authorities embarked on an ambitious educational reform and a 
national strategic plan (MOE 2007). Creating an accreditation system for Egyptian 
schools against the educational national standards became one of the main reform 
priorities. The first thing one observed upon walking into classrooms of the Nasser 
School was a printed version of the school’s vision and mission that were also hung 
on either side of Mubarak’s picture, the national oath, and the flag. The school 
quality improvement and accreditation processes started with developing the 
school’s vision and mission34. The Nasser’s school vision stated that:  
Nasser School is an educational institution that aims at achieving high quality 
education and preparing a scientifically, behaviourally, and professionally 
advanced generation, capable of being creative, solving problems, and facing 
the challenges of the future through effective community participation in 
following the national educational systems and standards.  
The school mission statement was:  
Nasser School is committed to working through an effective school 
management based on principles of transparency and objectiveness and a 
sustainable professional development for all staff. The school aspires to 
become a cultural, social and sports hub, strengthening its communication 
with society and attracting students by supporting the different activities and 
by the use of modern technology for developing their skills in order for them 
to become good citizens who are capable of facing today’s challenges. 
 
In addition to having the school vision and mission hanging in all the classrooms, 
there were mottos on educational improvement, mixed with religious quotations of 
                                                          
34
 The school vision and mission were main elements required by educational accreditation 
authorities as part of the school improvement processes.  
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Quran verses and “Hadith” (Speeches by the Prophet Mohamed), on the schools 
walls, bulletin boards, and even on the  school fence outside. Educational 
improvement mottos were based on concepts related to community participation, 
the role of the school’s “Board of Trustees”, the role of the teacher, and good 
governance, taken from the Educational National Standards document. Religious 
quotations emphasised the Islamic morals of “upbringing” (tarbeya) related to sex 
segregation, the hijab dressing code for girls, and culturally acceptable behaviour, all 
emphasising the image of the good Muslim citizen. 
 
The Nasser school was among the first group of schools in the Iddarra and the whole 
of the Cairo province that became involved in the government educational reform 
processes of quality improvement and accreditation. The school obtained its 
accreditation certificate in August 2009, indicating that the school had met at least 
75% of the Egyptian Educational National Standards. It was scheduled by the Iddarra 
to apply for accreditation in the year 2008. Both Mostafa Kamel and Al-Haditha were 
scheduled to apply in 2010 (at the time of my field work). As an accredited school 
the Nasser school was expecting monitoring visits any time by accreditation 
authorities. The three schools were struggling to meet the Ministry's expectations 
while facing the challenges of minimal resources to meet basic school needs 
including human resources. The management in the three schools had to involve 
almost all teachers and staff in order to meet the Ministry's expectations. A social 
worker at the Moustafa Kamel School for boys asked me if she could take some 
photos for my interviews and group discussions with students. She explained that 
the photos could be useful for the school improvement file which she was 
responsible for as part of the accreditation process. She explained further that the 
photos and some of my notes could be used as proof that the school provided 
counselling services to students on their future studies and career. Based on this 
incident and other discussions it became clear to me that the school accreditation 
process in many schools was a matter of preparing files and arranging documents 
without being serious about taking action towards real improvement.  
88 
Talking to students at the Nasser school about their school’s vision, mission and 
accreditation, I found that they were aware to a great extent that the whole 
accreditation process was just about completing paper work and files rather than a 
real school improvement. Students made fun of the whole process of state-led 
school improvement, while drawing my attention to dirty walls, broken windows and 
broken furniture. Leila (an 11th grade student) said:  
Don’t believe this. This is nonsense. These are just documents that are far 
from reality. There is no teaching, nor activities in the school. They asked us 
last year about how the school could be improved but they did nothing to turn 
our ideas into actions. Actually, the school this year is even worse than last 
year.  
Asma’a (another 11th grade student) commented:  
Honestly, I don’t care about the school or the school improvement. All I care 
about is to achieve the scores that will get me into the college I want. 
 Another 11th grade student said during the same discussion:  
Since the beginning of this process, those teachers who were keen to teach 
have no time any more after becoming very busy with this thing.  
 
In this section, I have looked at the school space not only as a reproduction medium 
intended by the state, but as an obvious base upon which all schooling activities and 
practices must occur (Molotch 1993:888). More specifically, the architecture design 
of the school building, human densities and locational relations are forces in 
determining what can be done in the space of the school (Molotch 1993:888). The 
school building was designed in the shape of several large buildings, high fences, iron 
gates, and security check points, with an obvious resemblance to the state’s control. 
While the student population of two of the three schools was arranged so as to keep 
the boys and girls separate, young people in each of the schools were a mix of social 
strata, coming from the different areas of the district. In terms of location, none of 
the three schools were built inside or even close to the poor areas where most 
student live. Instead, they were located at the heart of the New Maadi area, which is 
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known for luxury housing, large shopping malls and supermarkets, as well as 
companies working in the businesses of Petroleum and importing and exporting. 
 
 
3.3 Everyday school life: from morning rituals to unoccupied classrooms 
Both curricula and extracurricular practices and activities in the secondary schools 
had manifested students’ subjection to a disciplining nationalist discourse with a 
strong ethical Islamic flavour. In this section I explore elements of curricular and 
extracurricular schooling practices in an attempt to trace “how historically informed 
ideas, identities, and relations are converted into pedagogical practices” (Kaplan 
2006: xvi). 
 
Any normal day in any of the three schools started with the usual morning line 
programme. I observed that students were lined up for their classes in a U shape. 
The biggest group was grade 10, comprising around 60 to 70 % of the registered 
students, while there were a few 11 grade students, and no grade 12 students at all. 
Some students were late, moving slowly and still joining the line. The leader of the 
morning line (normally a PE teacher or a social worker) was holding a microphone 
and shouting at students, asking them to show more discipline to start the morning 
rituals. Some students were standing on the side, preparing to perform the role 
assigned to them. The morning line was normally attended by the school principal, 
deputies and all teachers who would normally stand facing students and watching 
their compliance with the line’s discipline. 
The programme started with the PE teacher leading students to perform their 
morning exercises. In all cases when I attended the morning line in any of the three 
schools, students’ participation in the morning exercises was minimal and was 
always followed by harsh comments by the line leader about how lazy and useless 
they were.  
90 
The morning programme that followed the morning exercises was usually led either 
by an Arabic or a Social Studies teacher. The programme in all schools35 started with 
chanting the Quran, to be followed by a reading of the Hadith. It was a practice that 
went back many years and had become regarded as a non-negotiable issue despite 
the fact that it was not a ministry policy at that time.  A selection of the Quran and 
Hadith passages was decided on by the teacher supervising the morning programme 
and was normally linked with religious, national or social occasions.  
The next part of the programme was the reading of the day’s news, taken from 
newspapers, and mostly about the president, the government, and the Minister of 
Education. The day’s news could be followed by a students’ activity, announcements 
on school planned events, or celebrating an achievement by a teacher, a student or 
by the whole school. The last part of the morning involved chanting the national 
anthem and saluting Egypt’s flag, a process which had to be loud and strong. Again, 
and before marching to classes, saluting the flag was mostly followed by harsh 
comments by the line leader because the salutation of the flag was not as 
enthusiastic and loud as it should have been. 
The morning line programme also addressed issues on school discipline, and 
included instructions and announcements, normally given by the principal or a 
deputy, emphasising the school rules, and code of conduct, and reinforcing the 
school authority. In most cases, these disciplinary announcements turned into 
warnings to those individual students, or groups of students, or classes, who had 
violated the school code of discipline, or announcing penalties for one or more 
students.  
Students’ compliance with the school uniform was one of the most important 
disciplining rules that occupied much attention most of the time particularly during 
the morning programme. Female students were supposed to follow the prescribed 
uniform, which was a blouse of a specified colour, with a skirt or trousers. In 
addition, female students in particular were instructed to appear in the school with 
                                                          
35
 By “all schools”  here I mean all Egyptian schools. 
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modest clothing, meaning that tight clothes and anything else that would attract 
attention, such as jewellery, accessories, and makeup, were not allowed. As for male 
students, they were also required to follow the approved specified shirt or polo 
colour with trousers. In addition, students wore jackets or pullovers in winter. For 
female students, while the veil was not a requirement all Muslim female students 
came to the school veiled. In order to control the potential colours and shapes of 
head scarves, only normal or simple white head scarves were allowed. However, 
despite the uniform rules imposed by the schools, many students contrived to 
circumvent these rules and to be in school without exactly abiding by the acceptable 
shapes and colours. Many girls would show up in the school in tight clothes, wearing 
jeans, accessories and make up, and in numerous fashions of white head scarves. 
Most male students came to the school in jeans and t-shirts. 
All students had to arrive on time for the morning programme. Those who were late 
were normally kept standing by the school gate until the morning programme was 
over, after which the principle or the deputy could decide on how to deal with them. 
In most cases, late students were warned and told that they should arrive on time 
for the line, and students normally made the excuse that they lived far away from 
the school and that the traffic was bad. 
The school’s morning line programme constituted its general assembly where all the 
students and teachers had to be present. The programme was intended and planned 
every day to enforce discipline. Both nationalist and Islamic discourses were strongly 
present side by side in the morning line.  
 
Leaving the morning rituals and looking at life inside the classrooms, the first thing 
one would observe was that classes were attended by few students. Grade 11 
students’ attendance was mostly around 15% to 20% and teachers usually combined 
students from several classes together.  
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Figure 6: A classroom at the experimental school. Photo by MF on 11 December 2009 
 
The class normally started with the teacher greeting the students with “asalam 
alikom” (peace be upon you) and the students would reply “Wa alykom El-Salam wa 
rahmet allah wa barakato” (peace be upon you too and God’s mercy and blessings). 
Depending on the relations between the teacher and the particular group of 
students in the class, there could be a few exchanges with individual students. The 
beginning of each class was always interrupted by the administrator or another 
teacher coming in and checking on students’ attendance through an attendance 
sheet that had to be signed by the teacher. The teachers’ readiness and motivation 
for teaching was always affected by the fact that students were absent and that 
most of the attending group of students were a combination of students from 
different classes.  
Few students were ready and motivated to be engaged with the teacher. Most 11th 
grade students in the three schools I have discussed with the phenomenon of the 
private tutoring always said that the school’s lesson schedule was always far behind 
that of the private lessons, due to the fact that the private tutoring usually started 
around two months before the school year. In the classes I visited, the teacher was 
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normally standing in front of the students and using the black board. Students were 
either sitting in their groups or in rows listening to the teacher while following what 
was being explained in the text book or taking notes of what was being explained 
and/or written on the board. Teaching was done through lecturing by the teacher 
with little student participation and with an emphasis on preparing for exams by 
alerting students to relevant exam questions.  
 
 
3.4 The nationalist discourses of “belonging” and “loyalty” 
During one of my visits to the Nasser Girls’ School, the group of students I was 
supposed to meet were not in the classroom. When I went to the administration 
building to ask about them, I was told that they were at the library for a lecture on 
“belonging” by a university professor and that I was allowed to attend if I wished to. I 
walked into the library, which was filled with students, teachers and some parents 
(members of the school board). The lecturer started by saying that she was not really 
going to give a lecture but that rather she wanted to have a discussion about 
students understanding of the meaning of “belonging”.  The students at first were 
totally silent and reluctant to talk. The lecturer had to address the question to 
individual students, asking for their opinions. The students’ answers came in a few 
words like: “belonging is about belonging to our country”, “loving the homeland”, 
“defending the country against enemies”, “not accepting any things against the 
national pride”. One student asked: “Is disrespecting the president considered 
against belonging? I am asking because some of us criticise the president and ask 
why he does not step down”. Another student said: “We have to respect the 
president, otherwise we could be sent to prison”. Students continued discussing 
whether criticising the president was against belonging or not, while the lecturer and 
teachers were looking nervous and not feeling comfortable about how the 
discussion was progressing. The lecturer tried to change the subject by asking about 
the difference between “belonging” and “loyalty” and whether they have the same 
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meaning. A student said: “We become loyal to the country and we do our best to 
make it a better place”. Students continued their contributions by saying that 
belonging and loyalty is about improving the country, building factories, creating 
jobs to counteract unemployment. The discussion went back again to the issue of 
the president when a student said: “Cursing the president or wishing that he would 
die is not enough and won’t solve our problems. There are lots of bad issues that 
require solutions. Feeling sorry for ourselves is not enough. We've got to do 
something”. The lecturer commented on all the students’ contributions, and 
concluded by advising students that “in order to make your voice heard, you should 
use the legitimate channels. My advice is to look for a local NGO where you live and 
become a member. Through the NGO you fulfil many of the great ideas you have 
mentioned today”. She added: “Be optimistic, please, otherwise you can’t do 
anything”. The head of the school board thanked the lecturer and decided to add 
some comments and closing remarks:  
If you decided to join a local NGO, check first on its goals and the nature of its 
activities, and the people in charge. Of course you don’t want to get involved 
with an NGO with bad intentions (referring to Islamist NGOs) and find 
yourself arrested.  
He added:  
 It’s very important to stick to ethics and religion. Taghyeer (change) starts 
from the self before demanding changes. It’s not your role to judge anyone. 
Those in charge are acting in a certain way because they see and know things 
that we don’t know. They do what they can do. God will not judge us or them 
on results. God will certainly judge human beings on the effort regardless of 
the result. This is why you should fulfil your own responsibilities and ask 
yourselves about how you make use of your time, how you treat your 
teachers, and so on. 
 
The school management realised that the school’s morning daily dose of saluting the 
flag and chanting the national anthem was not enough to reinforce nationalist 
discourses of “loyalty”, “belonging”, etc. One of the well-known approaches to 
reinforcing such discourse was to host a speaker from time to time who could 
address relevant topics with students. The notion of “belonging” was one of the 
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most important and famous topics for such events. Through such actions the state 
continued to use the school and education at large as a significant utility in trying to 
control younger generations. Surprisingly, the lecture that was planned to reinforce 
notions of belonging and loyalty was turned into a debate between students as to 
whether criticising the president was against belonging and loyalty or not. The 
unexpected discussions around criticising the president triggered a hint on the 
meaning of taghyeer (change) by the head of the school board in his closing remarks. 
That was the first instance during my field work when the notion of taghyeer was 
brought up in public, and in several instances this was done by young people (as will 
be discussed later in this thesis). 
 
 
3.5 The Islamic discourse within schools 
As explored in detail in the previous chapter, Egypt on the one hand started from the 
late 1980s to experience a forceful trend towards Islamic revival (elsahwa al 
eslamia,) which was claimed to be a reaction against the belief that religiosity and 
Islamic knowledge had become inferior in everyday practice in favour of 
modernisation and secularisation. On the other hand, the state under Mubarak's rule 
adopted a strong official Islamic discourse through the official media channels, 
mosques under the control of the state, and most importantly, schools.  
Kaplan’s (2006) study of schools in Yayla (Turkey) has looked at the Turkish national 
education system following the 1980 coup. Kaplan asserts that the education system 
“forged powerful emotional bonds between the military institution and the civilian 
population: the curriculum simultaneously instilled the idea that law-abiding citizens 
should dedicate their lives to army and nation” (Kaplan 2006:209).  With such 
compelling nationalist discourse, Kaplan emphasizes that the Turkish generals’ 
“ambiguous flirtation with adherents of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis not only has 
resulted in Islamizing the curriculum but also has ironically helped politicize their 
own corporate identity and ideas” (Kaplan 2006:209-210). 
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Egyptian students were also subjected to a powerful official Islamic discourse inside 
the school.  Quran verses were hung on the school walls, inside classrooms, and on 
walls of private tutorial centres. A considerable part of the morning line was spent 
on religion and piety ethics. In addition to religious education, which is a mandatory 
subject for all students, considerable portions of the secondary school’s Arabic 
language and social studies curricula had focused on the official view of Islam and 
Islamic history. Most teachers, both in schools and in private lessons, were adopting 
a religious discourse on the prominence of Islam in all aspects of life.  All female 
students at the Nasser and Al-Haditha schools, as well as teachers and other staff in 
the three schools, were veiled except for very few, who were mostly non-Muslims.  
Starrett (1998) has described the state’s official school-based Islamic discourse as 
the “functionalisation” of religion, by which religion becomes packaged and 
delivered to the public. Starrett argues that the state’s attempt to control religious 
revivalism through religious studies and the official religious discourse within schools 
did not work, but rather it created public discontent and criticism of the state, and in 
the meantime it has worked as a point of departure for further exploration of 
religious resources, particularly those away from the state’s control. 
I was not deliberately warned against talking to students about religion. However, 
there were many hints by teachers and administrators that it would be better to stay 
away from talking about religious issues. I intentionally did not ask to join religious 
education classes and avoided answering curious questions about my religion. 
Despite the restrictions on talking about religion, however, it was not difficult at all 
to observe such a strong discourse through the religious signs and connotations that 
permeated the school culture. In some instances, talking about religion was 
unavoidable. In this section I explore the religious discourse within the school as 
manifested in daily practices, classroom teaching, and extracurricular activities. 
First: in looking at the schools’ everyday practices, the three schools dealt with the 
Islamic part of the morning line programme differently. While the Nasser (girls) and 
El-haditha (mixed experimental) schools used a moderate tone, the Moustafa Kamel 
(boys) school usually had a very loud and long religious programme that included a 
97 
long Quran chanting by a teacher, a long Hadith by a student, and a long and loud 
religious speech by an Arabic teacher that was followed sometimes by another 
speech by the principal. Speeches mostly addressed notions related to Islamic 
superiority, highlighting Islam’s main teachings, and confirming the very strong 
Islamist identity of the school. All three schools paid special attention to all Islamic 
religious occasions and celebrations, and even considered them much more 
important than any other educational considerations.  
All forms of the speeches within the school, whether formal or informal, and inside 
or outside the classroom, included repeated elements of religious connotations 
about God (Allah) and /or the Prophet Mohamed. Teachers and students used such 
elements as an integral part of their speech. Expressions like “be-ism allah elrhaman 
elrahim” (in the Name of God the Merciful), “asalam alikom” (Peace be upon you), 
“wnabi” (for the Prophet's sake), “wallahi elazim” (I swear to God the Almighty), 
“Insha allah” and “b-izn allah” (God willing), “barak allah fek/feke” (God bless you), 
“be-ism allah mashallah” (thank God), and many other expressions were used 
spontaneously as part of the normal speech and communications. In addressing 
students, some teachers repeatedly used Quran verses and Hadith quotations.  
Second, in looking at the official Islamic discourse embedded in the secondary school 
curriculum, I observed a history class in which the teacher spoke about the 18th 
century French invasion of Cairo, as part of the 11th grade history curriculum on the 
Islamic rule of Egypt. The teacher compared the French invasion of Cairo to what she 
called the recent American invasion of Bagdad: 
Napoleon broke into the Al-Azhar mosque in Cairo on horseback while at the 
same time convincing Egyptians about how much respect he had for Islam 
and Muslims. Western colonisation never had respect for Islam and Muslims. 
We have a recent example as proof, which is the American invasion of 
Baghdad during which American soldiers broke into the mosques and houses 
of Iraqi Muslims, while at the same time George Bush was telling the world 
that USA respected Islam and was only rescuing Iraq from Saddam Hussein.  
The example given by the history teacher and the way in which history teachers 
taught the section on the “Crusades” emphasised the discourse that Islam had been 
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and still was subjected to attack by the West and others. It is a discourse that was 
used in conjunction with the discourses of superiority of Islam, and the inevitability 
of freeing and tatheer (cleanse) the Palestine and other Arab/Islamic territories of 
the western occupation / influence. The Arabic novel “wa Islamaah”, which was part 
of the 11th grade Arabic language curriculum, dealt with the Islamic era under the 
Mamluks period and addressed the relations between “Islam” and others along the 
same line of discourse.  The main elements that Arabic teachers dealt with in the 
classes I observed revolved around the notion that Muslims should not fight each 
other, but unite together to defend the Umma (Muslim community or people) 
against its enemies.  
The notions of Islam versus others and Muslims uniting against the enemies of the 
Umma, need to be examined against the notions of loyalty and belonging that were 
discussed in the seminar. The two discussions were reflecting the polarisation that 
existed within Egyptian society, between Egypt as the homeland for all Egyptians 
versus Egypt that is considered a small part of a more global concept of the Islamic 
Umma. 
Third, in looking at extracurricular activities, a camp was held by the Nasser girls’ 
school during the mid-year break and was attended by around 35 students. The idea 
of the camp was initiated by a small group of teachers who were eager to see the 
school doing better. The meetings to prepare for the camp witnessed tensions 
between the different competing agendas of different groups within the school. The 
initiators of the idea of the camp wanted it to be a new start to develop good 
relations between the school and its students. The principal and the school 
administration were keen to use it as a show case to prove to the Iddarra and other 
schools that it was the best school. Their main focus was on preparing attractive 
posters and banners and having a big show at the end of the camp, and to dedicating 
all the camp activities to prepare for this show, to which Iddarra officials and 
community leaders were invited. A third group wanted to use the camp to stress 
religious and ethical principles and to address issues related to what it meant to be a 
good Muslim young woman (moltazima). The camp ended up as a mixture of the 
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three agendas, with more focus on having the big show at the end. Ms. Soad’s 
position during the preparations for the camp was a good example of the school’s 
Islamist discourse. Ms. Soad, who was a member of the committee to prepare for 
the camp, stressed the importance of adding a morning session to the camp’s daily 
schedule. She said: 
A camp like this should put a big emphasis on religious and ethical principles 
and address issues related to what it means to be a good Muslim young 
woman (moltazima). 
Ms. Soad (a senior Arabic teacher) was regarded as a committed teacher and as 
someone who was concerned about the school’s role in ensuring religious ethics 
were taught, and that girls should learn at the school moralities of the good Muslim 
woman. Ms. Soad liked to talk to girls about their life and she preached on pious 
ethics in the class. She told me about an incident while still shocked because of the 
female students’ perspective on relationships:  
It was the month of Ramadan during the last school year when a student 
asked me in front of the whole class if it’s religiously acceptable to talk to her 
boyfriend while fasting or it’s better to wait until after the Iftar (the meal to 
break fasting). Of course the girl meant to ask if talking to her boyfriend 
might spoil her fasting. I didn’t believe that I had heard the question and 
asked the whole class: girls, do you really have boyfriends?” Some of them 
shockingly answered: “Oh, that started to happen long ago”. It’s a shame, 
thank God my daughter isn’t like that. Our generation was raised at school 
and home on following pious commitments. I never talked to a man until I 
was already at college. Even at college, talking to male colleagues was very 
limited and never went beyond issues around studying. Friendship between 
males and females at this age should be controlled. I have no problem at all if 
girls get married at the age of 18.  
Ms. Soad found a considerable contradiction in the student’s question. For her, as a 
committed pious person, being in a romantic relationship contradicted being a good 
Muslim and the pious spirit of the holy month.  
I also attended a seminar which the girls’ school arranged for parents and teachers 
of grade 10 students with a psychologist on how parents could handle their 
adolescent young people and problems of adolescence from an Islamic point of view. 
The speaker presented herself as an educator, a psychology expert, a chairman of an 
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NGO in the neighbourhood, and a mother of a student in the school.  The attendees 
were mostly mothers from the neighbourhood and teachers. The discussions mostly 
revolved around participants' complaints that young people argued and wanted to 
discuss everything and to have a say about everything and did not want to give up. 
The speaker narrated a case study that turned out to be the main topic of discussion 
about a high school female student who was regarded by her teachers as an 
excellent student. The young woman had fallen in love with a young man whom she 
met online in one of the chat rooms:  
She told her mother of her decision to marry her virtual boyfriend. As you all 
know, this is a disaster and a scandal for the girl’s family. What could be 
worse than the daughter loving a man whom she met online in a chat room? 
The mother was advised first to keep the father away from the whole matter 
in order to avoid any complications. Of course, as you all know, complications 
happen when the family acts in such cases with aggression such as physical 
punishment, withdrawing the girl from the school and rushing into an 
arranged marriage in order to rescue the family reputation. Mothers should 
carefully watch what their young people do on the internet and away from 
the family and should listen to them. If you don’t listen to them and jump into 
blaming and cursing, they will stop talking to you and you will never know the 
troubles they get themselves into. Our old Islamic history and the first Muslim 
mothers provide many examples on how early Muslim parents handled their 
children through listening and dialogue. 
One cannot tell if the case narrated by the speaker during the seminar was a true 
story or made up as an extreme example to horrify both teachers and parents into 
applying stricter controls on young people's mixed socialisation. Whether true or 
made up, telling such a story during a school seminar on "problems of adolescence" 
confirms the use of the Islamic discourse within the school in regulating young 
people’s sexuality. 
 
In this second section of this chapter I have tried to sketch an image of everyday life 
in the Egyptian state secondary school. The image I have described, while tried to 
complement the image described in the first section of this chapter on the schools’ 
physical space, has focused mainly on embedded discourses in both the curricular 
and extracurricular schooling practices. Despite what was claimed by the State (MOE 
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2007) concerning the role of the school in preparing a generation that can fit into the 
expectations of the state’s economic reform, the everyday school practices had paid 
more attention to the notions of discipline, religious commitment, appropriate 
behaviour, and loyalty and belonging to the country or the Islamic Umma.  
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The physical space of the three schools of the Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam iddarra 
privileged certain kinds of discourses connected with specific nationalist and 
religious meanings aimed at reproducing the loyal Muslim citizen. Despite the 
amount of jargon included in the educational reform’s vision, mission, and strategies 
for preparing future generations that can contribute to Egypt’s project of 
modernisation (MOE 2007), the three schools’ physical spaces attempted to support 
the state’s reproduction project and deterred the students from their goals (Lefebvre 
1991). Moreover, the physical space and everyday life in the three schools explored 
in this chapter emerged to suggest that schools were resources of ambivalence and 
contradiction. Walls around the school buildings carried banners and other media 
propagating the educational reform discourses of the effective school that would 
ultimately contribute to achieving sustainable economic growth and democracy. 
However the schools’ physical arrangements, everyday disciplinarian discourses and 
forms of fragility (to be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5) had come to contradict 
the propagated reform discourses. Students were not interested in engaging in 
school activities and were not really trusting schools' improvement efforts. Female 
students in particular were subjected to schooling disciplinary hegemony which 
controlled their existence in their school’s public space and their participation in 
activities that would be seen as contradictory to modesty. 
I maintain that the physical details and symbols in public spaces in schools only 
supported the state’s official authoritative discourse. School spaces were not a 
retranslation of all the invisible relations of power; however, they reflected the 
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challenges facing the schooling system and the political regime at large. Following 
Kaplan’s attempt to “trace how historically informed ideas, identities, and relations 
are converted into pedagogical practices” (Kaplan 2006:xvi), life in the three public 
secondary schools was a mere reflection of the fragile and ambivalent Egyptian 
political situation after 60 years since the 1952 coup and after 30 years of Mubarak’s 
regime. The schooling nationalist discourse manifested in a physical disciplining 
hegemony, different visual symbols and morning daily rituals was combined with an 
official Islamic view and challenged by a powerfully growing Islamist discourse.  
Realising the challenges facing the schooling system, the government was striving for 
reform. However, it was a reform that had the stamp of the same system of 
centralised authority (MOE 2007, Herrera 2006, Naguib 2006), trying to lead reform 
from above and ignoring local realities. Such reform efforts were reduced at the 
school level into written statements hung around the schools’ buildings and a 
useless rearrangement of desks claiming to promote “active learning” with no real 
improvement.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Cracks in the “national security”:  when schooling fails 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chatting with a small group of 11th grade students in the Moustafa Kamel Boys’ 
School, Ahmed (a student) said: “our school is totally out of control.” He continued: 
“Look from the window and you will see students climbing the school fence getting 
into or escaping from the school in the middle of the day.” I looked from the window 
and there were approximately ten to fifteen students jumping over the school fence. 
Watching the scene of the students jumping over the school fence, I recalled both 
the early discussion with the Moustafa Kamel School’s management on the notion of 
“national security”, and the launching events of the five-year strategic plan of the 
Egyptian Ministry of Education in June 2007. The mission statement of the Egyptian 
state schooling system according to the five-year plan was: 
 to foster equal opportunities for all Egyptian students to realize quality 
education that empowers them to become creative life-long learners who are 
tolerant critical thinkers with strong values and a wide range of skills for 
active citizenship and dynamic participation in an ever-changing global 
society.  
Despite the progressive schooling mission statement of 2007, I argue in this chapter 
that the Egyptian schooling system after thirty years under Mubarak’s rule is not 
qualified either to play its intended role towards maintaining “national security” for 
the Egyptian state, or to fulfil the state’s agenda of preparing young Egyptians for 
supporting the state’s measures for economic reform. 
This chapter looks at the fragility (Fuller 1991) of the schooling system from four 
viewpoints. First: with a highly hierarchal and authoritative education system and at 
the same time less investment on the state’s side, schools and teachers are out of 
order and there is a widening gap between the schooling system itself and the 
teachers. Second: the students’ everyday tactics of chaotic behaviour and opposition 
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are creating cracks in the old collapsing body of the schooling system. Third: 
students’ absenteeism is the way through which they voice their disappointment 
with the schooling system and contribute to the commodification of education. 
Fourth: tutorial classes on the one hand were flourishing as an alternative to the 
collapsing system; however, on the other hand they manifested a highly 
commercialised education system through which teachers were selling their services 
and students had become customers in the education market.  
In exploring the above-mentioned viewpoints, I continue in this chapter the school 
ethnography through which I became involved in the everyday life of the three 
schools. In the first section I will look at teachers and school staff negotiations in the 
school system to which they themselves are the key to its goals being achieved. In 
the second section I will explore the students’ reactions to the everyday school 
discipline. In the third section I will explore life in a private tutoring centre. 
 
 
4.2 Hierarchies of discipline: the state, the teachers and the students 
A new Minister for Education was appointed in January 2010 at the end of the first 
term of the school year. The next day, everyone in the schools was talking about it, 
given what they knew about the new minister’s leadership style in his previous 
responsibility as a president of one of the state universities. Very shortly after his 
appointment, the new minister visited a middle school in Helwan district (to the 
south of the Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam district) without any previous notification. 
The minister’s visit was accompanied by many journalists and was fully covered by 
the mass media. During his visit, the minister punished almost everyone in the 
school and humiliated in public the school administration and teachers. The next day 
almost all newspapers and many TV programmes had the minister’s visit at the top 
of their agendas. The minister announced that he would continue these visits to 
schools in order, as he said to the newspapers, “to ensure school discipline”. Very 
soon, the newspapers were announcing that staff and teachers at that school were 
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objecting to the way they were treated by the minister in front of the national 
media, and that they were threatening to go on strike. The three schools were 
terrified, like all the other schools.  The teaching and non-teaching staff were 
expecting a visit at any moment. These developments contributed to a more tense 
school environment.  Mr. Abdel Aziz, a senior Social Studies teacher, told me that 
“the new minister is more of a policeman than an educator”. He added that “what 
the minister did during that school visit was unethical and it means that the guy 
doesn’t understand what his role is as a minister for education”. 
School principals and deputies were mostly MOE staff in their last few years in 
service before retirement. The three principals of the three schools I worked with 
were about to retire and had only been promoted recently to their position as school 
principals. School principals report directly to the head of the Iddarra (the district 
level Educational office). School principals worked in a very centralised management 
system where many decisions about their schools were made either at central MOE, 
the governorate (province) level, or the district level. With all the government’s 
recent efforts towards decentralisation, principals were still running schools based 
on orders coming from above. For example: at the time of the field work of this 
research, principals were not involved in making decisions about hiring teachers or 
other staff for their schools. Despite the very small financial resources left for 
principals for the day to day needs of the school, they had to seek approvals from 
the district office for every penny they needed to spend. A considerable portion of 
the everyday life of schools was dedicated to receiving visits from officials and 
inspecting committees from different levels of the educational authorities. District 
and province level subject area supervisors visited teachers and carried out 
classrooms observations as a matter of performance appraisal. Other committees 
and individuals did school visits to monitor financial issues, administration issues, 
accreditation processes, etc. Mr. Ramadan, the Haditha school principal, said: “My 
job is mostly about pleasing someone above, rather than making this school a better 
place for learning”. Ms. Zeinab (the Nasser girls’ school principal) said: “I do not want 
problems and hope that the last few years of my service before retirement go 
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peacefully”. Whenever a high ranking committee was visiting the school, everything 
in the school was dedicated to pleasing the visitors. The school would turn into a 
showcase to convince the visitors that it was the best school ever. In a discussion 
with a group of teachers, Moustafa (a Maths teacher and one of the cadres recently 
trained on school reform processes) said: “I was chosen several times as a principal 
and I refused”. He added: “The principal's job is a humiliating one. I’d rather be a 
teacher. The principal's job is about following orders with no power or support at all.” 
 
Teachers within the Egyptian education system are poorly paid. The government had 
made several attempts to improve teachers’ salaries; however, such attempts had 
not yet materialised in actual improvement. Issues related to teachers’ income, 
promotions, certification, absenteeism and similar concerns were part of everyday 
life in a school. The situation of an unrewarding job with a highly authoritative and 
oppressive system created in the three schools (similar to other schools) a general 
attitude between teachers of resentment and being disillusioned with the whole 
system. Some teachers found a solution for their economic hardship through 
becoming private tutors (which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter).  
 
One morning, I was waiting at the social work office at the Moustafa Kamel Boys’ 
School with three social workers: one male (Mr. Hussein), and two females (Ms. Aida 
and Ms. Awatef). A 10th grade student was caught jumping over the school fence 
because he was late and was supposed to sit for an exam. Hussein and another 
teacher started to deal with the student. They took his bag and emptied its contents 
on a desk. They were looking for some specific items, perhaps cigarettes or drugs. 
When they did not find what they were looking for in the bag, they started to search 
his pockets. They took his mobile phone, a cigarette lighter, and his wallet. They had 
to hit the student a couple of times in order to get what they were looking for. 
Hussein opened the mobile phone and started exploring its contents and making 
jokes, while the other teacher was searching the student’s wallet and counting the 
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large amount of money. The student had to explain that he had received the money 
from his father just that morning in order to pay for the private tutoring class after 
the school day. They kept the mobile phone and the cigarette lighter, and allowed 
him to join his class.  
This was a situation where two members of staff (a social worker and a teacher) 
practised a disciplining role with the student through humiliation. It was a 
disciplining image of the school that made it very close to the brutal image inside an 
Egyptian police station which was one of the main factors that triggered the young 
people's uprising on 25th January 2011.  
 
Another situation occurred when I was leaving one of the messy classes in the 
Moustafa Kamel School to move to another class. I had met the two teachers who 
were assigned by the school management to maintain discipline on the third floor of 
the building where the class was located. The two teachers who were supposed to 
lead me to the next class visit commented as follows:  
Teacher (1): Oh, you are the one who is doing research in the school. 
MF: Yes, that's me. 
Teacher (1): Are you really doing research about those losers? (He was 
referring to the students). 
MF: (silence). 
Teacher (2): Maybe he is only interested in those losers in particular. 
MF: (silence again). 
 
Shortly after starting my field work, “Youssef” became my main contact person in 
Nasser girls’ secondary school. Youssef was a biology teacher, the head of the school 
improvement committee on student involvement, and a private tutor for biology in 
after-school hours. I first met Youssef on my second visit to the Nasser school, based 
on his request to see how I could provide some help to the committee he was 
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heading. Youssef was in his late thirties, and originally from a village in Upper Egypt. 
He graduated from the Faculty of Education, in the biology department. He left his 
village and moved to Cairo (Al-Basatin neighbourhood) where he lived with his 
family. Youssef presented himself as one of those teachers who wanted the school 
to be a better learning place for younger generations and aspired to play a role in 
shaping the young people as good Muslim Egyptian citizens. Youssef was one of the 
initiators of the mid-year vacation camp (which is discussed in more detail in the 
previous chapter). He admitted that he could not afford the needs of his family 
without the money he was making as a private tutor. In the meantime, he was a 
committed teacher in the classroom and the students were engaged and seemed to 
enjoy having him as their biology teacher. Youssef had good relations with everyone 
in the school from students to teachers, administrators and workers. He was joined 
in his efforts by a group of teachers and staff such as Ms. Salma, the psychology 
specialist; Mr. Sherif, the history teacher; Mr. Salah, the Maths teacher; Mr. Medhat, 
the Social Studies teacher; and Ms. Samiha, the social worker.  
 
Groups of male teachers and administrators usually gathered at night at the coffee 
house especially in the month of Ramadan when the season of private tutoring was 
not very busy yet. Every time I joined one of these gatherings it was clear how 
important such gatherings were for them as a venue for peer solidarity, connectivity, 
and information exchange. Such gatherings also attracted senior school and iddarra 
officials such as principals, supervisors, and unit heads. Most of the chats revolved 
around work challenges, trying to find a chance to transfer to a better school or 
obtaining some benefits. Coffee house gatherings were venues for talking about 
issues that could not be addressed freely in schools and offices in the morning. These 
were the behind the scene issues for assigning senior staff, demoting or transferring 
problematic staff, and many other issues. Senior officials used these gatherings to 
their benefit through addressing some sensitive issues with other officials and paving 
the road for decisions and actions in their interest.  
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Teachers in state schools were assigned to act in a way that reproduced the 
authoritative and disciplining state. The question here is whether such reproductive 
attempts by the school worked or not. Contrary to what one might officially hear in 
the morning at schools about all the enthusiasm for the school improvement policies 
and processes, all the educational participants in the coffee houses admitted that 
most of such efforts were only on paper. Most teachers and other staff, described by 
the classical Foucauldian (1979) analysis as “technicians of behaviour” and 
“engineers of conduct” (Foucault 1979: 294), spoke of the huge widening gap and 
the growing distrust between themselves and the system. Over the past decades, 
teachers’ conceptions of schooling and their role within the institution of the school 
had been through considerable changes. Such changes, impacted by socioeconomic 
factors affecting teachers’ livelihoods and a much centralised authoritative 
educational system, had disqualified teachers from assuming the role they were 
assigned to play through which the student as an “individual subject is a reality 
fabricated by ... discipline” (Foucault 1979:194).  
 
 
4.3 Students’ tactics and opposition to everyday school discipline 
Egyptian secondary school students, being subjected to school discipline and 
discourses, became involved in the everyday practices of chaotic behaviour and 
opposition. While students’ chaotic practices could not be argued as clear acts of 
“resistance”, nevertheless I argue they have caused cracks in the structure of the 
schooling system. Following Abu-Lughod (1990), who argues that we should respect 
everyday acts of resistance (Abu-Lughod 1990: 53), learning about everyday 
oppositional practices allows for understanding the complex and ever-changing 
structure of schooling power and how it works.  In this section I explore examples of 
the schooling environment with the intention of looking at everyday chaotic and 
oppositional practices.  
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Walking into the Moustafa Kamel School for boys was like walking into a battle field.  
When I finally entered the school after obtaining the security clearance, I realised 
that most probably it was not a matter of security at all. They were trying their best 
not to allow a stranger to walk into such a messy situation. After I had obtained my 
security clearance, the principal, while not really welcoming my presence in the 
school, asked Mr. Hussein (one of the social workers) to introduce me to a group of 
students. Mr. Hussein was the youngest social worker, a short but well-built sporty 
young man who was delegated by the school principals to handle discipline issues. 
He suggested that I meet a group of 11th grade students. Climbing up the stairs to 
the third floor, he was shouting and chasing students who were still outside their 
classes. Passing by the school’s large building on my way to where I was to meet the 
group of students, I saw that many classes were not functioning and the few 
students in those classes were extremely noisy. Before walking to the classroom, Mr. 
Hussein told me that this class was better than other classes and that they would not 
waste my time, but that if anything happened I should call him immediately. An 
Arabic teacher was working with the few students in the class as a replacement for 
another teacher who had not shown up. Mr. Hussein introduced me to the Arabic 
teacher and told him that he could leave the class with me. The Arabic teacher left 
the class and Mr. Hussein introduced me to the students: 
Everyone, stand up (all students stood up while the class was still noisy).  
Listen to me (in a sharp loud voice):  Mr. MF is a guest at the school. He will 
spend some time with you. Try to benefit from him. I am sure that you will not 
embarrass me by misbehaving.  
This particular group of students responded positively to my presence, and I was 
able to have a reasonable discussion with them. However, this was not the case with 
a 10th grade class that I joined the following day at the same school, when I met the 
“Al Kofar” (non-believers) group, and this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
6 of this thesis.  
The school management had almost lost control over the students, who showed up 
in the school whenever they wanted and left whenever they wanted. When the 
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school gates were closed, students simply jumped over the school fence. The 
morning line had to be led by the physically strongest teacher or administrator while 
they adopted a powerful religious discourse. The leader of the morning programme 
needed to be very loud and aggressive in order to finish it and send students to their 
classes. Many teachers had stopped teaching or even showing up in the classes 
because either the students were absent or the classes were out of control. Out of 
frustration, the principle once complained to me that he had caught one of the 
teachers hiding in a small building (that was closed for refurbishment) in order to 
avoid showing up in the class. The school was noisy all the time and students were all 
over the place: in the playground, in the corridors, and on the stairs.  
 
The first impression of what was going on at the Moustafa Kamel School for boys 
was that the students were causing chaos, and the school management was too 
weak to control it and apply the rules of discipline. I would argue that the chaos 
caused by students’ collective behaviour should be understood following Abu-
Lughod (1990) as “reinscribing alternative forms” of power (Mahmood 2005:7). 
Young men described by their teachers as a “bunch of losers” with no future had 
chosen to act like a real “bunch of losers“. Janice Boddy’s work is quoted in 
Mahmood (2005) for her analysis of the “subaltern gendered agency”. Boddy 
concludes that the Sudanese women in her study of the “Zar” practices “use perhaps 
unconsciously, perhaps strategically, what we in the West might prefer to consider 
instruments of their oppression as means to assert their values both collectively ... 
and individually… This in itself is a means of resisting and setting limits to domination 
... ”  (Boddy 1989:345, cited in Mahmood 2005:7). Following Boddy (1989, cited in 
Mahmood 2005), I argue that the young men’s chaotic behaviour at the Nasser 
school was perhaps either an unconscious or a tactical (de Certeau 1984) use of the 
instrument of their oppression in response to the hegemonic schooling authority.  
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Mr. Shaban (an Arabic teacher who had agreed to stand in for an absent teacher) 
became very aggressive towards a student called Yasmin who seemed to be 
whispering to the student sitting beside her while he was teaching some Arabic 
grammar. He started shouting at her that she should pay attention. He continued 
shouting: “I know I am not really benefiting you, I know that you have got it all at the 
private lessons, but who knows, if you pay attention, you may benefit a little” He 
continued even louder: “God help him”, “God help him” and continued “Yes, I am 
talking about your father: God help him to handle you”.  The reaction by Yasmin 
(who did not show up a great deal at school) was a very quiet and silent one and she 
looked unaffected by Mr. Shaban’s attacks.  
What do we have here? First: Mr. Shaban was an Arabic teacher who had accepted 
an extra workload to teach Arabic to groups of students from different classes. The 
Arabic grammar lesson he was teaching was a difficult one. He was one of the 
teachers who did not give many private lessons. He was also not known among the 
students as one of the teachers they felt comfortable with, compared to other 
teachers with whom the girls felt more at ease when talking and socialising. Teachers 
like Mr. Shaban had developed this sense of being marginalised because of not 
obtaining enough of the students’ attention in class and in their private lessons. 
Second: Yasmin was a thanaweya-aama student who was not attending school 
regularly. Thus, being away from the school for a long time, she was keener to talk to 
her peers than pay attention to Mr. Shaban’s Arabic teaching, which she might have 
felt was boring and not important. Young people after a period of absenteeism 
always had many stories to tell their friends at the school. Yasmin acted carelessly 
towards both Mr. Shaban’s teaching and his attack. He was striving to confirm his 
authority as a teacher and to show that he deserved some respect even though 
many students like Yasmin were developing carelessness and disrespect towards the 
role of the school and teachers. 
 
Chaotic and careless behaviour are examples of tactics (de Cetreau 1984) used by 
young people either collectively or individually within the schools’ complex culture, 
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in order to make the best out of their schooling situation. Despite the fact that such 
forms of behaviour could not be considered oppositional, they did, however, 
manifest the extent to which the students’ agency seemed to stand against the 
hegemonic schooling culture. In certain instances, young people’s reactions to the 
school disciplinarian system were far from being tactical in De Certeau’s sense (1984) 
and were perceived as deliberate oppositional acts. 
 
One morning in the girls’ school, after the morning line was over and all students had 
left for class, a group of about 20 students who had been kept near the school gate 
were brought in and were asked to form a row in the middle of the playground. They 
were students who had arrived late and missed the morning line. Students were 
asked to pay half an Egyptian pound for being late. It was a rule that the principal 
applied to students who arrived late and missed the morning line programme. Two 
students paid the money and went to their class. The rest of the students were kept 
standing in the middle of the playground because they had collectively decided not 
to pay the fine and said they were willing to stay all day standing there. After around 
45 minutes of negotiations, however, the students were dismissed and sent to their 
classes.  
 
I was allowed into the three secondary schools in the Dar-elsalam and Al-Basatin 
neighbourhood as a researcher with interests in younger generations and how they 
perceived their future education and self-realisation.  The school staff also 
recognised me as someone involved in Education reform efforts. Some 
administrators and teachers started to check whether I could support them with 
some activities.  
The psychology specialist at the girls’ school requested that I facilitate some 
seminars for students on topics of interest to them. I facilitated a seminar for 10th 
and 11th grade students, and for school staff, both teachers and administrators. The 
request came from students as a need to discuss generational relations and tensions. 
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The seminar was held in one of the empty classrooms in the middle of the school day 
and was attended by about 30 students and about 10 teachers and administrators 
including head teachers and deputies. The discussion started around the meaning of 
a generation and the difference between the two generations in the room.  The 
students moved swiftly towards talking about their own experiences and the extent 
to which they saw a problem in the relationship between the two generations.  The 
seminar started with a brain storming session during which the students said: 
Student 1:  We think differently. 
Student 2: Their mentality is different; they hardly understand our needs and 
our feelings. 
Student 3:  They are convinced that what they think useful for us is the only 
right thing and that we shouldn't question it. 
Student 4: They think they are always right, and never admit when they are 
wrong. When it's so obvious that we are right about something, they never 
admit that we are right. 
Student 5: They don't know how to pay attention or listen to us, and they yell 
at us all the time.  
Student 6: They say it’s a generation that is aar ala masr (a shame for Egypt). 
One of the students, called Norhan, said: Since I joined this school I feel like 
am going to have a nervous breakdown because of so much yelling at us. 
They are yelling at us all the time. She then directed her speech to Ms. Nour 
(the school deputy): Why are you always shouting? Excuse me, but you 
allowed us to express our opinions. Right? 
For a while the room was shocked by the situation of the 10th grade female student's 
loud criticism of the school deputy in front of everyone. While other female students 
were laughing and muttering, teachers and administration staff were completely 
astonished by such a situation which they were not used to. While the deputy was 
totally speechless, Ms. Soad, an Arabic teacher, started to defend Ms. Nour:  
She is acting like your mother ... she cares for all of you .... she is one of the 
few who really care about the students. 
The students continued describing how they saw the older generations’ attitude 
towards them:  
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Student 7: They hardly listen to us or take any steps to learn about our needs 
and expectations. 
Student 8: Older generations like my parents and most teachers don’t 
understand the difference between them and us. 
Student 9:  They allow themselves to make mistakes but they don’t allow us 
to make mistakes and learn from our mistakes.  
Student 10: They never remember the good things we do, they only 
remember our mistakes.  
Student 11:  While they keep watching our mistakes, we still are missing a 
role model from the older generations to inspire us. 
The teachers and other school staff (many of them already have children of the same 
age) started to become defensive in responding to the students.  One teacher said:  
Parents want their children to be the best. We are old enough to have more 
experience than you, and we have a responsibility to help you at this age. 
Youth today spend a lot, we give you a lot. Youth are not responsible and they 
have high expectations. You shouldn’t talk about the lack of a role model. 
Prophet Mohamed is the real role model for you. 
Towards the end of the discussion, students contested the teachers’ views that 
young generations have very high expectations. Wafa, an 11th grade student, said: 
Yes, we have high expectations, we expect a lot and we will continue to 
expect a lot. You know why? Simply because it’s our time, it’s our generation. 
It’s not true what older generations think and repeat, that we are useless, 
stupid, and spoiled. We are aware of what’s going on and most of us know 
what we want. It’s also true that many of us are frustrated and fed up. 
The “we” in Wafa’s narrative was both generational and gendered. Students 
(seminar participants) were pressured by disciplining rules imposed by the school 
and the family. Female students opposed the school and family authorities and 
talked critically of parents and teachers. They were keen to point out their 
generational consciousness through repeatedly highlighting differences between 
their generation and older generations and the fact that it was their “time”.  
Female students’ reactions manifested the extent to which the schooling system was 
gendered. Female students in many instances opposed the school discipline that 
attempted to control them as girls by applying stricter measures. Female students 
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reacted through rejection and withdrawal.  This pattern of action was repeated 
throughout the period of my presence in the schools. First, during the "belonging 
and loyalty" seminar when the students criticied Mubarak. Second, during the 
leadership camp when the students criticised the school's learning environment. 
Third, during the many group discussions I had with students during which they 
criticised the schooling and the education system at large. Let us look in more depth 
at the situation. During these events young women contradicted the discipline rules 
by voicing their criticism of older generations and even the president. While the 
school was organising dialogues and opportunities through which the students were 
supposed to enact norms and discipline, the young women exploited the situation 
allowed by the school to voice their generational and gendered opposition.  
 
 
4.4 Absenteeism: studentless means powerless  
I knew that secondary school students’ absenteeism was a general phenomenon 
particularly in Cairo and Egypt’s other main cities. For years the MOE tried to address 
the problem by posing more restrictions and penalties for absenteeism. For grade 10 
students, attendance was compulsory, since their final scores for attendance and 
participation in the school were calculated in addition to the results of their final 
exams. Starting from grade 11, however, the final scores were determined only by a 
student’s performance in the final exams. The MOE had to impose fines for grade 11 
and 12 students’ absenteeism and to cancel their registration for the final exams 
when a certain number of days absence had been reached. The MOE allowed 
students to re-register for exams after paying LE25 as a fine. Evidently, parents 
became willing to pay the fine in order to allow their children the time to go to 
private lessons and study at home. For most students and families, the school had 
become a place for registering for exams and nothing more. The issue of attendance 
and absenteeism was always a topic for discussion between students, in classrooms, 
in teachers’ meetings, in management meetings. Students always exchanged news 
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and rumours about the policy changes to be undertaken by the government to force 
them to attend. One rumour was that students would be prevented from sitting for 
final exams if they exceeded the limit of days of absence. Another rumour was that 
students going beyond the limit of days of absence would not be able to apply for 
military or police academies. 
While attendance in grade 10 in all three schools was around 60%, attendance in 
grade 11 was at best no more than 15%. These percentages of attendance were 
mentioned in meetings I attended in the three schools and were confirmed by the 
schools’ administrations. On the day of announcing final results for grade 11, I saw 
one student (Reem) whom I could not recall having seen at all in the school before. 
She was standing with a woman (whom I learned later was her mother) surrounded 
by other students and teachers.  The students and teachers were welcoming and 
congratulating Reem. I asked one of the teachers (Youssef):  
MF: Who is she? 
Youssef: Oh, you don’t know Reem? She is the ranked first for the school and 
the whole iddarra for grade 11; let me introduce you to her. 
MF:  Hello Reem, mabrouk. 
Youssef: Reem is one of our best students and she has won the school the first 
rank at the iddarra level. 
MF:  Reem, do you know me? How come I haven’t seen you at all? 
Reem:  I heard about you from my friends; I didn’t come to the school at all 
this year. 
MF:  You didn’t come to school at all? Why not? 
Reem’s mother: We insisted that she should have private tutoring in all 
subjects and that studying at home was better than coming to school. It 
would be waste of a time. It worked and she got very good grades and a high 
ranking. She was very close to being among the 3 highest ranked students at 
the Cairo level. 
 
Youssef said: “If you have the right wasta you shouldn’t worry about attending, and 
there are always solutions for handing the problems of absenteeism”. Mrs. Soad (an 
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Arabic teacher) said: “I have a daughter in grade 11 at the same school but she 
doesn’t come to school”. She went on: “I handled the issue of her attendance with 
other teachers and the school management”. This was how a few students managed 
not to show up at all except perhaps once or twice to complete some formal papers.  
 
Having an attendance of only 5 to 8 students in each class, the management in the 
three schools decided to combine every 3 or 4 classes together and assigned a 
teacher to work with them all together. However, the teacher might decide not to 
show up at all or pass by the class briefly to ask the students to stay quiet.  The 
students sat in couples or groups,  chatting, studying, listening to music and playing 
with their media devices (MP3 players and mobiles), taking and exchanging photos, 
ring tones, etc.  Almost all the teachers I talked to said it was very difficult for them 
to teach, with the current rate of student absenteeism. The majority of 11th grade 
students I met and talked to in the three schools during my field work told they 
showed up in their schools only once or twice a week. The reasons for absenteeism 
were brought into discussion with students in many instances during my class visits 
in the three schools. Students mostly expressed the same reasons. Here is what 
Ahmed (grade 11th at Mostafa Kamel Boys’ School) said: 
Why should I come to the school if teachers are not willing to teach?! They 
know that we have been through all the lessons in the private classes so they 
have stopped making any effort. Between the private lessons and studying I 
have no time to come to school more than once, maximum twice a week to 
see my friends and play football. Most of the time the teachers are either 
absent, ready to give up their time with us easily, or busy doing something 
else. 
I discussed with different groups of students in all three schools which days they 
choose to show up in the school: 
Student 1: I choose the same days that my friends also come to the school. 
Student 2: I choose the day when I don’t have a private lesson later in the day. 
Student 3: I choose the day of a certain committed teacher whose class I want 
to attend. 
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Student 3: I choose the day of the PE classes, to play football. 
Student 5: I choose Thursdays, it’s the end of the week and we go out 
together after school. 
 
Time management was a big concern for many students. In group discussions, 
students did quick calculations of their time. Every day they needed (at the 
minimum) 5 hours for studying, 5 hours to attend private lessons, 8 hours of good 
sleep, 3 hours to eat and watch TV.  Ahmed said:  
Coming to school consumes around 6 hours, which means I have to sleep less 
and study less. 
One day, upon leaving the Moustafa Kamel School, Abdu (an 11th grader that I had 
met in one of the classes) asked if he could talk to me. We sat at the side of the open 
area around the playground. Abdu was a tiny young man with a pale face. His main 
concern was that he could not manage his time to study and he needed my advice. 
Abdu lived in the neighbourhood and came from an educated family with 3 brothers 
and sisters. He did not have a personal computer because he told his father that it 
would waste his time. He was studying five subjects and taking tutorial classes in all 
of them (English, Arabic, Maths, Chemistry and French). He liked Chemistry but had 
difficulties in both English and Arabic. Out of fear, he had decided to come to school 
every day. We did simple calculations of his time in a school day as follows: six hours 
of sleep, three hours for special tutoring, six hours in the school, one hour for 
prayers, one hour watching TV, and seven hours for studying. He wondered if seven 
hours a day were enough, because one of his teachers said he should study 18 hours 
a day. My advice was “even five hours a day can be very good if they are done with 
concentration”. We also discussed how to organize his time between the five 
subjects by dedicating more studying hours to difficult subjects, after identifying his 
problems that required improvement. Abdu left our brief discussion with a little 
smile.  
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In all three schools, it was clear that school management had given up on the issue 
of attendance and that there was nothing for them to do. As a result, the schools 
acted as if they were not accountable to parents or the community in cases of 
student failure. The girls’ school principal desperately asked me in the middle of a 
discussion of the government’s plans for improving learning outcomes: “If students 
don’t show up at the school, how come the school is held accountable for educational 
results” While I was not in a position to answer the principal's question, the one that 
actually posed itself was: if families and students continue withdrawing from schools 
at such a high rate, meaning that the school is losing its disciplining subjects, what 
are the consequences for young people, teachers, the school, and the state? 
 
Absenteeism can be seen by students as simply a matter of time management, 
concerning the amount of time they spend in private lessons. Calculating the time 
needed for studying, attending private lessons, attending school, and so on, was a 
common theme in all the discussions with students in the three schools. The 
students had come to think that it would not be logical to go to school every day and 
do almost nothing, while having a very tight time schedule outside school. I argue 
that absenteeism should also be understood as students voicing their 
disappointment with the system and calling for change. Witnessing the collapse of 
the schooling system, the practices of exclusion, and the carelessness of those in 
charge, young people had chosen to withdraw. Furthermore I argue that instead of 
functioning as the docile bodies being reproduced at the school venue, students had 
come up as creative agents capable of commodification of the school itself. For 
thanaweya-aama students, the state school is a commodity that has no value any 
more.  For them, time was too precious to be wasted at school. While absenteeism 
manifested the devaluation of the state schooling commodity aimed at preparing 
students to pass the thanaweya-aama bottleneck, the private tutorial informal 
system flourished as the solution.  In the following section I explore the private 
tutoring arena as an alternative pedagogical possibility, and attempt to find some 
answers. 
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4.5 Private tutoring: an alternative pedagogical possibility 
The majority of 11th grade students I met in the three schools in the Al-Basatin and 
Dar-elsalam went for private tutoring in all their subjects and said they would 
continue the private lessons for the following year. Towards the end of the school 
year, students mentioned that they had started booking their places with teachers 
and centres for the following year. They mentioned that the month of August was 
the latest time to reserve a place (and pay a deposit) with the desired tutors and 
centres. Students found it strange that I kept asking about their reason for going for 
private tuition in all their subjects. They asked me: “Have you been living abroad?” It 
had become the system and there was no way to avoid it. It was not something for 
discussion in the family as to whether to do this or not. Older brothers and sisters 
had been through this before. When the decision was made by the family that their 
children should go for thanaweya-aama and continue to higher education, the 
students knew that going for private lessons was a necessity because very simply 
they were convinced that they could not rely on the school. All the students I talked 
to said that “Teachers don’t teach any more”. Students mostly saw that teachers at 
the private centres were more organised and did a much better job.  
Families were making considerable sacrifices towards meeting the demands of the 
thanaweya-aama private lessons. Abdu (the 11th grade student at Moustafa Kamel 
School) said: “My family has been saving money for the last two years in order to 
afford the cost of my private lessons”. Ms. Soad (an Arabic teacher at Nasser School) 
had a daughter in grade 11.  She said:  
Since Lamia (her daughter) became a thanaweya-aama student, our house 
has turned into a private centre. Her father and I didn’t want her to go to 
private centres which meant going out every day. That’s not right and is a 
waste of time. Teachers come to our place every day to teach Lamia and 
other female students. I know it costs more to bring teachers home, but my 
husband is an engineer and his income allows us to do so.” 
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The flourishing market in private lessons in Egypt started in the late 1980s to early 
1990s following the wave of economic privatisation recommended by the economic 
adjustment programme (Herrera 2008, Hartman 2007, Bray 2006). It was the time 
when the Egyptian government withdrew its promise of a guaranteed job for 
university graduates. Achieving high scores in thanaweya-aama exams and reaching 
their desired college became the obsession for every family with children at the 
general secondary stage in order to compete in the privatising labour market. 
Egyptian parents particularly those having children in thanaweya-aama became 
keen to provide their children with educational support in order to reach the desired 
higher education level. In the meantime, teachers found in the private tutoring an 
opportunity to supplement their income.  
Parallel to the boom in the private tutoring market, state education continued to 
suffer a gradual deterioration due to very high class density, poor in-service 
professional development for teachers, over-centralised decision-making, and too 
much emphasis on high-stake exams systems. For thanaweya-aama students, 
enrolling in private lessons became the main educational service. Secondary schools 
in particular turned into no more than sites for registration for exams and were 
almost empty for most of the school year.  
 
The main qualification required for a good private tutor for a thanaweya-aama 
student is her or his ability to predict exam questions or problems and to help 
students to prepare for the exams. Private tutors who had become stars in the 
private tuition market were those with a reputation for predicting exam questions. 
Many teachers, particularly for core subjects (languages, Maths, science, social 
studies) in all three of the schools did private tutoring. Private tutoring was a source 
of jealousy and competition between teachers in general and those at the same 
school in particular. There were the teachers who were seen by their colleagues and 
novice teachers as the “sharks” of “private lessons”. They were experienced in their 
subject areas, and reputed to be very good, and expensive. Their private classes 
were soon filled by students coming from an economic status that could afford their 
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high prices. There were other teachers who were trying to compete in the private 
tutoring market, with fewer qualifications, and lower prices. At the school level, 
teachers who received more attention and demand for their private lessons were 
very powerful. Teachers for non-core subjects or those who could not or did not care 
to join the private lessons competition were to a large extent left in the shade.  
In addition to teachers who were either employed by the government or private 
schools, there was another category of individuals involved in private tutoring. They 
held university degrees in engineering, science, medicine, languages, etc, and due to 
a very high rate of unemployment, decided to present themselves to owners of 
private tutoring centres as private tutors for a subject area that is relevant to their 
academic credentials. Some of them had become very famous in the neighbourhood, 
particularly those with an academic background in engineering, as tutors for 
Mathematics, Algebra and Geometry, and their private classes had become very 
crowded.  
 
Thus teachers, particularly those who were struggling to enter the private market, 
had made every effort they could to get more students into their lessons and private 
centres. They behaved very nicely towards the students by removing many of the 
traditional limits and the formality of the relations between a teacher and students. 
They socialised with students, talking and laughing, and allowed for an informal 
relationship to develop. In some instances, they put pressure on students by 
commenting publically on their performance or even by sending messages to parents 
that their young people needed support.  
Hadia (an 11th grade student) was repeatedly pressured by Mr. Ashraf, her Maths 
teacher to join his private tuition group. Mr. Ashraf even left messages at her home 
when she did not show up in school, that she should join his private group. Hadia, 
who admitted that she was weak at Maths, decided to join the private tuition group, 
despite what she said:  
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I don’t like Mr. Ashraf. He is boring. He doesn’t help me. In fact, he depresses 
me. He keeps telling us that we are losers and useless. 
I will address in Chapter 6 how Hadia ended up leaving the Maths private lessons 
after telling Mr. Ashraf that she was not benefiting from his tutoring. 
 
The Al-Eman Centre was a private tutoring centre at the heart of the Al-Basatin area. 
The centre occupied the whole of the second floor of a 5-storey building. The centre 
and the whole building were owned by Haj Mo’men, who was originally from a small 
village in Upper Egypt. Haj Mo’men studied agriculture and then travelled to Kuwait 
where he worked for around 15 years. Coming back from the Gulf with some savings, 
he decided not to return to his home village. Instead, he settled in Al-Basatin and 
built the 5 storey building for himself and his children. He was advised by some 
teachers to turn the second floor of the building into a private tutoring centre. The 
centre included rooms of various sizes: several small rooms for small groups of 
students (8 to 10), medium-sized rooms for around 25 students, and a large room 
that could accommodate close to a hundred students. The centre served students 
from all educational stages: primary, middle and secondary.  
 
I went to the Al Eman Centre with Youssef, who is one of its founders. It took Youssef 
a long time and much convincing and assuring Haj Mo’men to allow me to visit the 
centre. As the practice of private tuition was considered illegal, and in order to avoid 
paying taxes, teachers and owners were always suspicious of strangers and were not 
willing to allow them to walk into private lesson centres and venues. Youssef looked 
very worried every time I took a photograph.  
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Figure 7: A 
private tutoring 
centre. A photo 
by MF at the Al 
Eman Centre on 
12th April 2010 
 
Haj Mo’men himself sat at the entrance of the centre collecting the fees from 
students who paid fees for each lesson they attend. Upon making the payment, 
students were given special cards to be handed to the tutor when they joined his 
class. After finishing the lesson, the cards were used to process the payment for the 
teacher who received 70% while Haj Mo’men received 30%. Youssef said this was 
acceptable as he preferred going to the centre rather than to students’ houses. The 
cost per 90-minute lesson is on average 30 Egyptian Pounds per student. I was told 
that the fees had been set at this low rate so that they would be affordable for 
families in the neighbourhood. The cost per lesson became higher towards the end 
of the year when the centre started the so-called “revision classes”. These revision 
classes were mainly dedicated to preparing students for exams, and the students 
practised answering questions that were potential exam questions. During the visit, 
several small rooms were occupied by small groups of students (12 to 15) with their 
tutor sitting around a rectangular table. We waited in one of the small rooms. On the 
side of the room there was a shelf with packs of flyers that Haj Mo’men had printed 
to market the centre’s services. 
In addition to flyers, big posters had also been produced and hung all over the 
centre’s walls. The posters and flyers included the names of teachers and the timing 
of their lessons every week. These posters and flyers always added a title to the 
name of the teacher, such as “The famous”, “The outstanding”, “The unique”, “The 
master of ...”, etc to show that the centre had the best tutors on board. The posters 
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and flyers normally included a Quran verse to encourage students to study hard and 
some included a prayer to be said before studying. 
 
I joined Youssef’s biology lesson for a large group (around 40 students) of 11th grade 
male and female students. The students were sitting in a traditional lecture setting. 
As a tutor, Youssef was different from being a teacher at school. At the school I saw 
him trying to apply active learning practices and he encouraged students’ 
participation and cooperative learning.  As a tutor, he was performing according to 
students’ expectations to be ready for exams. Despite the great effort made by 
Youssef to explain the biology lesson, it was a long lecture loaded with a great deal 
of new information and no dialogue. A few students were taking notes, while others 
were not really paying attention. Many students were relying on the booklet that 
was prepared by the teacher and distributed at the end of each lesson. The booklet 
provided a summary of the contents of the lesson, and important questions and 
strategies to answer them. Youssef showed me the booklet for the lesson and was 
proud of his exertions in preparing it. He explained that each tutor prepared her/his 
booklets for her/his tutees. The booklet was part of the package that students pay 
for. Students mostly relied on these booklets for their studying and for exam 
preparation. 
 
After the lesson we went back to the waiting room to talk more to Haj Mo’men. He 
talked to Youssef about the promotion he was preparing for the thanaweya-aama 
revision lessons planned to start one month before exams. Haj Mo’men was worried 
about a new student assessment system the Ministry was planning to apply the 
following year. According to Haj Mo’men, the new assessment system would allow 
teachers to control 50% of the students’ final grades. The 50% would be used to 
evaluate students’ activities, class participation, and attendance. Haj Mo’men 
believed that the new system would reduce the demand on private lessons which 
meant that some centres would have to close or reduce their services. Haj Mo’men 
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said he made sure to recruit the best teachers in the neighbourhood. In order to 
ensure his clients’ (students’) satisfaction, he usually walked into the class after the 
teacher had finished and asked students whether they were satisfied with the 
teacher’s performance. Haj Mo’men said that he fired teachers when students were 
repeatedly dissatisfied with their performance. 
 
Students went to the private tutoring in their normal clothing (no uniform) and were 
mostly organised in mixed groups (boys and girls) unlike the school. They mentioned 
that going to the private lessons was a sort of escape away from the schooling 
system and family pressures. Girls, particularly those coming from conservative 
families that did not allow girls to go out alone, regarded private lessons as a way 
out to see their friends and socialise a little. In a discussion with a group of 11th grade 
female students at Nasser girls’ school about private tutoring, I asked: 
Imagine that next year the school and the quality of education is everything 
that you want, will you be willing to give up on going to private lessons and 
save all the money your family has to pay?  
They all replied in unison with a loud NO. One student said:  
Mainly, the quality of education will take ages to improve. It’s not fair; it has 
become the only way for us to go out. Boys can go out whenever they want. 
For us girls, our time is divided between studying, helping with home chores, 
and going to school for some time. We are mostly not allowed to go out as a 
group of friends. Going out has to be with my mother or my older sister or 
brother. 
Students estimated that private tutoring consumed around 30 hours a week. These 
30 hours included the time for what they called “sankaha” or “fooling around” 
before and after lessons. By “fooling around” or “sankaha”, Mariam (an 11th grader 
at the Al-Haditha School) explained:  
Walking slowly with a group of other students to the place for the lesson, 
walking slowly back home and maybe stopping for a drink or for a little chat 
and a few laughs, and stopping at a shopping mall to get an idea about new 
clothes, accessories, and makeup. We talk about a lot of things: about music, 
studying, the school, teachers, and also about boys. 
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Female students also implied, in the middle of informal discussions, that some girls 
also used the chance of going out to meet boys before or after the private lesson. 
They did not want to talk in detail about this issue nor about the fact that, in such a 
conservative community, going out to private lessons was the only chance to 
interact with boys.  
 
Young women, in particular, were subjected to their families’ control, which imposed 
restrictions on their movements and existence in the public sphere. Families had 
come to be obsessed about controlling young women’s sexuality and mixed-gender 
socialisation. Such obsession went further in some cases to restricting friendship and 
peer-relations with other girls and even not allowing girls to leave home unless 
accompanied by a family member. The private tutoring informality and flexibility, 
away from formal schooling discipline, has granted girls the space to manoeuvre 
their families' control over their movements and relationships. They have creatively 
used the time allocated to their private lessons to connect with their peer groups, 
have some leisure time, and meet boys away from the family and local community 
supervision. As such, I maintain that girls have used private tutoring as an escape 
from oppressive regimes at home. 
 
 
Although students somehow opposed state schooling, as part of the system, yet with 
societal and familial pressures they attended private tutoring centres in order to 
progress within the system. A legitimate question here is, what exactly were 
students then opposing and why? In answering this question, I am aware of the 
danger of becoming trapped in an agency-structure dichotomy that would lead to 
what Abu-Lughod (1990b) describes as a tendency to romanticize resistance. To Abu-
Lughod, such romanticising occurs when resistance is reduced to “signs of 
ineffectiveness of systems of power and of the resilience and creativity of the human 
spirit in its refusal to be dominated” (Abu-Lughod 199042). Along the lines of 
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thinking of Abu-Lughod and Foucault’s work on “governmentality” of the transversal 
nature of power relations (Foucault 2001), these young people were involved in 
multiple intersecting power-relations within the family and the school. 
First, the cultural capital of the thanaweya-aama educational credentials obliged 
families to make sacrifices in order to be able to afford tutoring. While valuing the 
educational cultural capital, families were also impacted by emerging market values 
and were aware of privatising labour market expectations. If the family could not 
afford to send young people to private schools to obtain other high school 
certificates, then passing thanaweya-aama was an obligation. With private tutoring 
investment, while supporting young people’s position in withdrawing from regular 
schooling, families were seeking a return to their investment. Young people were at 
the centre of the family's attention and observation on how they used their time and 
whether they were studying enough to achieve the desired scores. They were fully 
aware that their parents were carrying the financial burden of their education after 
having given up on the state's promise for free “education for all”. Abdu (the 11th 
grader at Moustafa Kamel School) had realised the sacrifices his family had made to 
support his private lessons and perhaps that made him tense about managing his 
time. Certainly he did not want to disappoint his family.  
Second, young people replaced the daily schooling hegemonic discipline by the 
informality of private lessons that allowed them autonomy and flexibility. At school, 
students were not allowed to choose their teachers or classes, or even their school 
uniform. While it was true that families and students were somehow obliged to go 
for private lessons and their ability to choose a private service within the 
neighbourhood was to some extent affected by a family's financial capability, still the 
private lesson arrangements granted students the privilege of choosing between 
different teachers, different locations, and flexible time schedules. Young people 
were strategically establishing their own networks and systems of support and 
solidarity with their peer groups and friends around their private tutoring plans. 
Friends or close colleagues go to lessons together. As Mariam (the 11th grader) had 
implied, female students were utilising the opportunity of going to private lessons as 
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a window of release to go out with friends and having some leisure time away from 
oppresive regimes at home and thanaweya-aama pressures.  
Third, young people opposed the system’s deteriorating quality of teaching and were 
replacing it by a pedagogical alternative that, despite being run by teachers from the 
system, satisfied young people’s demands and expectations in exchange for 
teachers’ financial benefits. This complex process had led to the reconfiguring of 
young people’s relations with teachers at the venues of the school and the private 
tutoring. Students were no longer schooling subjects to be disciplined but rather, 
customers in the educational market to be satisfied. At the school venue, students 
were easily connecting and establishing a rapport with those famous and well-known 
teachers in the market. Other teachers who were seeking to find their place in the 
private market would do anything to attract more students to their private groups. 
Some teachers, such as Mr. Ashraf the Maths teacher at the Nasser School, would 
even attempt to force students into their tutoring groups. At the venue of the 
private lesson centre, students could report to the owner of the centre if they were 
not satisfied with the performance of the teachers. If not in a centre, students could 
leave the private lesson group if not satisfied with the teacher’s services. That was 
exactly what Hadia did when she became dissatisfied with Mr. Ashraf (her Maths 
tutor). In fact, realising how vital client satisfaction was to the success of his centre, 
Haj Mo’men invited students’ feedback on teachers’ performance.  
 
 
4.6  Conclusion 
This chapter provides a vision of the highly contradictory nature of Egypt’s secondary 
schooling and its frustrating and confusing reality. In this chapter I have argued that 
the Egyptian schooling system after thirty years under Mubarak’s rule is not qualified 
either to play its intended role in maintaining “national security” for the Egyptian 
state, or to fulfil the state’s agenda in preparing young Egyptians for supporting the 
state’s measures for economic reform. 
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Teachers, assumed to be “technicians of behaviour” and “engineers of conduct” 
(Foucault 1979: 294), are pointing out the huge widening gap and the growing 
distrust between themselves and the system. Impacted by socioeconomic factors 
and an over-centralised authoritative educational system, teachers are no longer 
qualified to assume the schooling hegemonic disciplinary responsibilities.  
I have argued that Egyptian thanaweya-aama students have an agency that enables 
them to creatively and strategically contest the schooling system, occupy the space 
of education, and negotiate new meanings of schooling. In doing so, I have looked at 
students’ chaotic and careless tactics and at students’absenteeism. I maintain that 
chaotic and carless tactics and absenteeism might be understood as strategies calling 
for an inclusive schooling system. Young people witnessing the collapse of the 
schooling system, practices of exclusion and humiliation, and the carelessness of 
those in charge, have chosen to act chaotically and/or to withdraw. I have argued 
that their chaotic behaviour and withdrawal actions are perhaps either unconscious 
or perhaps a tactical use of the instrument of their oppression (Boddy 1989) in 
response to the state school exclusion practices. Young people’s agency in this 
context might be conceptualised as the capacity of being conscious of one’s own 
choices as opposed to the school hegemonic discipline (Mahmoud 2006:8). 
Furthermore, I have argued that instead of functioning as the docile bodies being 
reproduced at the school venue, students have emerged as creative agents capable 
of commodification of the school itself. For thanaweya-aama students, time is too 
precious to be wasted at school.  
Edmunds and Turner argue that “generations shift from being a passive cohort 
(‘generation in itself’) into a politically active and self-conscious cohort (‘generation 
for itself’) when they are able to exploit resources (political/educational/economic) 
to innovate in cultural, intellectual or political spheres” (Edmunds and Turner 2005: 
562). Female students’ narratives confirm an emerging active generational 
consciousness among young female Egyptians that is manifested in how they 
creatively exploit the school venue and the educational space at large in advocating 
their subjectivities and agency. 
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My intention has been neither to prove that the school has collapsed and is not 
functioning any more, nor to say that Egyptian young people’s agency has become 
dominant in Egyptian schools. I attempt to take the young people’s trajectories and 
strategies seriously, considering the way in which young people make sense of these 
for their lives. In fact, my intention in understanding young people’s position 
towards state schooling is to allow it to inform us about the “complex interworkings 
of historically changing structures of power” (Abu-Lughod 1990b:53) within the 
social and educational arena. In order to understand young people’s position, we 
should pay attention to “the existence of a range of specific strategies and structures 
of power” (Abu-Lughod 1990b:53).  Foucault’s works on governmentality stress that 
“the intensification or concentration of power-relations .. becomes the potential 
dissolution of the purely vertical, oppressive, model .. Power comes to be seen as 
‘transversal’ (Foucault 2001:329) and by no means solely oppressive” (Leask 2012: 
62).  
With the young people’s everyday tactics and oppositional acts to state schooling, 
the increasing rates of students’absenteeism, and the flourishing of the private 
tutoring market, the transversal and "complex interworkings of historically changing 
structures of power" (Abu-Lughod 1990b:53) are at play within the educational 
arena, striving for contestation of the entire system of education towards more 
inclusion and less hegemony. Such interworkings were significant among other 
factors that triggered young people’s forceful involvement in the 2011 street actions 
that have been and still are transforming the Egyptian political situation.  
At the intersections of state schooling discipline, discourses and failures that were 
explored in the school ethnography in Chapters 3 and 4, I will explore in the next 
chapter how young people are negotiating their future fears and aspirations.  
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CHAPTER  5 
Negotiating meritocratic aspirations and hopelessness 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I suggest that the transversal educational exclusionary circumstances 
of thanaweya-aama studentship constrain the sorts of subjects that students can 
become and at the same time constitute them as young and educated in the 
Egyptian context. In particular, I argue that Egyptian students' negotiations of 
notions of success and self-realisation reveal a number of ambivalences through 
which students’ subjects are constituted. As such, negotiations carry fragments of 
western notions of individuality36 (Jeffrey 2008: 741-3), and local culturally idealised 
trajectories of national, communal and pious commitments and submission to 
patriarchal social norms. I further argue that such communal and nationalist 
commitments for some young people go beyond the model of the "good citizen" 
towards exploring and negotiating notions of “taghyeer” (change) in what they 
witness of examples of corruption, and absence of equity and justice.  
 
The main theme of this chapter is to explore the extent to which young people, while 
negotiating their fears of failure and risks of exclusion were connecting these fears 
with what they witnessed of the collapse of the schooling system and the failure of 
the state’s welfare system. Mounia Bennani-Chraibi (2000, cited in Singerman 2007), 
argues that a new generation of the Arab youth has been brought into the post-
independence dream, where universal education is the dream of upward social 
mobility, and yet their hopes have not been fulfilled. Education, to a large extent, 
has failed to act as an agent of social mobility (Bennani-Chraibi 2000:147). The youth 
stayed in schools, their parents invested in private tutoring, they went for exams and 
succeeded, and then what happened? The state did not meet its promise to provide 
                                                          
36
 "Fragments of Western notions of individuality" here refers to recent geographies and sociologies 
cited in Jeffery (2008: 741) on Western youth, highlighting what he described as “interlinked but 
distinct themes” regarding Western young people’s lives which are “the decline of class, fluid 
identities, and transformation in young people’s political strategies” (2008: 741).  
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employment or to provide a dynamic labour market following the neo-liberal 
reforms (Singerman, 2007:35).  
A cross-cutting theme in this chapter is concerned with how the students negotiated 
meritocratic aspirations and at the same time hopelessness about the future due to 
the realities of life in the capital city of unemployment, corruption and wasta 
networks. The notion of hopelessness and the fact that young people were not taken 
seriously turned, for some of them, into aspirations for changing (taghyeer) the 
system itself. 
 
 
5.2 Narratives of tension, boredom and despair  
Thanaweya-aama, as explained in more detail in Chapter 2, is considered by 
students, parents and educators as a significant benchmark. Thanaweya-aama 
students consider the three-year period of their secondary school to be a very tough 
one. It starts immediately on the completion of their compulsory basic education at 
the age of fourteen. At such an early age, young people are obliged to make some 
difficult decisions about their future. They choose to go for the challenge of 
thanaweya-aama, which would lead them to higher education rather than joining a 
secondary vocational school, which would be the end of their educational ambition. 
Soon, towards the end of grade 10 and moving on to grade 11, they have to take 
another decision: between studying arts or science. It is a decision that will affect 
their area of study at university. In addition, when starting grade 11, they start to 
prepare for the exam at the end of each of the eleventh and twelfth grades.  
Thanaweya-aama students and their families are known for being always 
overwhelmed by studying and exam pressures and going through periods of 
depression and frustration. Other families in the neighbourhood sympathize with the 
families who have young people at the thanaweya-aama stage and always express 
the wish that the latter will pass through such a hard period successfully. Among the 
many criticisms of the way the government handles the dilemma of thanaweya-
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aama, are accusations that the political regime intentionally maintains this system in 
order to keep young people busy and pressured all the time, thereby ensuring they 
do not become involved in any political activism.  
During my field work, a major topic of young people’s narratives, given their status 
as thanaweya-aama students, revolved around aspirations for the future and the 
fear of failure. Ahmed was an 11th grade student in the mixed experimental 
language school. He was from an educated family (both his parents are university 
graduates) and lived in the Saqr Qurish area, which is adjacent to the Maadi 
privileged neighbourhood. As explained before, families who send children to such 
experimental language schools were among those willing to invest more money in 
order to gain an education service that was of a better quality than the regular state 
education.  However, despite the promise that students enrolled in such 
experimental schools would receive a better quality education, through discussions 
these students repeated the same complaints and frustrations about the schooling 
and exams system.  
Ahmed: Thinking of exams makes me feel very depressed. I am afraid of 
failing my exams and then failing to go to the college I want. Why have 
they decided to arrange exams in such way that despite all our efforts and 
our families' sacrifices over the three years of thanaweya-aama in studying 
and tutoring classes, all of it is reduced to achieving in exams. It's not fair 
that only my scores in exams will determine my future. I can't even think 
about the college of my dreams because it all depends on my scores. I don't 
study or go to private tutoring to learn but rather to prepare for exams. 
Failure is not about not passing exams but mainly about failing to get the 
required scores. You have asked us before if we practise or do anything else 
with our time besides being a student. Actually, we can't afford to do 
anything else with our time other than attending school and private 
tuition, and study.  
Ahmed voiced the fears, frustrations, and sense of boredom of many thanaweya-
aama students. For young people, passing from thanaweya-aama to college life was 
not just a step in their academic life but rather a big challenge through which they 
broke the vicious circle and state of boredom they lived in, and which would 
certainly have an impact on their future. For the three year period of thanaweya-
aama, young people had only one duty, which was to study for exams that would 
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determine their future. According to Schielke (2008), rural Egyptian "young men do 
not attribute boredom to saturation by media, consumption, and a search for 
spectacular experience as some Western voices do (e.g., Klapp1986: 117-129). Rural 
boredom is primarily framed as deprivation, not saturation" (Schielke 2008: 256). 
While very busy with studying, informal urban life for thanaweya-aama young 
people like Ahmed was on the one hand tense, due to the burden of the 
responsibility to succeed and fear of failing, and on the other hand boring due to 
repetition and frustration. Ahmed's response to my question about what 
thanaweya-aama students did with their time besides studying confirms the 
capacity to aim for more, and the awareness that there are alternatives to the 
monotony of the everyday schedule and the on-going state of tension. Such 
contradictory and hybrid experiences of tension and boredom manifest the extent to 
which such experiences were connected to "aspiration and a progressive modality of 
time" (Schielke 2008: 257). 
 
Amina, at the time, was a 16 year old 11th grader at the girls’ school. She was an 
outspoken and bright young woman, who lived in Dar-elsalam area with her family. 
Her father was a carpenter, and her mother worked in a factory in the 
neighbourhood to support the family. Amina had a twin sister who left school and 
was getting ready for marriage. Her older brother passed away two years ago and 
she had another brother who was 10 years old: 
Amina: I think I need a psychiatrist. 
MF: why?  
Amina: I am in a very bad mood and feel very pressured and unable to study. I 
am afraid of the unknown and what might happen all of a sudden and change 
my life. I can't afford to fail. My biggest fear is to fail thanaweya-aama 
because of the crisis in my family. 
MF: What's happening with your family? 
Amina: My parents got divorced last week. He (referring to her father) left 
home two months ago. Last Thursday I was at a private lesson when he called 
me and my sister who was with her fiancé and asked us to come home and 
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told us that he had divorced our mother. He is 56 years old and is getting 
married to a woman who is 27. She has never been married before.  I wonder 
what makes a girl, who has never married before, marry a 56 year old man. 
She told him: I am afraid of your daughters. I am very attached to my 
youngest brother Mohamed. I told him we are not afraid of your new wife, 
but I am worried about Mohamed and that the new wife would mistreat him. 
He wants to bring her to live with us. I am in thanaweya-aama and my sister is 
getting married soon. I won’t allow my mother to serve his new wife and I am 
scared that his new wife may start to ask me to leave my studying to take 
care of the household chores. Things are very stressful at home. My mother 
knew that the divorce was coming sooner or later. Actually she asked for the 
divorce, and because of that, he wanted her to give up all her rights and 
entitlements. She refused. He wanted to take all our furniture for his new 
house. She refused that too. He has beaten my mother for that. He has taken 
her bedroom furniture for his new wife. He still sometimes helps with the fees 
for my private lessons. Now after the divorce I am afraid that he will stop any 
financial support for my tutoring classes and my higher education if I pass the 
thanaweya-aama exams. He (still referring to her father) has three children 
from a previous marriage and none of them went to school. He was very 
happy when my sister dropped out of school and he is not interested that I 
finish thanaweya-aama and go to college. He kept telling me and my sister 
that we've got no future in education. My mother works hard to support us 
and my sister's marriage. I want to pass my exams and go to college because 
this is the only way to support my mother and brother financially in the 
future. If I fail my exams and lose my chance to go to college, particularly 
after my parents' divorce, there will be a crisis. I am sure that my mother will 
insist that I get married very soon. Not having older brothers and after my 
father has left home, she will insist that I get married.  
 
Both Ahmed and Amina dreamed about passing their thanaweya-aama exams and 
reaching the college they wanted. While surviving thanaweya-aama and starting 
college life was a break–through for Ahmed, it was crucial for Amina in coping with 
her family crisis and as the only way for social mobility. For Amina, surviving 
thanaweya-aama and finishing college would allow her to support her family, so 
they could move up and away from what she currently saw as a crisis situation. Such 
modest ambition in Amina's case was “inherently paired with despair and frustration 
because practical circumstances make it difficult or impossible to realize one's 
ambitions” (Schielke 2009:172). Amina brought gender and class aspects to the 
understanding of young people's negotiations of thanaweya-aama challenges by 
giving a voice to young women coming from urban poor families.  Amina, while 
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feeling sorry for her mother, was worried about how her father's new marriage 
would affect the financial support for her tutoring. For Amina, failing thanaweya-
aama would mean disappointing her mother and most probably being obliged to 
accept an early marriage. She was well aware that she was being subjected, like her 
sister, to attempts at control over her sexuality through early marriage. The only way 
out for her was to succeed in obtaining the scores that would qualify her for college. 
Tension and boredom in Amina's case were paired, like that of the Rabi Das young 
women in West Bengal, India (Ganguly-Scrase 2007), with the circumstances and 
disadvantages of the life of the “urban poor”. 
 
Karim, at the time, was an 11th grade student in the Don Bosco Technical Institute 
located in Shubra, a lower middle class neighbourhood in northern Cairo. Karim lived 
in the Al-Daher area which is another lower middle class neighbourhood located in 
the middle of Cairo, and his father worked as a driver in a private company. Karim is 
one of the young people I had met in Tahrir.  
Karim: I was in a state school before joining Don Bosco. I joined this school to 
escape thanaweya-aama with all its tension. We study Electricity, Maths, 
Physics, Social Studies, Italian and Arabic. The study in the school is all in 
Italian. Don Bosco is a sort of private vocational high school that can lead to 
university education. It qualifies me to go to the Faculty of Engineering if I get 
high scores. The degree is also accredited in Italy. In order to join the school I 
had to go through a number of admission tests. In my school there is no 
private tuition and the teacher has to do his job. If he doesn’t, I have the right 
to complain and the school admin is responsible for taking action. After the 
revolution, the school disciplinary system became stricter. We have two 
sections, Mechanical and Electricity. I decided to study electricity because it 
opens more job opportunities in the future. 
I am truly proud to be at Don Bosco but my biggest fears are about the fact 
that the education authorities recognize Don Bosco as another vocational 
high school. As you may know, such vocational high schools are known for 
being horrible.  There is news that the government will ban school-leavers of 
vocational education from joining the School of Engineering. The government 
claim for such upcoming policies is that the degree of the vocational school 
doesn't qualify students with credentials equal to the thanaweya-aama 
certificate. My school is not a normal vocational school and we are way more 
qualified than state thanaweya-aama students to join the Faculty of  
Engineering. Such a decision would mean ruining my dreams and those of 
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many others and then we can't go on to higher education simply because the 
School of Engineering is our only option. 
I am not worried about finding a job because school-leavers of Don Bosco are 
known in the market and can find a job. I am just worried that I can’t go to 
university. I may have to go to Italy for my higher education. There is an 
Italian University here in Egypt but it’s too expensive for me. I don’t mind if 
people say that I am a school-leaver of a vocational education but we are 
perceived by the government as lower quality school-leavers.  
Karim was not a typical thanaweya-aama student. He and his family had chosen the 
private vocational school with the promise of no private tuition, a better schooling 
system, a guaranteed place in the college, and a better chance for a place in the job 
market. However, with the government's expected restrictions on allowing school-
leavers of vocational education to join the School of Engineering, Karim and other 
Don Bosco students feared that their dreams were being compromised.  
 
Young people were also worried about university studies and what exactly to expect 
as university students and whether they would have a fair chance to succeed.  
Ahmed, Marwan, and Khaled, at the time, were 11th grade thanaweya-aama 
students at the boy’s school. They showed up at the school together twice a week. 
They also went together for private lessons in all five subjects for the 11th grade. The 
three friends came from educated families, and all lived in the Al-Basatin area. 
Ahmed’s father was an accountant and worked for the government. Marwan’s 
father was an agronomist, also in the government. Khaled’s father was an engineer 
and worked for a private company. At the time of talking to them, Ahmed and 
Marwan had not made up their minds about their future studies; however, Khaled 
wanted to study Engineering.  
 
Ahmed:  I am very frustrated (mohbat) because of this school 
MF:  What do you mean by frustrated? 
Ahmed:  Well, first I have to waste my time and come, and now even more 
with the new Minster, as they want us to come every day. As you can see, 
coming to this school is a complete waste of time. We do almost nothing all 
the time. If a teacher shows up at the class he shouts and curses all the time. 
Well, there are just a few good teachers, but students will not give them the 
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chance to teach. As a student I have no rights in the school. We are being 
treated very badly.  
MF: Have you made up your minds about your future college studies? 
Marwan: No, I haven’t decided yet. Actually, it won’t make any difference 
what I decide. You know, in the first place what we learn at school is useless. 
The evidence is that most university graduates don’t find a job. Even if I find a 
job, how much money I will make? Very little.  
Ahmed: The studying we do here at school and then at the college is not 
enough for a real job and a good income. So what we end up with is a 
certificate that we hang on the wall. Useless, right?  
MF: What do you think can be done about this? 
Khaled: As students we can’t do anything. We have no time to think or do 
anything other than being a thanaweya-aama student. But those in charge 
have to find solutions to improve the education system. They need to study 
examples in other countries in Europe, the USA and Japan and learn what 
they did with their education systems. Teachers’ salaries here are very low. All 
those who go for a teaching job, they do it because they didn’t find a better 
job. They need to learn what other countries do to prepare youth our age and 
older to learn skills needed for the market. 
Ahmed: The private universities the government have allowed in the last 
years are creating inequalities between thanaweya-aama leavers. 
MF: Ahmed, what do you mean by creating inequalities? 
Ahmed: Yes, let's assume that Khaled (his friend) achieves lower scores than 
me. He still can find a place at the college he aspires to, as long as his family 
can afford the fees of the private university, while I can't because my family 
can’t afford the expensive fees. This is simply due to the fact that the private 
universities' admission system is not the same as the one for the state 
universities.  
The government of Egypt during Nasser's time made the promise to make higher 
education free for all Egyptians. That was the case until ten years ago when the 
government started to allow business men to establish private universities. By 2010, 
there were more than 30 private universities and higher education institutes, and 
the number was growing, serving thousands of young people coming from families 
capable of affording the fees of private higher education.  
 
141 
Young people's narratives about their fears of failing to join the college they wanted, 
raise critical questions about the official educational discourse which, while 
emphasising a “social contract based on democracy, freedom, and social justice” 
(MOE: 2007), fails to support the most modest ambitions of the young generations. 
In fact, it forces them into a vicious cycle of despair and frustration. Young people's 
experiences with thanaweya-aama, while blended with ambition for college 
studying, are full of risks, uncertainties, and fears of failure. The narratives of young 
people revealed the extent to which they perceived passing the thanaweya-aama 
bottle neck as constituting their educational cultural capital (Bourdieu 1977, 
Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). In the meantime, young people's narratives also 
revealed the extent to which they were aware of how the educational system was 
being used in attempts to determine them and reproduce domination and exclusion.  
 
Even talented young people were not sure whether choosing a college subject that 
corresponded with their talent would bring them closer to achieving success.  Noura, 
at the time, was a 16-year-old 11th grader in the girls’ school.  She lived in the 
middle-class New-Maadi area close to the school. Her parents were divorced and she 
lived with her father and her 13-year-old sister. Noura’s father had a university 
degree in commerce and owned a small real estate company in the Maadi area. 
Noura had shown me several of her drawings, and it was obvious that she was 
talented at drawing: 
Noura: I like drawing so much and I am a member in the school’s arts activity 
group.  
MF: Do you plan to study art when you go to college? 
Noura:  I want to study fine arts when I go to college. But my father is not 
convinced that I should do so. He said that it will not help me to secure a real 
job. I feel he is right about that. He said: I want you to go to college and study 
mass communication or something else that can secure you a job, and you 
can keep practising drawing as a hobby.  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Amro was an 11th grade student at the Pyramids School, Giza when I knew him as 
one of the Tahririan frontline “revolutionaries” and fighters facing the aggression of 
the police and army. Amro, a tall, well-built young man who talks very fast, was very 
proud of himself and of his involvement in the revolution. He lived in the lower 
middle class area of Fiesal in Giza with his family: his father, who is a government 
official; his mother, who is a housewife; and his only younger sister. I met Amro 
shortly after the thanaweya-aama results had been announced:  
 
Doing graffiti during the revolution changed my life and made me to want 
to study art and design. I started to dream about studying graphic design 
but my thanaweya-aama scores won’t allow me to reach this dream. My 
scores may get me into the Faculty of Mass Communication. There I can 
study advertising, which could be close to my interests. I consider that I 
have failed thanaweya-aama as I couldn’t achieve the scores I wanted. 
Actually, having been in the streets after the revolution I didn’t expect to 
pass in the first place. I didn’t achieve the scores I wanted in the 
thanaweya-aama exams and at the end I am being enrolled in a higher 
education course that isn’t what I aspire to. But I will live with it and can 
make something out of studying mass media like many journalists I know.  
 
The narratives of Karim, Ahmed, Noura and Amro, around taking their steps to 
college life expressed the fears and frustrations that their dreams were being 
somehow compromised. They either would be obliged to study, or would have to 
choose to study something other than what they had been longing to study. Neither 
the colleges' admission policies nor the job market were working for the benefit of 
the young people. They were convinced that the system was not working for their 
favour anymore; however, each of them somehow was working on surviving the 
situation. 
 
The question here is how the thanaweya-aama students’ subjectivities were 
constituted while they made sense of their feelings of despair, frustration, 
uncertainty and exclusion. Between a high-stake exams system, family pressures, 
and colleges’ admission policies, young people were confronted with an unfair set of 
material circumstances. It might be suggested that the circumstances of thanaweya-
aama studentship “constrain the sorts of subjects that students can be at the same 
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time as they constitute students" (Youdell 2006:37). In other words, while 
negotiating their thanaweya-aama experiences and aspirations to college life, young 
people were discursively constituted and constrained. In the middle of matrices of 
the transversal class, gender, and educational inclusion and exclusion discourses, 
new possibilities arose for overcoming the conventional and familiar links. Amina, 
Karim, Ahmed, and Amro's negotiations of their class, gender, ability, disability, 
inclusion, and exclusion were "examples of shifts in the implicit .. discourses" 
(Youdell 2006: 40) of being young and a student in the Egyptian context. While 
confirming the value of the educational cultural capital, they even were more aware 
of the attempts to reproduce patriarchy and inequity within the educational arena.  
 
The next section will take this discussion further towards young people’s 
negotiations of their own aspirations about the future and their dreams of success.  
 
 
5.3 Wealth and power aspirations, and wasta realities 
Young people's narratives on the meanings of success aspired to culturally idealised 
trajectories towards mature manhood and womanhood. Coming from urban lower 
middle income families, young men had voiced an image of success that was 
somehow organised around and in relation to the living standard of wealthier 
citizens.  
 
In a discussion with a group of students in the boy's school, male students talked 
about what it meant to be a successful man in the future.  Some students responded 
that being successful would mean benefiting society, being a good citizen, 
supporting one's parents, and fearing God. However, Ahmed (a friend of Khaled and 
Marwan) disagreed with his colleagues: 
 
Ahmed: I don't agree, this is not success for me. 
MF:  So, what's success for you? 
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Ahmed (starting to speak loudly in a theatrical tone as if he wanted to 
attract the attention of his colleagues):  
Five issues will be a sign of being successful. First, a bank deposit that 
would give me a monthly income of at least 6,000 pounds, which would 
allow me to buy anything I wanted. Second, a job with a good salary. Third, 
a nice big house. Fourth, a nice big car. Fifth: getting married to a beautiful 
wife and having a big family of at least 3 children. 
The rest of the students were laughing and commenting on each of the five signs 
mentioned by Ahmed, showing their agreement with him.   
 
The students presented somehow inconsistent meanings of success. Ahmed and the 
students who seemed to agree with his views were fantasising about an image of 
wealth and prosperity. However, other students during the same discussion 
presented meanings that were more associated with notions of the “good citizen”. 
The latter view on the meaning of success will be addressed later in this section in 
more detail, highlighting the tension between this view and the fact that the system 
had failed them.  
 
Young men had also fantasised about becoming military or police professionals, 
given the discourse of power and control that was bound up with the power of the 
political regime. Members of the group of male students in Mostafa Kamel boys’ 
School who called themselves the “Al Kofar” group fantasised about this: 
 
Nasser: I will join the police academy. I want to become a police officer. 
MF: Why a police officer in particular? 
Nasser: Being a police officer allows me to give a hard time to anyone who 
bothers me. I will also make good money. All the "kofar" are planning to 
apply for the police academy. 
 
Amro “the revolutionary” had a similar fantasy: 
 
In the past I strongly wanted to join the special forces of the military, and 
even prepared the papers for this. It’s the army branch responsible for special 
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operations. I have someone in my family who joined this force. After the 
revolution I withdrew the application and got rid of it. I can’t spend the rest of 
my life in the army after this experience.   
 
It is a fact that Mubarak, who was originally a military General, depended on the 
power of the army to continue ruling Egypt for about 30 years. It is also a fact that 
the Mubarak regime extensively utilised the police forces against any form of 
opposition. It became a public discourse that military and police officers were in 
return granted numerous benefits and power. The fantasies of some young people 
about becoming police or military officers in the future were affected by the public 
discourse within the Egyptian context about the power granted by the political 
regime to the police and the army.  
 
Ahmed, Amro, and the Al-Kofar, in negotiating notions and meanings of success, 
aspired to being rich and powerful. Such aspirations fitted with the “culturally 
idealised trajectory towards mature manhood” (Osella and Osella 2000:118) within 
the Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam informal urban context (Hoodfar and Singerman 
1996, Hoodfar 1997, Schielke 2009a). Young men’s narratives suggested that the 
extent to which they aspired to becoming wealthy and powerful was a sign of 
successful masculinity. Along these lines, young men perceived their lives as 
somehow organised around and in relation to the living standards of wealthier 
citizens (Kaplan 2006). “Through ‘voyeurism’ and window-shopping” (Abaza 
2006:215), images of globalised consumerism in the public spaces of the city of Cairo 
became mixed with young people’s aspirations about the future and their fulfilment 
of fantasies and expectations.  
 
Abeer is an 11th grade student living in the Al-Basatin area. Her father owns a car 
maintenance workshop in the neighbourhood: 
 
I dream of finishing my college studies, and becoming a well-educated 
person, getting married to a good person, living in a nice place, working 
and making a difference to my country. I want to have at least two kids. 
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I want to be someone famous and have an important position. I also dream 
of travelling abroad and seeing the world. I especially want to go to 
France, Italy and Dubai.  
Sometimes I dream of being very rich, living in a big villa, and owning an 
expensive car.  All these dreams depend on whether I get the good scores 
that can get me into the college of communication studies or drama.  
I know that as a female, finding a good job is not easy and sometimes it's 
impossible. I also know that men take all the good jobs and that they don't 
see us working.  But I don't accept that I am less than men or that they can 
do things that I can't do. I will not just get married and stay home. I will 
have a journalism or media-related job.   
Despite the fact that a rich husband would mean better life conditions, I 
dream of getting married to a person I love, not just because of money. He 
should be successful, even if his education level is lower than mine.  
 
Young women have also voiced an image of aspiring to the living standards of 
wealthier citizens. In doing so, young women's views on the meaning of success is 
gendered, expressing an ambivalent image of a longing for equity, yet in the 
meantime submitting to patriarchal social norms. Such ambivalence was manifested 
in Abeer's ambition for a good job, while recognising at the same time the 
patriarchal norm that privileges men in the labour market. Abeer also contradicted 
herself in dreaming about being very rich and yet not necessarily getting married to a 
rich husband but rather to the person she loved. More than male students, young 
women emphasised the social capital of forming a family and having children. Abeer 
was looking for marriage with a man who would be good, educated and successful. 
Manifesting a gendered meaning of success, a good marriage was consistently part 
of the equation when young women expressed their views about the meaning of 
success. Along the same lines, early marriage at high school age was a common 
theme mentioned in many of the female students' narratives.  
 
Amina (the young woman encountered earlier in this chapter) talked about her twin 
sister's marriage at the age of 17 (grade 11):  
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Farida is my twin sister. She was here in the school with us and finished 
grade 10. She was supposed to be in grade 11 now with me. Last summer 
she got a marriage proposal from a much older man than her in our 
neighbourhood and she accepted. They will get married in summer. I think 
she is happy that she is getting married soon. He finished a high school 
vocational diploma and makes good money. My mother encouraged her to 
leave the school and get married. With our parents’ divorce, my sister's 
marriage will reduce the responsibility and educational financial burden on 
my mother. 
Some girls who are currently in the school are already engaged and will 
marry after they finish thanaweya-aama and who knows, maybe they will 
get married before they complete their degree. In most cases, families and 
girls would accept a rich husband who will secure her a good living 
standard. A good marriage deal for them is a big success compared to the 
hassle of thanaweya-aama that most probably will lead to unemployment. 
In general, men in our neighbourhood prefer to marry a young girl with a 
lower education level than themselves. However, having the certificate of 
thanaweya-aama will mostly guarantee a husband with a good education 
level but not necessarily a good income. If she doesn't complete 
thanaweya-aama, she will be obliged to marry whoever her parents accept.  
MF: Will you agree to leave thanaweya-aama and get married to a rich 
husband if you get such a marriage proposal? 
Amina: My mother would want this to happen, but no, I want to finish 
thanaweya-aama and go to college.  
 
A few months later and upon the announcement of the thanaweya-aama results, I 
had not seen Amina at the school but I knew that she had successfully passed grade 
11 and was moving to grade 12. I called Amina on her mobile to congratulate her, 
and was surprised when she said "wrong number". Later on, when I asked her friend 
Noura about what was happening with Amina, Noura told me that Amina was going 
to be married soon and that she had not seen her any more. 
 
Youssef, the teacher of biology (my guide at the school and in the neighbourhood) 
explained the view of parents in the neighbourhood on girls' early marriage: 
 
The well-off men in the neighbourhood are those involved in the quarry 
and marble business. For most families, a girl's marriage to a rich man in 
the quarry business is a big achievement. It means improving the living 
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conditions of the whole family of the girl. At the same time it's also 
considered a protection for the girl. Many families would even accept that 
their girl is going to be the second wife. For them, dropping the girl's 
education plans for an early good marriage deal is a "success". In doing so, 
they make a comparison between the immediate good marriage offer and 
keeping the girl in the school, going through the hassle of private tutoring, 
carrying the burden of college education, and God knows whether then the 
girl might end up staying home unmarried and unemployed. 
 
The case of the two sisters Amina and Farida shows how the cultural capital of 
education is gendered in the course of the decision making: whether to drop 
educational plans and go for an early marriage deal or to continue the investment 
with the hope that it will help to secure a good marriage. Fears of uncertainties and 
exclusion were used by some young women and parents to justify the decision to 
drop the educational plans. In some cases, when the proposing man was rich, it was 
discussed within the family as an opportunity that might never come again. It might 
be suggested that the cultural capital of the educational opportunity was being lost 
under pressures of insecurity and uncertainty. In other cases, education was still 
crucial for securing a good marriage, precisely because of the cultural capital it has. 
That was what Amina confirmed: that not completing at least the thanaweya-aama 
qualification would oblige the young woman to marry whoever was accepted by the 
parents. 
 
Fears of unemployment and exclusion were significant common themes in both male 
and female students’ narratives. The Egyptian state had failed to fulfil the promises 
to provide the education that can prepare young people for a better future. Egypt 
HDR (2010) reports that for 2008-09, “unemployment was more pronounced among 
the poor, where 29% of poor educated persons [aged] 18-29 were unemployed and 
one out of four educated non-poor was unemployed” (Egypt HDR 2010:82).  
 
The notion of wasta was a significant common theme in almost all students’ 
narratives on aspirations for future employment. In several discussions with 11th 
grade students, they had talked about future aspirations and practice of wasta. Both 
female and male students had expressed their senses of hopelessness for the future 
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due to what they described as networks of corruption that were dominating the 
Egyptian scene: 
 
Student 1: We understand that our chances of getting good jobs after 
graduation are limited because of wasta.  
MF: What exactly do you mean by “wasta”? 
Student 2: Wasta is when individuals get a job or are favoured over others, 
not because they are qualified and meet the job requirements but rather 
because they are well connected somehow with someone powerful.  
Student 3:  Wasta is one feature of corruption that is everywhere.  
Student 4:  Wasta is everywhere, even at the sporting club. I went to play 
football because I am a good player, as all my friends say. I went for the 
admission test but I was not accepted because spaces were reserved for kids 
coming from well-connected families.  
Student 5: Wasta means that those who possess the power of money and 
connections can find their places and the rest of us will be sitting and waiting 
at the coffee house. 
Student 6: We are cancelling our dreams because it's obvious that there is no 
hope of achieving them. 
Student 7: I know university graduates, even graduates from the School of 
Medicine, who are working in unskilled labour because of unemployment. 
Student 8: I admit it, after graduation I will look for wasta from a relative who 
works in a big company in the industrial area. He can help me find a good job 
opportunity. 
In negotiating hopelessness about reaching future aspirations, young people engage 
in a political position through an obviously cynical attitude as shown in their 
discussion of wasta and corruption. All those students were coming of age in the city 
of Cairo to join its large segment of educated unemployed youth. They belonged to 
lower middle income families of the Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam areas. Families 
invested considerably in thanaweya-aama and higher education; however, such 
investment was not matched by real job opportunities that enabled young people to 
move on to the independence of adulthood. The notion of “cancelling our dreams” 
manifested young people's desperation at the signs they saw of corruption and 
injustice. Young people continued critiquing the system for its failure to support 
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them in achieving their dreams. There might be a tension here between the young 
people critical stance of the system, and how they spoke about “benefiting the 
country” and being “a good citizen” as a sign of success. In doing so, young people 
“are not trapped into acting in certain way by their habitus” (Jeffrey 2008: 747) when 
they spoke of the notion of a “good citizen”. On the contrary, I argue that notions of 
“benefiting the country" and being a “good citizen” were about longing to make a 
difference and not about maintaining the “status quo”. 
 
 
5.4 Self-realisation: change (taghyeer) is the key 
Young people had considered the notion of "tahkik-elzat" or self-realisation through 
talking about their long term dreams or how they saw themselves in the future:  
 
Noura: I want to be (God willing) someone good and appreciated. I want to 
hold an important position one day so that I can make a difference and 
(afeed el balad) benefit the country. However, the academic and 
professional future is predestined by God. Of course it does not mean that 
we become passive and do nothing but we are certain that we can’t reach 
any success or achievement beyond what is destined for us by Almighty 
God.  
 
Khaled: I want to fulfil my dreams and make my parents happy and proud 
of me, establish a family, and serve the community like Professor Zuwil. But 
he succeeded abroad. I want to go abroad. Zuwil said: in the US they gave 
me all the support to succeed. He didn’t find any support here.  
 
Ahmed: El-balad de mesh mehtagalna – this country doesn't need us. I 
want to go abroad where I can succeed. I have many relatives working in 
the Gulf. Most probably they will find me a job over there after I finish 
college. I have no value here and many young people my age want to go 
abroad. I want to go abroad because I expect to be more respected and 
appreciated and my chances to succeed are higher. The situation here is 
awful and is getting worse. I feel ashamed that some people in my 
neighbourhood can’t find food for their kids’ supper.  
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Despite being ideologically loaded with reference to western notions of individuality, 
the notion of "self-realisation" (tahkik elzat) when used and responded to by young 
people also carried locally understood meanings. I argue that young Egyptians’ 
notion of self-realisation, as exemplified in the narratives of Noura, Khaled and 
Ahmed, carries fragments of western notions of individuality, particularly their 
assertions of the declining influence of class differences in reaching success (Jeffrey 
2008: 741-3), as well as local notions of national, communal and religious 
commitments. However, I am not suggesting that young Egyptians’ cultures are 
derived from western youth cultures. Moreover, the student’s confession (quoted 
earlier in this chapter) about his intention to use a relative’s wasta for employment, 
and Ahmed’s narrative of letting relatives find him a job in the Gulf shows the extent 
to which young people valued the available local and traditional networks in 
negotiating their future aspirations and potential. 
 
Acquiring a university degree, finding a good job, and forming a family were common 
themes in both the male and female students' narratives on the meaning of “self-
realisation”. However, young people had navigated other notions that I am exploring 
here in more detail, such as “wanting to benefit the country”, “wanting to go 
abroad”, the notion of change (taghyeer), and the religious notion that “success and 
future are predestined by God”. 
 
The notion of benefiting the country (afeed el Balad) and wanting to become the 
good successful citizen who contributes to the good of the nation had been used by 
some of the young people. While it can be interpreted as a nationalist position, 
young people's negotiations of the notion of “benefiting the country” have 
expressed the extent to which they wanted to contribute to improving the quality of 
life for their families and communities. Amina, for example, wanted to reach her 
dream for higher education and a good job in order to support her mother and 
brother to survive economic hardship. The position of young people such Amina 
does not confirm Schielke's view that what the “aim of self-realisation entails can 
come to stand in conflict to community- and family-oriented values and aims” 
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(Schielke 2009a: 172).  However, I argue with Schielke that young people's longing 
for self-realisation through personal achievement of graduating and forming family 
“entails aims and ideals of personhood that, while they do not necessarily stand in a 
felt conflict to community and religion, are not framed by them” (Schielke 
2009a:173).    
 
The notion of “benefiting the country” is inherently paired with despair and 
frustration (Schielke 2009a: 172), particularly with young people’s notion of being 
excluded and awez aseeb el-balad w asafer bara – wanting to leave the country and 
go abroad. With the expression “this country doesn’t need us, I want to travel 
abroad”, young people were negotiating on the one hand their sense of exclusion, 
and on the other hand their sense of individuality, which means that if what it took 
to succeed was to go abroad they would make that decision. The notion “this 
country doesn't need us” manifested young people’s sense of desperation due to 
exclusion. According to the Egypt HDR (2010) report, “28% of male youth expressed 
their intention to migrate” (Egypt HRD 2010:39).  
 
Schielke argues that for rural Egyptian young people, “this is an escapist perspective 
for sure, and escape is a strong topic indeed in the aspirations of young people” 
(2009a: 173). For those rural young people, a “sense of emptiness, and stagnation” 
are behind what Schielke described as “the grand paradigmatic strategy of escape 
and success” (2009a: 173). In the case of the young people in Al-Basatin and Dar-
elsalam, the escapist perspective was blended with a political position against the 
system that did not meet their aspirations at all. Noura, while expressing what self-
realisation meant to her, declared her position against Mubarak and his government. 
Ahmed, while longing to go abroad to succeed, expressed his sense of shame at the 
examples of injustice. These young people’s aspirations to migrate were based on 
their sense that the situation was hopeless and that their circumstances would not 
improve. I argue that the young people’s narratives on going abroad were more of 
an expression of frustration and despair rather than a trend towards escaping into 
an individual solution. 
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For some young people, the notion of benefiting the country went beyond the model 
of the “good citizen” and notions of change (taghyeer). They were very critical of the 
system failure, from the degeneration of schooling and the whole education system 
and to the networks of corruption that they saw as dominant within Egyptian 
society. Young people like Noura, Ahmed and Khaled did not believe in the 
effectiveness of small changes here or there. They believed in a total change of the 
whole system. For them, the system did not work any longer. With the expression 
“taghyeer", young people referred to changing the whole regime. Along these lines, 
Ahmed spoke about the sense of “shame” that some poor families in the 
neighbourhood could not afford to provide the basic needs for their children. For 
Ahmed, it was the corrupt system and absence of justice that had led to such a 
shameful situation.  
 
Jeffrey (2008) seconds Cole’s (2004) argument “for the distinctive capacity of young 
people to challenge and transform structures of political domination” (Jeffrey 2008: 
749). Cole argues that “youths’ structural liminality – the fact that they are less 
embedded in older networks of patronage and exchange – makes them uniquely 
poised to take advantage of new social and economic conditions” (Cole 2004: 576, 
cited in Jeffrey 2008: 749). There were many signals made by young people in the 
three schools, as transcribed in this chapter and in other parts of this thesis, which I 
found striking for their critical political position against the political regime. In 
several instances, upon leaving a school after a long day's visit I was wondering 
about what was happening and whether such signals by young people should be 
considered as an alert for a large-scale change (taghyeer) on the horizon.  
 
The pious notion that the future and what one can achieve is predestined by God is 
another common theme of young people's narratives in negotiating a notion of “self-
realisation”. Young people had used the discourses of “God willing, I will succeed” 
and other expressions which showed their convictions that success, income and 
other benefits are gifts destined from God. These young people had mostly 
emphasised that a commitment to religious ethics was not to be compromised for 
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reaching success. One would think that such pious discourse might be in conflict with 
the secular liberal notion of agency that was manifested by many young people in 
negotiating notions of taghyeer (change) and in their critical position towards what 
they described as a corrupt system.  
 
Noura had criticised the political regime in the middle of a discussion on her meaning 
of self-realisation:   
 
I am totally against this government and I hate Mubarak and all the 
corruption around us. I want to contribute with something small that can 
help taghyeer (change) the bad situation in this country (el-balad).  
 
While Noura was very critical about the political regime in the course of discussing 
her future aspirations, at the same time she confirmed her conviction that success, 
future and change are “predestined by God”.  Noura (as I discuss in Chapter 6) was a 
participant in the neighbourhood’s mosque lessons. Young Egyptians were 
negotiating the meaning of achieving self-realisation at the intersection of piety and 
religious commitment. Their pious commitments were not in conflict with their 
critical position towards corruption, and their desires for changing the realities 
around them. With such conceptions, young people were producing their own 
hybrid meanings that were to a great extent trying to break down such polarisation 
(Mahmood 2009:861). 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter young people voiced their sense of tension, and boredom regarding 
their current status as thanaweya-aama students. While acknowledging the value of 
passing thanaweya-aama as the pathway towards future success and social mobility, 
young people also showed their awareness of how the educational system was being 
used for the reproduction of domination and exclusion. Emerging from thanaweya-
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aama to college life, young people’s subjectivities were constituted while they made 
sense of their feelings of despair, frustration, uncertainty and exclusion. At the 
intersections of class, gender, and educational exclusive circumstances, young 
people showed their capacity for overcoming the conventional links that were aimed 
at subordinating them. 
 
Coming from lower middle class backgrounds, the Egyptian students voiced an image 
of success that was somehow organised around and in relation to the living 
standards of wealthier citizens. Their narratives suggest the extent to which they 
aspired to become powerful and wealthy as a sign of successes. Young people’s 
notion of "self-realisation" carried locally understood meanings of finding a good job, 
forming a family and believing that success is predestined by God, and it showed the 
extent to which young people valued the available local and traditional networks in 
negotiating their future aspirations and potentials. 
 
Young people’s narratives reveal a number of ambivalences through which they are 
constituted as young and educated. For instance, voicing criticism against wasta 
networks and the corruption they entail, while at the same time thinking of the 
potential wasta networks available to them for employment upon graduation; 
swinging between the notion of “self-realisation” with what it carries of western 
notions of individuality and longing to live abroad while voicing Egyptian lower 
middle class idealised trajectories of longing to benefit the country and make a 
difference; young women longing for equity in the labour market upon graduation 
while submitting to patriarchal social norms by being willing to drop their 
educational plans and going for an early marriage and admitting that men have a 
better chance in the labour market. These contradictions are centered on intense 
competition between the middle-class elite and disadvantaged low-income strata 
(Roger 2008), “effectively reworking the social history of youth … to meet the 
demands of new economic and political conditions” (Rogers 2008: 79). 
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CHAPTER  6 
Gendered tactics: unruliness and ambivalence 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores young Egyptians’ navigation of forms of patriarchy and 
subordination of their wider everyday life inside and outside the state school. Such 
navigation manifests young people’s tensions about the schooling system, familial 
and societal pressures, and hopelessness about the future. I suggest that young 
people, while going about such navigation were deploying “tactics of the weak or 
powerless” (De Certeau 1980: 8). I will particularly explore in this chapter some cases 
of young people’s individual and collective gendered tactics of unruliness and 
ambivalence.  
 
Life for Cairo's informal dwellers is mostly dominated by older generations (Hoodfer 
1997, Wikan 1990, Singerman and Hoodfar 1986) which leads to a state of constant 
tension between older and younger generations. “The family is the main source of 
social capital, in the form of bonding, social networking, exchange, synergy and trust 
of others....However, family links can also constrain social development, especially 
when family values dominate youth and transcend the private sphere to spill into the 
public domain” (Egypt HDR 2010: 69). Patriarchy in this context is manifested in 
fathers' (as household heads) control over the political economy of the 
neighbourhood. Mature men at the age of forty and older are the business owners, 
the craftsmen, the experienced workers, the informal merchants, or the government 
officials and the teachers.  They attempt to be in control of the young peoples’ 
future choices, employment, relationships, and even political participation within the 
household and the neighbourhood.  
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6.2 Boys’ unruly tactics 
Young men from the informal neighbourhoods face various forms of contradictory 
pressures and subordination. While they are regarded as men who will in the future 
be responsible for their families, they are meanwhile accused of being undisciplined 
and irresponsible. While they are burdened by the expectation of finishing their 
higher education degrees and finding a good job, they look around and see older 
brothers and cousins who are unemployed and have not achieved much. While they 
are regarded as the protectors of females of the family and the neighbourhood, they 
are accused for committing street harassment. While they are encouraged to act as 
an example of a good Muslim citizen, they are accused of being conservative and 
fanatical.  
The following are cases where young men individually and collectively deployed 
tactics while they navigated forms of pressures and subordination. I will first 
exploring the Al-Kofar group’s aggressive and chaotic position, and then I will look at 
Amro’s political unruly position. 
 
6.2.1 The “Al-Kofar” gang 
A group of male students in the Mostafa Kamel boys’ School decided to call 
themselves “Al Kofar” (non-believers). The group that occupied a corner in one of 
the 10th grade classes proudly introduced themselves to me as the “Al-kofar” group. 
The name “kofar” comes from the Arabic word “kofr” denoting unbelieving in 
religion. It was my first time in this particular class, so I started by introducing myself 
and explaining what I was doing in the school. The Al-kofar group started fighting 
with each other, and then they started fighting with other students. They cut me off 
while talking and they interrupted any other students who were talking, by making a 
noise or commenting sarcastically on what was being said. I waited a long time for 
the class to calm down and listen. I had hardly introduced myself, and having a 
discussion was almost impossible without shouting higher than all of them. I decided 
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to observe the situation for a while, and had side talks with a small group of students 
and individual students: 
Ahmed (a student) said: “Teachers avoid coming to our class. Those students 
keep fighting and creating problems all the time. They all come from the Dar-
elsalam area. Our school is totally out of control because of them.  
MF: What did you want to imply by mentioning that they are from Dar-
elsalam? 
Ahmed (lowering his voice): Students in the school come from three areas: 
Maadi Gardens, Al-Basatin, and Dar-elsalam. Dar-elsalam is a poor area with 
a very low level of education and many problems. We have fights every 
couple of days outside the school gates between students coming from Dar-
elsalam and other groups of students. 
I approached the Al-Kofar group to try and have a conversation. I waited for a while 
until there was a moment of silence during which I was able to get their attention. 
The discussion started and I tried to keep it going despite interruptions: 
MF: What do you mean by naming your group “Al-kofar”? 
Student 1: It means that we are bad and nobody can defeat us. 
MF: Why are the six of you in particular in the group? 
Student 1: We are old friends and we come from the same area. We all live in 
Dar-elsalam, we go out together. 
Student 2:  And we fight together. 
MF:  Who do you fight? 
Student 2:  We fight with anyone who dares to bother us. 
MF:  Why do you keep disturbing the class work? 
Student 2 (laughing):  We try to fill the boring time in the school.  
MF:  But some teachers are trying to do their jobs and teach, right? 
Student 3: Don’t believe that, all these students take private lessons, the 
teachers don’t teach any more. 
Student 4: The teachers in the school don’t have any respect for us. They treat 
us like “shit”. 
Student 5 (not a member of the group): I agree there is no respect for 
students in the school. The other day a teacher hit me on the face for nothing. 
159 
The unruly tactics of the Al-kofar group at the Moustafa Kamel School can be 
understood, following De Certeau (1980: 6-8), as an uncertain move causing a mess 
within the classroom. The Al-kofar was one example of various unruly tactics 
deployed by students at the boys’ school. It was a sign of their attention and 
understanding of the gaps in the school discipline created by a particular 
combination of circumstances at this specific school venue due to weak school 
administration, among other factors that were discussed in detail in previous 
chapters. 
Students were keen to point out that their chaotic behaviour was due to the fact 
that the school was not really the venue for education any more. More importantly, 
their narratives reinforced their claim that they were treated with disrespect and 
aggression. Male students who came from poorer areas within the district were 
particularly positioned as trouble makers and the source of problems. The Al-kofar 
group had chosen a provocative title. The meaning of “kofar” within the Egyptian 
context has bad connotations. Such terms are not normally used or welcomed 
among informal dwellers, who are known for being highly respectful towards religion 
and religious beliefs.  
 
6.2.2 Amro: “the revolutionary” 
Amro (the 11th grade student) encountered in chapter 5 had talked about his 
political unruly position at the school venue and within his family: 
Amro: My parents for a long time didn’t know that I had joined the 
revolution’s street actions. While I was known to many people in Tahrir, I lied 
to my parents that I was in a private lesson or hanging out with friends. Even 
after I'd told them that I'd joined some demos, they didn’t understand that I 
was that close to the street actions.  
MF: But why did you lie to your parents? 
Amro: You know, even if they'd known, I wasn't going to stay home. I just 
saved myself the headache of them panicking and worrying about me. My 
parents are pro the revolution but like many Egyptian parents they support 
the revolution from home and as long as it’s away from their kids.  
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One morning I found out through Twitter that the clashes in Tahrir had 
resumed. I left home after a fight with my parents, who didn’t want me to go 
out. My father told me, if you insist on going now, just stay in the street and 
don’t come back. I said, fine. I had no money. I collected my stuff and 
borrowed some money from my cousin on my way to Tahrir. For two days I 
was engaged in non-stop clashes with the police. My mother called and asked 
me to go back home and I refused. She said, come back and discuss the issue 
with your father.  
Before going home I had to attend a private lesson. I had a big fight with the 
private teacher when he accused those in Tahrir of treason, and he even 
cursed those who had just died and said that those in Tahrir were thugs who 
were paid to fight against the police. I told the teacher loudly that he was an 
‘idiot’. I called him names and assured him that those in Tahrir didn't get 
anything in return. I told him that I was going to Tahrir and that my father 
had raised me as a real man, not a “pussy” like him (the teacher). He asked 
me to leave and not come back. I left after telling him that I would never 
come back. He called home and complained to my parents. Later on when I 
went home, I had a long argument with my father for almost four hours. 
MF:  Has anything changed at the school since the revolution? 
Amro: Being called a bunch of losers and useless kids by the teachers and the 
principal continued after the revolution. Nothing has changed. Actually after 
the revolution they started to call us “thugs”.  
A student, “A.M.”, in my school, in the same grade as me, died with a bullet in 
his neck in Tahrir when the army attacked the sit-in of April 8th. That was the 
sit-in following the Friday’s demonstrations when a group of military officers 
announced that they were supporting us and announced their disobedience to 
the military authorities. A few days later at the school we decided to hang up 
a huge banner with the photo of our classmate who had died in Tahrir. I 
walked to the principal's office with a couple of my classmates to ask him to 
allow us to hang up the banner. Some teachers were also sitting in the 
principal’s office. The principal (son of .....) refused and said: “I won’t allow a 
photo of him to be hung up in the school. He is (referring to our classmate) 
just a thug”. The principal and teachers called us losers and thugs and said 
that what we are doing is ruining the country. We got very angry and we 
attacked the principal and teachers. All of us were punished and were not 
permitted to hang up the banner. 
The clashes that happened at the school after the accident in the Port Said 
Stadium37 was even more confrontational. There was a call for a general 
                                                          
37 The Port Said Stadium disaster was a mass attack that occurred on 1 February 2012 in the Stadium 
in Port Said, Egypt, following an Egyptian premier league football match between the Al-Masry and Al-
Ahly clubs. At least 79 people were killed and more than 1,000 were injured after thousands of Al-
Masry spectators stormed the stadium stands and the pitch, following a 3–1 victory by Al-Masry.  Al-
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strike leading to civil disobedience after what happened in Port Said. In that 
massacre I lost many of my friends who were members of the "Ultras 
Ahlawy"38. The strike was calling for the military to step down after the failure 
to lead the country. We (students in my school) were among the first to join 
the strike. Well, I know that most of us don’t go to school anyway; however, 
with the strike the school was literally empty. Unfortunately the strike failed, 
thanks to government workers and older generations who have become 
slaves to the regime. After the failure of the strike, we (in my school) prepared 
and hung several banners about the Port Said Martyrs and announcing our 
position against the regime. The school management ordered the removal of 
all the banners. A big clash erupted in the school between students on one 
side and the principal and teachers on the other side, after the principal again 
called my friends (who died in Port Said) thugs and the losers of Ultras. We 
almost destroyed all the school’s furniture and windows. Many students were 
dismissed from the school that day.  
Amro is an example of some (certainly not all) thanaweya-aama students who were 
engaged somehow in the Egyptian revolution. It can be suggested, in relation to the 
public discourses of the revolution and the Arab Spring, that the revolution is a 
“youth-made and youth-led revolution” which had an effect on the way young 
people have navigated forms of patriarchy and subordination since January 2011. 
Notions of solidaristic masculinity and violence have become significant among many 
male students during and since the revolution. Male students’ previous experiences 
of in-school everyday oppositional practices turned into exposure to threats of death 
and injury during the revolution clashes. Amro lost some of his classmates and 
friends in clashes and accidents that followed the revolution. He faced the dangers 
of death and injury every time he was in the front line of such clashes. With all that 
Amro went through during the street actions, he continued to struggle with familial 
and school authorities that were trying to control him. Engagement in street actions 
at such particular historical moments had a significant effect on students’ position 
towards the schooling normative hegemony. Instead of continuing the tactics of 
acting chaotically in De Certeau’s sense (1984), students started to shift towards 
transferring the revolution into the space of the school in a way that would 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Masry fans violently attacked Al-Ahly fans, and also the club's fleeing players, using knives, swords, 
clubs, stones, bottles and fireworks as weapons (BBC 2012). 
38
 Ultras Ahlawy (UA-07) is an Egyptian ultras group that supports the Cairo-based Egyptian Premier 
League football club Al-Ahly.[1] The group was founded in 2007 by former members of the first Ahly 
support group, Ahly Fans Club (AFC). (Saied and Hassan 2007). 
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eventually contribute to redefining the meaning of the schooling space.  Amro 
narrated two incidents during which he and peer students attempted to use the 
school venue to honour their friends and classmates whose life was sacrificed during 
the clashes of the revolution. He also mentioned the strike against the military rule 
that was joined by his school and many other schools.  
I asked Amro if he considered himself religious or not. He said: 
I am not religious, I don’t pray a lot and I don’t fast every day in Ramadan. 
But I don’t go with the idea of atheism that some young people talk about. If 
a boy or a girl tells me they don’t believe in God or religion, that should mean 
that they have read about all religions and done enough research to reach 
such a conclusion. But they are idiots and just repeat ideas without any n-
depth understanding. They think that by saying so, they can do whatever they 
want with no obligations. However, Islamists are trying to impose religion 
onto everything, particularly the political conflict. I am not convinced about 
the frames of ethics in our society. It’s so hypocritical and Islamists are using 
religion to serve their political agenda. 
Amro’s frankness about not being religious went beyond the notion of “flaws of 
perfection”. While an Islamist would describe Amro’s position as “imperfectionism”, 
Amro and other Tahririan young people would see it as the normal position by a 
rebellious generation which, while respecting religion, did not accept replacing a 
corrupt regime with a theocracy. Young people like Amro, who had engaged 
somehow in the actions of the revolution, had started to realise that the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other Islamist groups were using religion excessively for achieving 
their political agenda towards establishing a religious state. Amro was simply saying 
that he did not risk his life and his martyr friends and classmates did not die in order 
to replace Mubarak with the Islamists.  
 
 
6.3 Girls’ ambivalence and tactics of survival 
Thanaweya-aama young women in the informal neighbourhoods also face various 
forms of pressure and subordination. On the one hand, they are burdened by the 
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expectation of succeeding in their exams, and finishing their higher education 
degrees. On the other hand, they face considerable control of their movements and 
existence in the public sphere. Given that the informal areas were intensively 
targeted by the actions of the Islamist revival, girls and women were particularly 
targeted. Preachers of the Islamic revival consider mixed-gender socialisation and 
issues of love and romance outside the confines of marriage to be very dangerous 
(Schielke 2009b: 161). Consequently, informal communities have developed an 
obsession about controlling young women’s sexuality and have preferred to allow 
girls’ early marriage as a matter of protection and in order to maintain the family 
reputation against the dangers of any potential mixed-gender socialisation.  
The following are cases of young women's navigation of forms of pressure and 
subordination.  In the course of such navigation, young women on the one hand had 
voiced an ambivalent and sometimes ambiguous position, and on the other hand 
through the tactics they had deployed had shown the potentiality for causing 
“cracks” within the structure of the given patriarchal and Islamist discourses (De 
Certeau 1984:37-38). 
 
6.3.1 Hadia: “provisional submission” 
Hadia was 16 years old (at the time), and an 11th grade student living with her family 
in Al-Basatin. She attended some of my events and discussions but she mostly 
remained silent and did not participate. Whenever I saw Hadia in the school, she was 
walking alone. As I understood later, Hadia approached Ms. Sanaa, the psychology 
worker, to talk to her. Ms. Sanaa suggested to Hadia that she might like to talk to 
me. Over a number of interview sessions, Hadia explored her day to day challenges 
with her family and teachers: 
Hadia: My father is originally from Upper Egypt and moved to live in Al-
Basatin, and got married to my mother who is from Saida Zeinab39. He is an 
artisan working in manufacturing bags, and my only brother (Ahmed) finished 
                                                          
39
 The famous district in old Cairo. 
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his high technical (vocational) education and is working temporarily as a 
salesman. My mother doesn’t work.  
I attend private lessons in four subjects: Arabic, English, Mathematics, and 
Italian. History is the only subject I study on my own. I like studying history – 
it’s like reading a story, and I like stories. 
I am not allowed to go outside the house without my mother, and I am only 
allowed to go to school and private lessons after school. I can't talk to 
neighbours because my mother doesn't like them. Mum is always nervous and 
doesn't listen to me at all. I feel am useless with no value. Nobody cares to 
know what I think, even at school. 
I'd like to be a normal girl, laughing, and going out with friends, but I am 
mostly alone and frustrated. Home is frustrating, school is frustrating. 
Nobody cares about what I want. Even if some people ask about me, they do 
it sarcastically, so. I lock myself in my room and cry. The only refuge for me is 
music.  
I am a shy person and don’t have many friends. Actually I only have one close 
friend (Farida). Farida is my age and also in grade 11 but she goes to another 
school now. We used to go to school together until grade 10. I used to go to 
her house and she used to visit me. I like her so much, and I miss her. We 
haven't met recently. 
I wish that my parents would pay more attention to my needs and my studies 
instead of keeping on watching over me and my behaviour all the time.  
MF: What makes you think that they watch over you all the time? 
Hadia: I am sure they do. My mother reads my diaries, and spies on my mobile 
to see who I am talking to or texting. 
Ahmed cares for me and talks to me when he is home and not tired from 
work. However, he wants to control me. He keeps watching over me, where I 
go, who I talk to, ...etc.  
The worst thing is that Ahmed refuses to let me see or even talk to my only 
friend Farida. My mother agrees with Ahmed and tells me to obey him. 
Ahmed thinks that my friend is impolite because she is never shy about telling 
anyone what she wants or dressing the way she likes. She is veiled also, but 
she puts a nice veil. They want everyone to be speechless like me. My brother 
claims that he saw her walking with a boy. I don’t believe him. But even if she 
meets boys, it’s not his business. I use every opportunity to call her on the 
mobile when they are out, but I am not free to answer her calls if they are 
around. I am planning to visit her next week but I won’t tell my mother. 
MF: What about your father. Why can’t you ask for his support? 
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Hadia: I know that my father cares for me but he doesn’t talk to me at all. 
Even if I try to talk to him he tells me to ask my mother or Ahmed. 
Hadia was struggling with the familial rules, and pleaded for more attention and 
equity. Rules imposed by the family regarding relationships and socialisation were 
not suggested in Hadia’s narrative as being religious but were seen rather as social 
norms. Ahmed (Hadia’s brother) retained a traditional notion of masculinity through 
exercising repressive control over Hadia. The notion of being “useless” was used 
repeatedly by Hadia to refer to her position within the family. Being in contact with 
her friend and having a peer friendship was of great value to Hadia, to the extent 
that she would take the risk of seeing her friend while hiding this from the family. 
This was the making of Hadia’s gendered subjectivities as the lonely, shy, obedient, 
quiet young woman. She was being taught by her family what it means to be a 
“young woman” living in an informal neighbourhood. The same processes were 
relevant for Ahmed (Hadia’s brother) who was being trained to become the man 
responsible for guarding his sister. Such masculine social norms represented another 
element of the patriarchal legacy facing young women within Egyptian informal 
communities. 
 
Being economically dependent on their families, young people at the ages of 
attending high school and university are subjected to communal and familial 
pressures and control over their socialisation and aspirations. The older generations 
are in control of many decisions concerning young peoples’ lives, such as education, 
friendship, marriage, practising religion, as well as simpler things like choosing 
clothes and even going out with friends. Among informal dwellers, young women in 
particular – upon reaching the age of adolescence and in addition to the daily 
pressures of being young – are subjected to official and informal measures to 
regulate female sexuality, the way they dress and the roles they are permitted to 
adopt within the public sphere. 
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Hadia was also struggling with her marginalisation within the schooling system, both 
the formal and informal. By informal, I refer to the private tutoring system that 
emerged as a parallel and informal educational system: 
MF: Tell me about school. 
Hadia: I come to school every day in order to escape home. However, here in 
the school also, nobody cares or is willing to listen. You know what?  I was 
forced to take private Maths lessons with Mr. Ashraf, my Maths teacher at 
school. He passed by our house and told my parents that I needed help with 
Maths and that I should join his after-school tutoring class. My mother forced 
me to join his private group. It's twice a week after school hours and we have 
the lesson in the house of one of our classmates. I hate it and I want to leave. 
MF: Why do you hate it? Don’t you need help with your Maths? 
Hadia: I do need help with Maths, but I think I can help myself if I get more 
encouragement. The problem is that Mr. Ashraf doesn’t have faith in us. He 
keeps telling us during the class and also during the private lesson that we are 
useless and hopeless. I don’t need private tutoring in Maths with a teacher 
who keeps telling me that I am useless. 
MF: So what are you going to do? 
Hadia: I don’t know yet. I don't get any benefit from the private lessons and I 
pay a lot. I will stop, but I am afraid that Mr. Ashraf will give me a hard time 
after I leave. Should I tell him face to face or should I send the final week's 
lesson payment with one of my classmates and ask her to inform him that 'm 
stopping? I don’t know what to do. 
A few weeks later I saw Hadia in the school and she had a big smile on her face. She 
stopped to talk to me briefly: 
Hadia: Finally, I have just told Mr. Ashraf face to face that I don’t need the 
private Maths lesson and that I can study it myself. I told him that I am 
leaving the lessons. But I didn’t tell my parents that I've left Mr. Ashraf’s 
lessons. He may talk to them, meaning that I may face trouble at home. But I 
will insist I'm not going back. 
Thinking of the prominence of what the school should mean for Hadia, her narrative 
does not suggest that a significant role is in fact being played by the school. Although 
she escaped from home by going to school, she repeated the same notion of being 
“useless” when describing her position within the school. She submitted 
provisionally to restrictions placed on her movement and relationships by her family 
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and to the norm of the private lessons. At first I thought that it was a contestation on 
Hadia's side to the teacher’s authority by telling him face to face that she was leaving 
his private Maths lessons. If, however, it was not an act of contestation and 
subversion, then what was it? Hadia neither subverted nor escaped the teacher's 
and family's pressures to join the lessons. It might be suggested that Hadia had 
submitted to norms in a way that changed the norm itself (Butler 2006: 532). Butler 
asks: “Is it possible to inhibit the norm in order to mobilize the rules differently?” 
(Butler 2006:532). Hadia strategically avoided subversive actions and joined the 
private lessons. Through submission to the norm, she allowed herself the time “to 
make room for an alternative agency, a creative deployment of power” (Butler 
2006:533). Butler argues that “there are, after all, other things to do with rules than 
simply conforming to them. .. They can be recrafted. Conformity itself may permit 
for hyperbolic instantiation of the norm that exposes its fantastic character” (Butler 
2006:533). That is exactly what Hadia did by joining the teacher’s private lessons for 
a short period which allowed her the opportunity to realise the uselessness of the 
private lesson for her which eventually granted her the courage to face him with the 
fact that she did not need his help. It was an example of the ambivalence of mastery 
and submission which paradoxically occur simultaneously towards the constitution 
of the subject (Davies 2006:426). Hadia as a subject had cultivated a novel tactic of 
desubjection through abiding by the rules. It is a tactic that perhaps she might start 
deploying with her family and in the school. 
 
6.3.2 Noura: being young and Muslim 
Noura (the 11th grader in the girls’ school, encountered in Chapter 5) wanted to 
speak about her social life within her family and in the neighbourhood: 
Noura: Despite the fact that I am not wearing a hijab (veil), I regularly go with 
my neighbours to Quran and Fekh (Islamic principles) lessons at the 
neighbourhood mosque. I go to these lessons two to three times a week. My 
neighbour makes sure to remind me and now I go regularly with her and her 
daughter. I like the mosque's lessons because it makes me more 
knowledgeable about my religion. 
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MF: Why have you chosen not to wear the hijab? 
Noura: I am refusing the hijab for a very simple reason. Many girls are 
wearing tight clothes and yet wear a hijab. For them the hijab is just a 
fashion. I think this is wrong. I am wearing tight clothes too, but not wearing 
a hijab. My father never obliged me to wear a hijab because he knows about 
how I behave. There are many girls who are wearing a hijab and yet do bad 
things.  
My younger sister is so reckless. She has a group of female friends who are 
crazy. I can’t believe what they do. They go with men in their cars and do lots 
of crazy stuff. My sister doesn’t listen to any advice from me or dad. She 
listens to music all the time. She wears tight clothes despite being veiled. She 
keeps a long list of boys’ mobile numbers. When I asked her where she got all 
those numbers, she said that boys go to the school and throw papers at the 
girls with their mobile numbers.  
Every time I go to the mosque lessons, I try to take her with me but she 
refuses. We are not really religious at home. We are open-minded or you 
could say not conservative or liberal (motahareren). 
MF:  What exactly do you mean by open minded / liberal (motahareren)? 
Noura: My father is not conservative like our neighbours and he doesn’t pray. 
At the time of prayers no one at home will tell us to go and pray. My father 
drinks alcohol sometimes and smokes shisha. My sister and I listen to music. 
My father never comments on how we dress or that our clothes are not 
appropriate. He just lets us decide on whatever we like to wear. Our 
neighbour’s father has a big beard and the mother is monaqaba (wearing a 
neqab, which is a veil that covers the whole body including the face). They are 
committed (moltzmeen) meaning that they do all the prayers on time. They 
are conservative about dressing and relationships between girls and boys. You 
know, when they have visitors, even relatives, men and women do not sit 
together. My family is not like that. 
Looking at Noura's case versus that of Hadia, the latter presents an image of an 
oppressive and overarching patriarchy which does not appear to be at work in 
Noura's case. The differences between the two cases reflect the socioeconomic gaps 
and fragmentations that have emerged in Cairo neighbourhoods in recent decades, 
as discussed earlier in some detail in Chapter 2. 
Being subjected to the piety discourses of the mosque movement and the 
conservative model of her neighbours on one side, and a secular father on the other 
side, Noura joined the mosque lessons and in the meantime did not wear a hijab and 
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defined herself as motaharera (liberal). Noura, while critical of her sister’s reckless 
behaviour and her peers’ duplicity, did not mind that her father drank alcohol and 
she had no interest in her neighbours’ conservative model. Noura liked to be modest 
and acknowledged that veiling and other pious practices were a means for acquiring 
modesty, and in the meantime she liked to be motaharera, which means being free 
from strict religious obligations such as prayers, veiling, etc.  
 
For Noura, not wearing a hijab and considering herself motaharera was not in 
contradiction with being a good Muslim young woman. However, this view is 
certainly not consistent with the views of the preachers of Islamist revivalists. I argue 
that Noura’s self-image as a Muslim young woman is considered one of the “cracks” 
within the established grids (De Certeau 1984: 37-38) of the given Islamist system of 
thinking. Nonetheless, with such tactical practice, did Noura sound ambivalent by 
voicing concerns about the mixed-gender socialisation carried out by female 
students in her school while at the same time longing to meet boys? 
Noura: I want the school to pay more attention to students and stop being 
careless. There are many girls who are doing bad things and it is the school's 
responsibility to help protect them. They know and watch girls walking with 
boys outside the school and they do nothing! They say, since it’s outside the 
school borders we can’t do anything. It's their responsibility to do something if 
the family is not aware. 
MF: Doing “bad things” means that they meet boys outside the school, right? 
Noura: Yes, for example I see many girls meeting boys close to the market 
around the street corner and teachers passing by them and not doing 
anything. Ok, let’s say they can’t do anything in the street, at least the next 
day in the school they could talk to the girl or notify the family. But they do 
nothing! 
MF: But again, what do you expect the teacher to do? Maybe the girl is 
walking with her brother or cousin? 
Noura: No, it certainly doesn't look as if the girl is with her brother or a 
cousin. They are sitting very close to each other. The boy has his arm on the 
girl’s shoulders, and they are sitting very close together. Actually, it’s not only 
one girl. It’s a group of girls and boys acting like lovers. How come they are 
freely sitting together in the street and he is putting his arm around her. How 
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come? Unbelievable!! I am a girl like her. How come I would allow a boy to 
get close to me like that in front of everyone in the street, particularly when I 
know that he is fooling me?  
Ok... I used to go to a sporting club to practise “Karate” and I met many boys. 
But there are no ways that I would talk or go out with anyone. One day I felt 
that the trainer’s assistant was crossing the limits during the “karate” 
training, so I decided to leave. He wanted to hold my hand while coaching me 
on doing certain moves. So I said no and decided to leave. I have stopped 
practising for the last 6 months. I was very advanced in my training and if I 
was still practising I was going to be a coach myself. Despite all that, I decided 
to leave and I don’t regret it. 
MF: What exactly are you worried about? 
Noura: I think that such relations are wrong, haram (forbidden by religion) 
and can lead to a sexual relationship outside marriage. Actually, due to my 
own circumstances, I am totally against such relations.  
MF: What do you mean by your own circumstances? 
Noura: Well.. I don’t want what happened to my parents to happen to me. My 
parents divorced when I was like 3 years old. Since then I've been living with 
my father and I didn't know my mother until I was 13 years old. At the age of 
13 I found out that I have a sister who is three years younger than me, who is 
now living with us. My mother is married and currently living outside Cairo. I 
go visit her every now and then and she is only allowed by her husband to see 
us for half an hour at the most.  
At first it seemed that Noura was driven by the effect of the pious morality of the 
mosque movement in rejecting any mixed-gender socialisation. She even confirmed 
that such relationships are religiously forbidden. However, it transpired that she was 
affected by her social status as a daughter of divorced parents. It was obvious that 
she meant that rushing into a relationship at such an early age could mean ending up 
in a marriage that would not last for a long time. Interestingly, Noura started to talk 
about how much she liked a radio programme called “Ana w el Ngoom w Hawak”. It 
is a late night famous radio programme that receives calls mostly from young people 
asking for advice related to their romantic affairs. 
Noura: Do you know the radio programme “Ana w el Ngoom w Hawak”? I 
always listen to it. I never miss that programme. 
MF: Actually, no. What about it? What do you like about it? 
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Noura: The presenter is very good at discussing real life love stories and all 
kinds of relationship problems of love affairs, marriage problems, divorce 
cases, everything. I like romantic and love stories. I am very romantic but at 
the same time I am very conservative about relations.  
MF:  That means you have never been in a relationship? 
Noura: My neighbours are 4 young men and a girl. The four young men are all 
older than me. The youngest is 20. I'm friends with all of them and my father 
knows all of them too. One of them, who's 23, admires me and he told my 
father so, but he will not go for a friendship with me. The four of them are 
very polite, which makes me to believe that there still a few men who can be 
trusted.  
MF: What about that one who admires you, do you admire him as well? 
Noura: I don’t admire him but I like his personality and the fact that he is 
respectful, compared to what I know about the majority of men. 
MF:  So you do admire him. 
Noura: I don’t admire him enough to marry him. 
MF:  Nobody is talking about marriage at your age; you are just 16 years old. 
Noura: Everybody is talking about marriage at my age. Many of my friends 
(my age) are engaged and some of them are already getting married. The 
sister of my very close friend Amina is getting married soon and has already 
left school.  
MF: Amina is your closest friend? 
Noura: Yes, Amina is my closest friend but she is making the same mistake. 
She also has a boyfriend. She lies to herself. She knows that this is not right 
and she is stubborn and insists on repeating the same mistakes as she made 
in the past. She knows how to protect herself and to put limits. Although she 
can’t be obliged to do anything she does not want, at the same time she can 
be stubborn enough to choose to do wrong things. 
Noura had no problem in talking to men and even liking one of them, as long as she 
was comfortable that the person was trustworthy and respectful. At the end it 
seemed that Noura in rejecting romantic relations at her age was not really coming 
from a pietistic position but rather from a social conservative position due to her 
own experience within her family. Noura had decided on what I would call a survival 
tactic. Butler asks: “How does one stay in the matrix of rules enough to survive, and 
how does one bend and redirect those rules in order to breathe and live? If without 
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the norms one cannot survive, it is also clear that with the norms survival is also 
imperilled.” (2009:533). Noura was not driven by morality rules regarding romance 
and relationships. Rather, she wanted to be on the safe side by talking to men within 
a safe environment, and in the meantime she was seeking to fulfil her curiosity 
about relationships by listening to lovers' narratives on that radio programme.  
 
 
6.4 Ambiguity between religiosity and fun 
Young people in Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam were being subjected to a forceful 
Islamic discourse. Mosques and local religious organisations targeted young people 
by organising subsidised private tuition and other youth-centred services and 
activities. Some of the young people I met went regularly to Quran lessons at the 
mosque; and/or attended private tutoring organised by mosques and religious local 
organisations supported by the Muslim Brotherhood or Salafi movements. Some of 
the young people mentioned that they watched new religious TV satellite channels 
and programmes presented by new preachers, both moderate and conservative. 
Some young people showed ambiguity in navigating such forceful religious 
discourse. I borrow here Bayat’s definition of fun as “a metaphor for the expression 
of individuality, spontaneity, and lightness, in which joy is the central element”, and 
his observation that “youth are the prime practitioners of fun and are the main 
target of anti-fun politics” (2007:434).  In the following two examples, I am exploring 
how young people, both male and female “swing back and forth from partying to 
prayers”, (Bayat 2003:1) taking an ambiguous position in navigating religious 
discourses and the embedded anti-fun politics: 
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6.4.1 Sheikh “Turbo” 
The first month of the school year 2010/11 overlapped with the month of Ramadan. 
After the Ramadan Fitr feast, I passed by the boys’ school to say happy ied (feast) 
and meet the few male students I had known and worked with in the previous year, 
as well as to ask how they were doing and how their summer break had been. It was 
the daily break time and the group of students, I wanted to see, were in the 
playground, standing together and laughing aloud. I approached them and talked 
briefly, and they told me about the subject of their laughter. Ahmed said: 
We remembered what we were doing during the month of Ramadan. We 
laughed remembering how we managed to escape the long Ramadan night 
prayers (taraweeh) in the nearby mosque, by going to another mosque in the 
neighbourhood where the imam is faster in finishing the long Quran reciting. 
The funniest thing is that we were calling the faster imam “Elsheikh Turbo” 
because he was very fast at finishing prayers compared to other mosques 
where the prayers took forever. 
During the month of Ramadan, in all mosques evening prayers are conducted, during 
which long parts of the Quran are recited. These special prayers are known as 
taraweeh and they can be very long (over an hour), during which one stands upright 
to read from the Quran. The Quran is divided into equal parts for the purpose of 
reading sections of equal length during each of the Ramadan nights, so that by the 
end of the month the entire Quran has been completed. With the forceful trends 
towards Islamic pious practices, and despite the fact that these prayers are 
voluntary, it has become a phenomenon that Egyptian Muslims of all ages, both 
females and males, attend the taraweeh prayers in the mosque after asha (the last 
evening prayer).  
Male students were keen to be seen physically in the mosque for the “taraweeh”; 
however, they could not endure the long prayers and found relief with the imam 
they named Sheik “turbo”. Scheilke discusses practices of piety and their “flaws of 
perfection” (2009b:S34) by arguing that Ramadan, for many young Egyptian men, is 
about fasting and prayers as much as it is about other forms of fun and enjoyment. 
Following Schielke, highlighting the notion of Sheikh turbo is “likely to shed more 
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light on the much less perfect social experiences and personal trajectories that all 
too easily remain obscured by the strong tendency of religious discourse” 
(2009b:S35).  
 
6.4.2 Music is “haram” but we cannot give it up 
During a group discussion with 11th grade female students, they wanted to discuss 
managing their time and what they called time wasters: 
Noha: Listening to music wastes my time. I spend a lot of time listening to 
music. I love all kinds of music.  
Khadija (in a very restraining tone): Listening to music is “haram” (forbidden). 
On the Day of Judgment a heated stick will be pushed into the ears of all 
those who used their ears to listen to music”.  
MF (addressing other students): What do you think of what Khadija has just 
said? 
Khadija (before other students have the chance to talk):  This matter is not 
subject to disagreement because it comes from Almighty GOD. That’s what 
was said by both the Sheikh on the TV and the Sheikh at the mosque. 
Listening to music is a distraction to ibada (practices of piety) and makes 
people think about bad issues. 
The rest of the students were speechless and left with no choices other than to 
agree that listening to songs and music is haram (forbidden). 
MF: So all forms of music are considered haram? What about some music 
genres such as religious music? Is that considered appropriate?  
Khadija: no music at all. That means no TV, no radio, no cinema. One should 
stop paying attention to music played in the street while passing by. I trained 
myself to close my ears when and where music is played so that I don’t hear 
it.  
Fatma: I listen to music and songs. It may be wrong. But I am not religious 
enough to stop loving and listening to music. (A number of girls nodded, 
agreeing with Fatma) 
Listening to music, particularly modern Egyptian pop music, is a major element of 
the everyday life practices of young people. They store their favourite music on their 
cell phones, computers and MP3 players. Noha, Fatma and the other girls could not 
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deny their desire for the fun of listening to music. According to TV and mosque 
preachers quoted by Khadija, however, the committed and God fearing Muslimness 
does not fit with listening to music that is considered a distraction to ibada. Faced 
with Khadija’s concerns, the female students had no other choice but to admit their 
ambiguous position that despite the fact that it may be “haram” they could not give 
it up.  
 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
I have argued in this chapter that young people, while navigating forms of patriarchy 
and subordination of their wider everyday life, were deploying “tactics of the weak 
or powerless” (De Certeau 1980: 8). Through deploying these tactics, young people 
were either confirming their gendered agency causing cracks within systems of 
subordination, or surviving times of pressures and tension. In certain cases, young 
people’s navigation showed ambivalence and somehow ambiguity about the 
direction in which they wanted to head, while navigating forms of subordination. 
Both the Al-kofar group and Amro had deployed unruly tactics in handling schooling 
and familial subordination. Despite the Alkofar and Amro’s lack of power, the value 
of their unruly tactics derived from their skilful use of the available opportunities and 
circumstances to shake “the foundations of power” (De Certeau 1984:39). Amro, 
through his political agency, had gone beyond De Certeau’s tactic of the weak and 
powerless by confirming that he was not religious and that he was against an Islamist 
regime. However the “Sheikh Turbo” young men and some female students had 
shown ambiguity in handling the forceful religious discourse when those discourses 
intersected with their individual desires. The two cases in the last section of this 
chapter have shown that while young people wanted to abide to religious preaching, 
even the most conservative preaching, they sought ways out when such preaching 
went against their desires for fun and enjoyment.  
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Young women showed ambivalence and somehow ambiguity in navigating forms of 
patriarchy. Hadia was ambivalent as to whether to submit or subvert familial and 
schooling pressures, and Noura was somehow ambiguous between abiding by the 
Islamist rules of the good Muslim girl and her very individual choices. In the middle 
of their ambivalent and ambiguous positions, both Hadia and Noura had produced 
survival tactics that I have argued were a confirmation of their gendered agency and 
at the same time considered as cracks in the very foundations of patriarchy. Hadia’s 
action to leave the private lesson she hated was a moment of victory. Noura’s 
decision not to wear a hijab and her obsession with romantic relations were not 
consistent with the Islamist discourses of the mosque movement and poses 
questions about the effectiveness of such movements to mobilize young people. 
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CHAPTER  7 
Tahrir narratives: renegotiating age, gender, and the city spaces 
 
7.1 Introduction 
On 24th February 2011, a small group of thanaweya-aama students established a 
Facebook page40 under the title “thawret tolab thanaweya-aama” (Thanaweya-aama 
Students' Revolution) and wrote: 
Dear thanaweya-aama colleagues: we have established this page following 
our great revolution in order to demand changes in the education system 
for a better future for all Egyptian young people. Please share this page 
with all your friends and colleagues both boys and girls. We want to have 
thousands of members so that we can prepare for our first street actions.  
A post was added on 24th February calling for an event on Monday 28th February 
2011 at 10 am for a march from Tahrir Square to occupy the headquarters of the 
MOE that day.  Several posts followed, calling for increasing membership of the 
page, discussing their demands as thanaweya-aama students, and making 
preparation for the first street actions by students after Mubarak’s removal.  
From 25th January 2011, young Egyptians of high school and university age, and 
young graduates, took the lead in what had been described as one of the pivotal 
historical moments in Egypt's modern history.  Egyptians from different social 
segments on an unthinkable scale joined the young people's waves of protests and 
sit-in that forced the removal of ex-President Hosni Mubarak (Herrera 2012, Schielke 
2011, Hirschkind 2011). 
I finished my field work in Cairo between November 2010 and January 2011, and was 
preparing to work on the data analysis and start writing my thesis.  However, with 
the 25th January protests and then the occupation of Tahrir Square, the downfall of 
Mubarak, and the incidents that followed, I had to go back to fieldwork for the 
whole year of 2011, but only in and around Tahrir Square. Despite not seeing the 
familiar faces of the young people of the Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam schools, thus 
                                                          
40
 https://www.facebook.com/thanawya.revolution  
178 
causing the discontinuity in persons between this and preceding chapters, there 
were other young faces within the square whose voices have also appeared in the 
previous chapters. During that period, schools were closed for the mid-year break 
and the MOE extended the schools' closure through April 2011 until it was somehow 
safer to reopen schools for a very short period before they were closed again in May 
2011. During that period, the whole of Cairo was for most of the time under curfew 
rules imposed by the army forces that turned Cairo from the Friday of rage (27 
January 2011) into a huge military facility. The curfew rules and the insecure 
situation in many areas around Cairo, including the Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam area, 
made it impossible to go back to my informants in the three secondary schools.  
As will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, Tahrir Square was one 
possible route which the emerging oppositional consciousness could take. In order 
to understand Tahrir Square, the insights of the previous chapters are crucial. I argue 
in this chapter that young people, through calling for and engaging in the Tahrir riots 
and occupational actions were claiming a “right to the city” (Lefebvre 1996). The 
demands that were made in Tahrir Square through young people’s acclamations, 
“iesh, horia, adalaa igtimaaia, karama insania” (“prosperity, freedom, social justice 
and human dignity”) were, following Lefebvre, a call for “a radical restructuring of 
social, political, and economic relations, both in the city and beyond” (Lefebvre 1996: 
34), manifesting their emerging political consciousness. I further argue that young 
people’s engagement in the Tahrir actions contributed significantly to redefining the 
meaning of the city’s “abstract spaces” (Lefebvre 1991). 
According to Ahmad Abdalla (1985), the prominent leader of the Egyptian university 
students' movement in the early 1970s, Egyptian students' engagement with anti-
colonial and protest actions go back to the early 20th century. As discussed in some 
detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the 1967 - 1973 students' movement was “a socio-
political force that acted principally as an element of pressure on the ruling power” 
(Abdalla 1985: 218).  According to Abdalla, students played a pioneering role in 
stimulating other social forces, especially the middle class (1985: 219). Yet about 
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forty years later, youth were seen as “burdened with authoritarian states, corruption 
and nepotism that circumscribe their life chances” (Swedenburg 2007:8). 
 
I will first explore in this chapter how young Egyptians’ sense of hopelessness and 
their desires for change acted as a real ground, among others, that gave birth to the 
events in Tahrir. I will then explore the narratives of three young people (Amro, 
Mona and Karim) through which they recall their memories of being engaged in the 
Tahrir actions from 25th January 2011 and the Tahrir occupation to the Mohamed 
Mahmoud battle in November 2011. In exploring the three young people’s 
narratives, my intention is to understand what Tahrir gave to young people in return 
and what their engagement in the Tahrir actions meant in relation to their sense of 
hopelessness and future aspirations.  
 
 
7.2 The route to Tahrir 
I spent several Ramadan nights during August 2010 in the informal settlements of 
the Al-Basatin and Dar-elsalam neighbourhoods. I walked along the streets and 
narrow lanes; I met familiar faces from the three schools and the educational district 
office, and joined gatherings in coffee houses with groups of young teachers and 
parents. The following is from my field notes: 
I crossed the bridge above the metro railway and jumped into one of those 
small motorised carts called a “toktok” on my way to Al-Basatin. The small 
and very tight toktok was riding along the unpaved narrow streets of the 
informal neighbourhood. There were about 8 of us packed inside it and 
banging into each other every time it jumped or turned in the middle of the 
very crowded narrow lanes. All the buildings on both sides of these lanes 
had turned their ground floors into small shops for selling goods. Streets, 
buildings, mosques and shops were beautifully decorated with colourful 
Ramadan decorations. Shops were packed with different types of food 
needed for Iftar (Ramadan breakfast) and Sohor (Ramadan last daily meal 
before fasting). 
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Street vendors were all over the place selling fruits, vegetables, homemade 
food and even clothes.  The buildings were mostly small and very close to 
each other except for a couple of main streets where there were tall 
buildings with a few smart cars parked in front of them. There was one of 
“mawa’d el rahman” (charity meal) which was almost empty after the 
Ramadan Iftar meal where either well-off families, businessmen or 
parliamentary election candidates arrange every day during Ramadan for 
the provision of Iftar meals for the poor who cannot afford expensive 
Ramadan food.  
Every street we passed had a number of small and medium-sized mosques 
and several coffee shops.  Men who had just left the mosques after the 
long taraweh prayers as part of the Ramadan daily prayers were gathered 
around cups of tea, shisha and their favourite backgammon games.  Many 
young men were also in cafés watching a football match, chatting, 
laughing, also smoking shisha, and looking at girls passing by. Young 
women with mothers and/or elder sisters were walking around until late at 
night, and even after midnight, buying food for Sohor and for next day’s 
Ramadan’s Iftar. Almost all the conversations in the café gatherings were 
about the coming biggest Egyptian parliamentary election in a month's 
time, and the most controversial Egyptian presidential elections expected 
in 2011.  These have made the holy month of Ramadan different this year, 
with all the tensions and politics of elections. 
The street noise was an amazing mix of Quran reciting coming from 
mosques and some shops, modern Egyptian pop singing, famous TV shows, 
young people yelling while watching a match, and political debates 
between men over the upcoming heated elections. In the middle of all that 
was going on, groups of students could be seen leaving the private tutoring 
centres located in the neighbourhood. They were the thanaweya-aama 
students preparing for the upcoming school year that would start soon 
after Ramadan and they had already started their private tutoring lessons.  
 
It was an image of the Cairo urban “informality” (Bayat 2009) alliance created from 
the marginals and the working class during decades of dramatic expansion of 
impoverished urban settlements amidst an excluding state’s privatising economy. 
Beneath the surface of the Ramadan cultural rituals in the crowded narrow lanes and 
coffee houses, unemployment, street children, deprivation of basic rights, and other 
features of exclusion and informalisation existed side by side with luxurious upper 
class neighbourhoods.  
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Cyberactivism and blogging about politics by Egyptian young people – particularly 
young journalists, photographers, lawyers, and computer programmers – goes back 
to 2004.  Since then, cyberactivists and bloggers have been focusing on documenting 
and reporting incidents of torture and anti-human rights practices by the regime, 
and about street actions organised by political activists demanding change. The road 
for cyberactivism was paved by the coordination between both the leftist and 
Islamist forces from late 1990 onwards, that resulted in the establishment of the 
"Kefaya – The Egyptian Movement for Change” in 2004. Kefaya (enough) was formed 
by Egyptian political activists from different generations and backgrounds who for 
the first time mobilised successful street protests calling for an end to the Mubarak 
regime and rejecting Mubarak's son as his successor for the presidency (Hirschkind 
2011). In 2008, the 6th April Movement was born from within Kefaya in support of 
protests and strikes by workers in the industrial town of Mahala El-Kobra: 
When 6th April arrived, Egypt witnessed its most dramatic political 
mobilization in decades, an event that brought together people across the 
political spectrum, from Muslim Brotherhood members to Revolutionary 
Socialists (Hirschkind 2011: 15). 
 
In the early summer of 2010, a brutal case of torture and killing by the Egyptian 
police in the large coastal city of Alexandria was uncovered by media and 
cyberactivists. Khaled Said, a young man from a middle class family in Alexandria, 
had been dragged out of an Internet café and beaten to death by two policemen. 
The case of Khaled Said triggered a considerable amount of rage among young 
people and students, particularly in Alexandria, Cairo and other large cities. Several 
youth movements, particularly the “6th April Movement” and “Youth for Change”41, 
arranged streets events and demonstrations against such brutal government 
practices.  A Facebook page was created by some young people called “We are all 
Khaled Said”. The page was created, as explained by its creators, to express the 
collective stance of many Egyptians who were fed up with practices against human 
rights and government corruption.  Surprisingly, in a few days, followers of the page 
                                                          
41
 The youth wing of the Kefaya movement. 
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reached about half a million members, and in a few weeks, members subscribing to 
the page reached one million.  Herrera maintained in an interview on 28 February 
2011 that the case of Khaled Said broke the fear barrier:  
Suddenly the youth were saying “We’re not afraid anymore,” “We’re fed 
up,” “Enough is enough!” They were getting bolder and bolder on 
Facebook, insulting the president and political figures, spreading photos of 
corruption and torture. When I asked one of them, “Aren’t you afraid to 
do this?”, she replied, “What are they going to do, arrest millions of us? 
Millions of us are doing this.” So this became a moment when collectively, 
a generation crossed the fear threshold (Chamberlain 2011: online). 
 
In fact, young people’s engagement in protest actions against the Mubarak regime 
was not really a sudden phenomenon. In addition to the several groups of activists 
that emerged from the Kefaya movement starting from 2004 such as “Students for 
Change”, and “6th April Movement”, there were also several Ultras groups that 
attracted thousands of young men of high school and university age who were fans 
of famous football teams.  Amro’s (the thanaweya-aama student encountered in 
Chapters 5 and 6) engagement with street action went back, as he said, to when he 
was 16, when he joined Ultras: 
Amro: My engagement (fel syasa) with politics started when I joined the 
Ultras Ahlawy group (the Al-Ahly football team fan group) in the 
neighbourhood in 2009 through my friends. There was an Al-Ahly match in 
summer 2010 at the same time as the incident and death of Khaled Said. 
We decided to arrange a “cortege42” for him as part of the Ultras activities 
and It was the first time the song was chanted, “khafe mena ya hokoma” 
“Fear us, cops”.  
MF: Do you remember the lyrics of the song? 
Amro: Of course. 
 “khafe mena ya hokoma” (Fear us, cops) 
“Gayeen el-lela nawyeen” (We came tonight for a purpose) 
                                                          
42
 “Ultras have always taken positive initiatives to attempt to outdo the cheering activities of the 
opposing team's supporters. From here came the term “cortege” which was adapted from the street 
war terminology of Colombia, Brazil and Argentina. It means going out in demonstrations as a show of 
power in the opponents’ areas of influence, away from the stadium. Cortege sometimes leads to 
violence” (El-Sherif 2012). 
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"Gomhor Al-Ahly walaaoha" (Al-Ahly fans have lit the fire) 
"**om elzabet aal amin" (fuck the officer and the sergeant) 
Alle alle holy gans alle  Alle alle holy gans alle   
Alle alle holy gans alle  Alle alle holy gans alle 
"**om elzabet aal amin" (fuck the officer and the sergeant) 
This song has always sent the cops crazy. We were thousands chanting it in 
the stadium and it was like an earthquake. At the end of 2010, during the 
match of Al-Ahly, the Police Central Security Forces (CSF) beat us and threw 
tear gas at us. Another match was a few days before the event of 25th 
January. The instructions were: Ultras are not allowed to chant or raise any 
banners. It turned into harsh clashes with the CSF. 
On 24th January, the day before the revolution, I was standing close to my 
school. By chance there was a demonstration in the street. A police officer 
asked me what I was doing there; I replied “I'm playing”. The police officer 
slapped me in the face and called me bad names and told me to leave. I 
will never forget the feeling when I was slapped. Every time I was in anti-
police demonstrations I remembered the slap on my face and that horrible 
feeling of humiliation. 
As an Ultras member, Amro experienced the brutality of the CSF when he was a 
young football fan travelling after his team. During those events, Amro usually 
became engaged in clashes with the CSF, which always feared such wild gatherings 
of the young football fans. Ultras’ gatherings and marches, chants, banners and 
fireworks were attempts by the young football fans to make their own “claims to the 
city” in the spaces of main streets, stadiums and football courts. Through this 
process, young people subverted the authority of the state by controlling their 
everyday sports gatherings; through it, too, they experienced “an unmediated and 
unobstructed fulfilment” (Vradis and Dalakoglou 2011: 87) of their subversive 
desires.  Ultras’ clashes with the CSF around the football pitches also showed “how 
competition over the production of space operates” (Molotch 1993: 889) between 
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the state’s brutalities to produce spaces of domination versus the young people who 
strove to produce spaces for subversion. That is exactly why the site of actions is 
important and why we should be concerned with spatial legacies (Vradis and 
Dalakoglou 2011: 87).  
Amro also suffered other street experiences of humiliation and disgrace from the 
police. Narrating his first encounter with streets actions by his Ultras group, he 
repeatedly called it “mosharkety fel syasa” (engagement in politics). For Amro, 
engagement in politics meant opposing the CSF brutality. However, it should be 
noted that his path prior to the revolution was different from that of many of his 
peers, like Mona, who had never been into a police station before other than for the 
issue of her national ID. 
 
I met Mona following her arrest by the CSF during the Mohammed Mahmoud battle, 
which I will address in detail in a later section of this chapter. We met through a 
revolutionary friend after she was released and she narrated the story of her link 
with Tahrir. Mona (at the time) was a 23-year-old university student from a middle 
class family. She was studying at the college of languages. However, she said: “I don't 
really care about the university studies; my main interest is my work, which is 
shooting and directing movies.” Mona lived with a room-mate in a small flat close to 
down-town Cairo so as to be near her work: 
I was struggling to live my life, like any normal Egyptian girl. Before the 
revolution I was living a normal life, doing my job, and was not interested 
in any politics. In fact, I avoided it because I thought only about making 
movies, which is the thing I love doing. I never talked about politics. I 
always thought that politicians were a bunch of rich people who were good 
for nothing. There was no hope at all that anything might change in this 
country, so I said: "I'll try and do something here, and if I fail, I'll leave the 
country and live abroad."  Life was monotonous; even the works that 
tackled politics were shallow. I used to say: "What are you talking about! 
Nothing will change that way. I even didn’t know who the Prime Minister 
was. I'd heard that those who tried to talk about politics were tortured and 
put in jail. 
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Mona's position and aspirations before the revolution were not too far from those of 
many of the young people I had known during my field work in the three schools.  
She aspired to success either in Egypt or abroad, and as she mentioned, her 
aspirations did not include any involvement in politics.  While Amro had chosen to 
engage in street actions, Mona sounded hopeless about the whole situation. Despite 
their different positions, however, the views of both Amro and Mona correlated in 
terms of the meaning of involvement in politics and acts of resistance.  Such 
correlation confirmed that young people had reached a point where politics 
practised through negotiations and compromises had become rotten and corrupt, 
and did not convince them anymore. That was confirmed later on in many instances 
during the Tahrir occupation and beyond, when young people in particular 
completely refused to negotiate or compromise unless their demands were met. 
 
 
7.3 Is it possible!? 
The year of 2010 had just ended with all the political tensions related to the brutality 
of police authorities, disastrous parliamentary elections, and fears about the near 
future.  Suddenly, around 1 am after New Year’s Eve, the TV news cut into the New 
Year celebrations to announce that a massacre had just occurred. A church bombing 
incident had occurred at the heart of Alexandria. News agencies around the world 
soon reported 21 people killed and 97 injured in the blast, which had occurred 
shortly after midnight as Coptic Christians were attending services at the church. 
Here is how Mona described the situation around that time: 
The anger started to pile up. I noticed that something had been going on in 
the country since the last parliament elections in 2010, and that anger had 
started to rage. I was living in downtown, and I heard by chance about the 
fraud that had happened in those elections, but one reaction happened 
that changed everything, because it was one incident following another, 
and after what had happened at the Alexandria church, anger really 
started mounting up. The moment we heard about that incident, we knew 
it wasn't a sectarian strife scenario; this was not the kind of sectarian strife 
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scenario that had been created perfectly during the previous years. We 
thought that the Alexandria church incident was a mere game to drag 
people's attention from where the course of actions were heading, and this 
affected the mass perception in an irregular manner. People were fed up 
and we were among them, and day after another everything was heating 
up.  
 
In January 2011 and following the uprising in Tunisia, the anonymous admins of the 
Facebook page “We are all Khaled Said” suggested turning the national holiday for 
Police Day on 25th January into a Facebook event, “Revolution of the Egyptian 
People” (Thawrat Shaab Misr).  Mona was doubtful that any change could happen:  
Public invitations were launched on Facebook, motivating people to go on 
demonstrations on January 25th. But we thought this was just a joke; was 
it really possible to agree on a demonstration or a revolution?   The march 
was to depose the leadership of the police forces. I felt they must be joking. 
 
The Facebook event, which was joined by many young people and many other 
Egyptians, had caused serious discussions in the press and on social media between 
supporters of the event (mostly young people) on one side, and those who did not 
really see what was coming on the other side.  Academics were also doubtful that 
anything could happen:  
Just days before 25th January, a friend asked whether there could be a 
revolution in Egypt like there was in Tunisia, and I said no, I don’t think so, 
because it seems so difficult to mobilise the people in Egypt, and for 
decades people have expected a revolution to break out in Egypt, but it 
hasn’t. (Schielke 2011: 1). 
 
 
7.4 From 25th to 28th January: emergence of political consciousness  
The period of rage from Tuesday 25th to Friday 28th January was a period full of 
doubts and questions on what was going to happen next. It was also full of fears 
because of the magnitude of aggression by the state authorities, and concerns about 
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safety after the news broadcast by the media that police stations were being 
attacked and prisons being broken open by force and that thousands of criminals 
were free in streets.  
The narratives in this chapter on young people's involvement in the Tahrir actions 
during the 18 days from 25th January to Mubarak's downfall on 11th February and 
beyond come from the three young people Amro, Mona and Karim (the Don Bosco 
high school senior encountered in Chapter 5).  In building the story of young people’s 
involvement in the Tahrir actions I will use the narratives of the three young people 
which they had narrated in different meetings with me and at different stages. Parts 
of the narratives come from Amro, Mona and Karim's written memories which they 
have posted online on their blogs and / or Facebook pages.  
 
During the month of Ramadan / August 2011, it was night time and I was in Tahrir 
Square at the intersection of Mohamed Mahmoud Street. A group of 25 to 30 young 
people, mostly of high school age, were gathering in front of the Hardees restaurant. 
They were waiting for others who had responded to an invitation for a gathering in 
Tahrir Square. I approached the few familiar faces I knew in the middle of the group 
and saluted both Amro and Karim. The latter agreed to leave the group to sit with 
me in one of the Tahrir coffee houses. 
Karim: I am not ashamed to say that I wasn't at Tahrir Square during the 
revolution, but I followed the progress of the revolution in Cairo, 
Alexandria, Suez and the rest of the governorates. Being locked at home 
was out of my hands. It was against my will and I wanted to go to Tahrir 
Square. Although staying at home watching what was happening on TV 
during the revolution was the peak of being negative, I was able to turn it 
into something positive and they were the best 18 days in my life; I can't 
forget even a single hour of those days. 
On January 25th, I heard there would be demonstrations. But what 
difference does that make, I thought; every now and then we hear about 
demonstrations and nothing happens. I even didn't pay attention to what 
happened on the 25th. The next morning, on January 26th, I left home to 
go to my institute in Shubra. On my way, my eyes fell on Aam Mohamed 
(the newspaper seller).  I thought of taking a look at what had happened 
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yesterday.  The official newspaper headlines were about Lebanon and 
what was going on there and a bit of news on demonstrations requesting 
reforms that had ended safely.  I laughed mockingly, saying that the 
country would never change, that would be only in my dreams and I swore 
that not in a million demonstrations would anything happen. Before 
leaving Aam Mohamed for the institute, by chance I saw a newspaper 
called "Al Masry Al Youm", and its first page looked odd, as there was a 
photo of a dark square with thousands of people rushing in different 
directions, but the photo wasn't very clear. I found out later that it was 
unclear because of the tear gas bombs; I bought that newspaper for the 
first time and rushed to arrive on time at my Institute.  
At the end of the week, on Thursday January 27th. I left home for the 
Institute and came across Aam Mohamed, but I didn't find anything new, 
so I continued on my way. I reached the institute and we had a Social 
Studies class; we happened to open up the subject of the demonstrations, 
and I told the teacher, “The young people went on demonstrations on 
Tuesday, and look what happened!! They were beaten and went back 
home, nothing happened. ” He told me, “You will see what will happen 
tomorrow.” I sat down wondering what was going to happen. 
 
Mona went on to tell her story after she had been released. Up until the midnight of 
25th January Mona was still sceptical that anything could happen: 
I thought that nothing was going to happen on 25th January and that no 
one would do anything. This was my thinking until the midnight of the 
25th; all of a sudden we found our friends knocking at the door to escape 
from the tear gas bombs… We didn't believe it until our friends showed us 
the photos they had taken in Tahrir Square and we saw a lot of people 
there. Our friends themselves did not realize the number and variety of 
people that were there: it wasn't only the elite (cultured people and 
political activists). One of our friends told us that some young people lit a 
fire from the wood, sat around it and started to sing, and the question I 
kept thinking was, What is the meaning of what is happening? 
I hadn't really been into demonstrations or protests in the past. I was 
happy to join the 6th April Movement strike in 2008 because my friends 
were there and I was just cheering from a distance… but to have such a 
number of people engaged in the same thing as was the case on the 25th… 
was fairly weird to me, a lot of enthusiasm in the air. I kept asking myself,  
was anything going to happen or not? On the 26th some of our friends got 
arrested! There was a strange movement in the country that we didn't 
realize… the incident that was similar to what was happening was the 
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students' protest that took place in the 1970s that my mother had told me 
about. 
 
The one who found it most difficult to speak was Amro who, as he said, carried many 
sad memories of those days.  He didn’t join the 25th January demonstration because 
he had “a private lesson”. He said he wasn’t convinced about joining in and didn’t 
believe that there was going to be a revolution. Sitting in a Costa Cafe close to Tahrir 
Square, Amro talked about his Tahrir memories: 
I actually joined the revolution on Friday January 28th (known as the Friday 
of Rage). I didn’t know what to expect. The private lesson was cancelled. 
By accident I joined the march from my neighbourhood to Tahrir. When we 
were approaching the square, the march took the wrong entrance to the 
square, which brought us face to face with the police forces that were 
waiting. We were beaten aggressively. We were attacked with khartoush 
and tear gas. I went home, but passed by the pharmacy in order to deal 
with the effects of the tear gas. I slept for two days. 
My parents didn’t know for some time that I had joined the actions of the 
revolution. Even later on, when I told them that I'd joined some demos they 
didn’t understand that I had been that close to the front line. My parents 
are pro-revolution but like any parents they are always worried about me 
and what could happen to me in the street.  I will never forget those days.  
 
Karim's memories of January 28th, the “Friday of Rage”, come from where he was 
stuck in the Al-Daher area, not too far from down town Tahrir:  
I woke up at 6 a.m. and went to church. I prayed, then at 8:30, I walked 
along the street with my friends to have breakfast as usual. But on our way 
back, and all of a sudden, we found all the signals of our cell phones were 
going up and down. At that moment I knew I had to move and that 
something was happening in the streets. We went around a lot of streets 
and then went out to the main streets where I found plenty of cars and 
armoured vehicles, people running to left and right, shops closing their 
doors and some people who looked weird wearing black sunglasses and 
with strong physiques (State Security Sector guys). But when we got back 
to the side streets, we found everything was normal, people walking by, 
shops open, so I realised that the danger was in the main streets only. But 
by 1 p.m. I noticed some youths who looked very strange who did not 
belong to the neighbourhood standing round the corners of the streets. We 
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called them ”baltagia” (bullies). I went back home around 2:30 p.m. and 
found all of our neighbours gathering at our place watching the Al Jazeera 
TV channel for some time and the official TV channels for a while after 
that. 
 
Mona continued narrating her memories about the Friday of Rage from her location 
close to down town Tahrir: 
There were invitations on Facebook for something to happen on Friday the 
28th. What would we be doing?... We thought that it was over, that the 
demonstrations had been suppressed and that our friends would be 
released… and then it was the 28th; all means of communications (internet, 
mobiles, and even landlines) were cut. I was supposed to shoot a movie 
that day, and my day was going on as planned, but 30 minutes before 
shooting the communications were cut, so I cancelled the shooting, and 
when the communications were disconnected, we couldn't reach either our 
families or our friends, so people had to go down to the streets to know 
what was happening. I couldn't go out that day: my friend locked me at 
home because she was afraid that we might get lost in the crowd.  
After the Friday prayers I tried to go out, but I couldn't find anybody to go 
with.  It was such a bad feeling. I felt paralyzed and helpless, it was a 
horrible feeling.  From the balcony, I saw people arrested, I saw a lot of 
violence, and I didn't know what to do. I felt terribly helpless, all I could do 
on the 28th at 3 p.m., as all the pharmacies had finished their stock, I sent 
bandages or disinfectants, and the whole neighbourhood did the same.  
All the men and women were standing on the balconies throwing cotton 
and bandages, and we knew that people were dying in the streets. My 
roommate was so sick, so she had to go down for an injection, but she 
found injured people with serious injuries, the pharmacies were empty, and 
the policemen were about to retreat, so they took off their clothes in the 
streets and were wearing civilian clothes to run away. That night I couldn't 
sleep, but on the 29th I woke up to hear the sound of bullets coming from 
everywhere, and I heard from our friends that they (the Ministry of the 
Interior) were starting to kill people, This didn't frighten me as much as 
when I asked myself a question: Where am I? I 've seen armoured vehicles 
shooting people with live bullets. So it is a revolution then, and I don't 
know what to do?  
My mother called me, and I was telling her that people were dying here 
without any fault, it is a war!! As my mother was breaking down, I had to 
go to her house on the other side of Cairo. She picked me up and there 
were fires everywhere on the ring road, especially on our way back home. 
In my family I am treated as a responsible person, just like my eldest 
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brother to a great extent. I have achieved this the hard way, it is such an 
effort, so I've always felt responsible for taking care of my elderly father 
and mother. I didn't know how to protect them. I didn't know what to do. I 
didn't know whether what was happening was right or wrong.  
 
The memories voiced by these three young people on the first few days of the 
Egyptian revolution showed the emerging young Egyptians' political consciousness. It 
was something they had not experienced before, of being face to face with the ugly 
aggression of the state. Amro had been in clashes before, between the Ultras and 
the police during football matches, and Mona has been in a demonstration before. 
But this time, demonstrators were being beaten and even killed in the streets. In 
narrating their memories they repeated the questions: is this really happening? 
What can I do? What does this mean?  For young people, the emergence of political 
consciousness came as they witnessed moments of uncertainty, fear and worries 
about themselves, their families, and friends.  In the middle of hopelessness that any 
change could happen, chaotic streets, and fears of consequences, critical decisions 
were made. Amro joined the march from his neighbourhood to Tahrir without letting 
his parents to know that he had done so, while Mona told her mother that she was 
leaving home and going back to Tahrir with her friends.  
 
For young people, one of the significant paths leading to Tahrir was online social 
networking through blogging, and the connectivity of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, 
and other online media. In various ways, young people intensively utilised their 
digital experiences, strategies, tools, training and networking during the first few 
days of the mobilisation and throughout their engagement with the Egyptian 
revolution. The significance of online connectivity for young people during those first 
few days was tested when the government cut the internet and mobile service. 
Away from notions of cyberactivism, as Mona put it very simply: “When 
communications were disconnected, we could reach neither our families nor our 
friends; people had to go down to the streets to know what was happening.” This is 
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what Hammelman and Messard (2011) argued, that online participation leads to 
offline participation (2011: 24). Moreover, online connectivity was utilised by young 
activists during the first few days for mobilisation and disseminating information 
about routes of marches, safety precautions, types of suitable clothes to wear, 
medicines needed for street clinics, and other items required in order to support the 
occupiers.  Despite the significance of the role of social media and online 
connectivity however, some young people rejected the notion of the “internet / 
Facebook revolution” that was widespread during those early days. Karim said: 
When I am on Facebook or Twitter I feel I am in the kitchen of the 
revolution. However, this is not a Facebook revolution. This is our 
revolution. This is the youth's revolution. 
Karim said exactly what Herrera (2011) argued, following the downfall of Mubarak, 
that: 
What is happening in Egypt is not a Facebook Revolution. But it could not 
have come out without the Facebook generation (Herrera 2011: 5). 
 
Young Egyptians’ sense of hopelessness and their great desires for real change were 
the real grounds that gave birth to Tahrir. Despite the uncertainties and fears, 
masses of Egyptians from different social strata were moved by the younger 
generations’ “claims to the city”, the radical connotations of their call for real 
change, and that they filled the roads and streets leading to Tahrir Square. However 
what Tahrir has in turn given to young people remains to be explored. The following 
sections of this chapter are attempts to unveil part of it. 
 
 
7.5 Tahrir occupied 
The Friday of Rage ended with the defeat of the police forces, who by around 5 pm 
on that day had vanished completely from all streets around Egypt.  The escalations 
of the Friday of Rage of bloody battles between protestors and the CSF, the 
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demolishing and burning of police stations, the invading of prisons and the escape of 
prisoners, ended with the scenes of Egyptian military tanks around critical points in 
Cairo, other large cities and main roads. In a few hours, Tahrir Square was 
completely surrounded by military tanks. At the same time, the state media 
announced a state of emergency all over the country, a curfew in Cairo and major 
Egyptian cities, and the military forces had been put in charge of internal security. 
Most Egyptians from that point were obliged to guard their neighbourhoods against 
what the media were announcing as potential attacks by thugs and criminals.  
On Monday February 2nd, hundreds of thugs, whom revolutionaries claimed were 
hired by Mubarak supporters, attacked the demonstrators in Tahrir Square on 
camels and horses. Eleven of the Tahrir occupiers were reported dead and around 
600 injured due to the attack. The incident, which became famously known as “the 
Camel Battle”, was followed by a street war in Tahrir Square and Cairo's down-town 
streets between occupiers and attackers and many were killed or injured. Following 
the “Camel Battle”, thousands and (on certain days) millions of Egyptians from all 
ages and social strata filled Tahrir Square demanding the removal of Mubarak and 
his regime.  
I did not spend much time physically in Tahrir Square during those 9 days, as I and 
many others were torn between staying in Tahrir and joining the local security 
committees or legan Shaibya, which became responsible for guarding 
neighbourhoods and properties against potential attacks. 
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Figure 8: Street Clinic in Tahrir Square on 10th Feb 2011. Photo by MF. 
 
Tahrir Square during those 9 days turned into an icon of the so-called “Arab Spring”. 
The square was so lively with the occupation’s actions of acclamations, flags, 
banners, songs, collective prayers, night discussion circles, graffiti drawings, and 
music playing.  Thousands of Tahrir occupiers were able to stay there together 
during the occupation period, while none of them could predict when and how this 
occupation was going to end and what was going to happen to them if it failed. The 
occupiers took care of many details to support the occupation: checking IDs / 
passports at the square entrances, guarding the square against potential attacks 
particularly at night, securing food and water for thousands of occupiers,  
establishing and operating clinics to take care of occupiers needing heath care, 
securing medicines and other urgent needs for clinics, building mobile toilets, 
running an internal Tahrir broadcasting service to share important news and 
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broadcast the speeches of leading revolutionaries, and arranging blankets and tents 
for thousands who were spending the night in the square.  
 
 
Figure 9: Focal points of the occupied Tahrir Square. Photo by BBC News. Available 
at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12434787 
 
Amro, Mona, and Karim narrated their memories about those nine days, from inside 
the square as occupiers or from outside supporting the informal committees. In the 
following sections I am using the three young voices to tell the story of the Tahrir 
occupation and the overthrow of Mubarak in their own words: 
Amro: 
I went back to the square the very day of the Camel Battle. I was laughing, 
not believing what was happening. Everything happened in front of the 
army forces and they did nothing. Then I was involved in the battle that 
followed the Camel Battle, and it continued all night and the following day. 
I saw lots of blood that night and many people I didn't know died that day. 
I remember very well a young man of my age who was killed close to the 
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TV building. His corpse was carried to the square and that made the 
situation very bad. After these incidents, people of different ages and 
social backgrounds started to fill the square. 
Karim: 
From January 29th to February 1st I was sitting in front of the TV following 
the news in the morning and in the informal committee at night. During 
those days I believed in change but I wasn't sure that saying “Mubarak 
Out” was what change was really about, and of course, the term 
“revolution” was totally new to my ears.  
February 2nd was one of the hardest days that I've ever witnessed, as I was 
in a dilemma, especially after Mubarak's famous speech. The Camel Battle 
took place and I saw it all live on TV. I felt so numb and helpless, I didn't 
know what to do. I stayed watching the TV all night and didn't sleep; every 
now and then I went down to update those in the informal committee. I 
waited patiently for the sun to rise, hoping that the numbers of occupiers 
would increase in the morning and their resistance would become 
stronger. On Thursday we were watching the progress of events in extreme 
silence and I asked my father a question: “Does Mubarak have to leave or 
not?”  He answered, “He has to leave, he has ruined the whole country, but 
not this way.” I replied, “Hosni Mubarak would never leave other than this 
way,” and from then on I was struggling to go to Tahrir Square, but my 
father refused because he was afraid something bad might happen to me, 
especially as we lived far from Tahrir and there were a lot of transport 
problems, due to the curfew. He took all the money to prevent me from 
leaving home. I totally understood his situation as a father.  
Mona: 
I stayed with my mother 3 days, she is so with the revolution and she felt 
so sad for the young people who were dying. From January 29th to the 
Camel Battle I didn't know anything. The television was filling people with 
the idea that what was happening was wrong. Then on the day of the 
Camel Battle, I woke up and watched it all on the TV, I kept watching and 
was completely absorbed by what I had watched on the TV the whole 
night, I cried and couldn't believe what was happening in our country. It 
was a war. The next day I told my mother that I was going back to Tahrir.  
My mother wanted me to swear that I wouldn't go to Tahrir, but in fact I 
did. I called my friends to know their locations, I knew two who had died, 
Sally and Basiouny.  These guys had been sitting at the table next to me in 
the coffee shop two weeks ago.  Tens of our friends were arrested and bad 
things happened to them. When I was at my family’s house, I couldn't 
access the internet, so when I went to Tahrir, I saw what had happened in 
the past days… I decided that I wasn't going back home again, and when 
197 
my mother called to check up on me, I told her that I was staying in a safe 
place. She told me, I don't want you dead. 
At first, I didn't have a clear role in Tahrir. I went there with my friends, and 
I joined people to distribute things to others, on Thursday, and the day of 
the provoking speech before the day Mubarak was overthrown there was a 
march that I joined. My normal role was to be there all the time; make sure 
the numbers of occupiers were not decreasing and defend any attacks. I 
started to feel that I had to take photos to collect some material, so I 
started to look for any camera, even if it was small or borrowed; I realised 
the importance of documentation. 
Some days I joined people without cameras, just to be with them, and 
some other days, I wanted to document what was happening as I thought 
it might be a proof of something like Mohamed Mahmoud. I needed to 
take photos, no matter the quality. That's why the first thing that was 
broken after we got arrested was the cameras. I took photos of the 
attacks, the bombs, and the gunshots, how attackers were moving. I 
needed to document these things, just to prove that the occupiers were 
neither criminals nor bullies. 
 
 
Figure 10: Tahrir Square on 10th Feb 2011. Photo by MF. 
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Karim: 
Just after the Camel Battle and for a week I went into streets in my 
neighbourhood talking to people, saying that we should scream out in the 
face of injustice, we should say No, and join the protesters in Tahrir, and 
that those who could go should never hesitate to help Egypt and liberate 
the country, and other things of that sort. We found some people hanging 
up posters for Mubarak, so we tore them apart, and others were writing 
Yes to Mubarak, so we altered the Yes to a No.   My friends and I did that 
kind of work around the neighbourhood. 
Amro: 
The night before Mubarak stepped down, I spent it with Ultras in 
Mohamed Mahmoud Street. We didn’t sleep all night. When Mubarak 
stepped down I went home for some sleep.  
Karim: 
February 11th was the best day in my life. I woke up at 6 a.m. and decided 
that I would do anything to go to Tahrir that day, but how could I do that, 
as my father was completely rejecting the idea, but I decided I would try, 
and maybe he would agree. My father woke up around 8 a.m. and he 
found me packing.  He asked me where I was going, so I said I was going to 
my grandfather. He said that I was not going anywhere, but I told him that 
I was fed up of staying at home, that things had become safer and people 
were going to work I said, Please let me go, I am fed up of staying at home, 
it isn't 12 yet and the demonstrations have started. Anyway, after a long 
fight I was able to get out of the house and I went to Al Abasseya to my 
Grandfather. I knew that the demonstrations would pass by my 
Grandfather's house. I went out and after almost half an hour I heard 
people crying out, and without thinking I ran and joined the 
demonstrations and cried out with them "Good Morning Mubarak… Today 
is your Last Day".  
I was just about to ask where we were going when I heard them saying: 
“Martyrs in Millions… we are going to the palace”, so I knew that we were 
going to the presidential palace and I was very happy that I had joined in. 
We walked along and after some time we heard the mosque calling for 
prayers. I told myself: “I am a Christian. What should I do?”  Someone 
called Mina (Christian too) said, “Let's go around those who are praying 
and open a path for the cars to pass.” They finished praying and we 
continued the march towards Ramsis Street to head to the palace. There 
were thousands and thousands of protesters coming from our direction. 
We were so happy and we ran to join them.  
Women from houses gave us cold water to be able to continue as the 
weather was a bit warm that day, but we didn't feel it, we were crying out 
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with all the strength we had, we were happy and angry. Every time I felt 
that I had gone far from home I said to myself that I should go back so as 
not to worry them, but I kept hearing a voice saying “Freedom, Freedom”, 
so I kept walking and repeating this until we reached the palace. Of course, 
on our way there we heard some people cursing us, and a lot of people 
were astonished and couldn't realize what was happening…..!  We reached 
the palace, and after almost an hour we saw a woman coming out onto 
the balcony and she was making calls full of excitement and joy 
(zaghrouda) and at that very moment I felt that I was alive and all the 
tiredness I had felt was gone and I kept jumping and dancing saying: 
“Egypt is free and Mubarak is out”. We cried, thanked God, prayed, played 
songs and celebrated. 
 
For young people, the scenes they had witnessed of bloody battles, tear gas, and 
massive state repression became combined with their hopelessness about the 
future.  In that sense, Tahrir became a turning point for many Egyptians, particularly 
young people. Despite notions of hopelessness about future and fears of the 
present, new hopes about change were born in Tahrir. The three young people were 
persistent about the significance of being physically present there.  Karim was very 
upset that he could not be there physically. Mona had emphasised that the number 
of occupiers was very important, as well as securing the square, and documenting 
what was happening. Her role had evolved from being there in the square to support 
an adequate number of occupiers and to defend attacks, to taking photos and 
collecting materials for the documentation of what was happening. Karim, despite 
restrictions on his involvement, started talking to people in his neighbourhood to 
protest and to join the protesters in Tahrir.  
 
All the battles from January 25th to the Camel Battle (February 2nd) were about 
which side could seize the square.  The aggression of police forces on the Friday of 
Rage (January 28th) was mainly to prevent protesters from reaching there. The 
Camel Battle was the last fight by the Mubarak regime over the Tahrir space. After 
Mubarak’s camels and cavalry were defeated, Tahrir was officially occupied and 
declared to be a liberated territory. The moment the square was occupied by 
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protestors, it was claimed as the base and the icon for the revolution. Protestors 
acted in various forms and with great creativity to make their claims to the city. The 
entrances to the square were completely closed and guarded, traffic was prevented, 
banners with revolutionary demands were hung all over the square, some protestors 
slept under the military tanks to prevent them from moving, and street surfaces 
were painted.  The revolutionaries made every effort to confirm the Tahrir 
occupation through barricades, ID check points, a radio in the square, media areas, 
street clinics, IT sections, lodging areas, etc.  All forms of procedures, division of 
labour, daily schedule of events, artistic works, photos of martyrs, music, singing, 
and signs were attempts by the occupiers to make their own claims to the city 
(Lefebvre 1996) and subvert the authority of the state.  Like the Greek case of 
Navarinou Park (December 2008), Tahrir Square – which used to be the centre of the 
capital of the state of Egypt – was “turned into a lived space reflecting and affecting 
political developments in the country” (Vradis and Dalakoglou 2011: 84). 
 
During the 18 days of Tahrir, thanaweya-aama young people became involved in the 
numerous occupational techniques that allowed them to redefine the meaning of 
“public space” and its significance for their political consciousness and everyday 
oppositional practices. These young people also learned a great deal about practical 
occupational techniques that enabled them to make their move to start claiming 
their rights to quality education. 
 
 
7.6 Claiming rights to education: the MOE occupation 
The online discussions on the Facebook page “Thanaweya-aama Students’ 
Revolution” around the MOE occupation event reached a decision to meet on 28th 
February at 10 am in Tahrir Square and march to the Ministry building. After a long 
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discussion and contributions by the page members, the final demands of the first 
thanaweya-aama street actions were agreed upon. 
 
 
Figure 11: Demands of the MOE occupation (a translation of the demands posted on 
the group’s Facebook page on 26th February 2011). 
 
On Monday morning, 28th February 2011, I left my office in Maadi for Tahrir Square. 
There were a few tents that were kept in the middle of the square, which was partly 
open to traffic. The square was still decorated with flags, banners, and photos of the 
revolution martyrs.  At the side of the square there was a gathering of around 500 
students. It was apparent from the banners they carried that they were the 
thanaweya-aama students. A couple of young people were taking the lead to 
organize the group and prepare for the march to the Ministry building, while other 
students were busy with their sheets of papers and markers preparing their banners 
in which they expressed their demands, while still other students were using their 
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cell phones to call more students, urging them to hurry up and join the march that 
was going to start moving soon. The gathering was mostly male students, with a 
small group of female students who came in their school uniform. With the growing 
number of young people gathering, cars and buses crossing the square started to 
slow down, and the pedestrians and car drivers were asking young people who they 
were and what the gathering was for.  
Despite the fact that the march to the Ministry building was planned to start at 10 
am, the young people decided to wait for more students to join. So the march 
started at about 11 am with around five hundred students leaving the centre of 
Tahrir Square and heading towards Elqasr Elieny Street then turning left into Falaky 
Street, passing by one of the old campus buildings of the American university and 
the buildings of the Ministry of Social Affairs.  Military tanks were still blocking most 
street around Tahrir Square, particularly those leading to the Ministry of the Interior, 
which is the police headquarters. The military police tried to stop the march, asking 
young people about their purpose and where the march was heading to; however, 
the students continued their march while more students kept joining. Three to four 
students were leading the chanting of the march. The chanting was mostly about 
students' demands for a better education and better future. Their slogans were also 
very critical of the current education system, particularly the thanaweya-aama 
exams system. 
 
In less than half an hour, the students' march reached the main gate of the Ministry. 
In no time the gate was completely locked and the street in front of it was occupied 
by students who continued shouting their demands. More kept coming and joining 
the occupation of the street and main gates of the ministry. Some students decided 
to climb the very high fence and main gate, carrying flags and banners. Shortly after 
the march had arrived at its destination, military tanks arrived and blocked the 
streets around the Ministry; however, they did not prevent other young people from 
joining. 
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Figure 12: Occupation of MOE on 28th February 2011. Photo by MF. 
 
The MOE occupies a wide area close to Kasr Elani Street and Tahrir Square and is 
composed of a large main building in the middle as well as a number of other 
buildings, and surrounded by a very high fence. The main building, which contains 
the offices of the Minister and senior staff was, until the 1950s, a luxurious palace of 
one of the princesses of the Mohamed Ali family that ruled Egypt until 1952. Over 
the years, with the growth in the number of employees and the need for more 
space, several other buildings were added. As someone who is familiar with the MOE 
buildings, I can confirm that occupying the Ministry’s main gate and its surroundings 
meant that none of the Ministry’s key officials, including the Minister himself, could 
leave the building unless the occupation was dismissed by force.  
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I was standing between groups of students, trying to do more than just observing 
and photographing, by chatting to individuals or groups.  I approached a group of 
female students standing at the back talking to each other: 
MF: First time taking part in street actions? 
Student 1 (sounding hesitant to reply): Are you a journalist? 
MF: No I'm not a journalist. I'm a researcher writing about students’ 
participation in the revolution.   
Student 1: Ooookay. No, this is not my first time! I've been in Tahrir several 
times and I go to Tahrir every Friday but it's the first time for some of my 
friends. 
MF: You are all dressed in your school uniforms! 
Student 1: Yes, we agreed to gather at the school gates in our uniforms so 
that our male colleagues would recognize us and can help us in case we 
face any harassment. 
MF:  Where are your schools located? 
Student 1: Most of us come from schools in the close-by neighbourhood of 
Saida Zeinab.    
MF (asking another student who had become interested in our chat): Is 
this your first time in a street action? 
Student 2: Yes.  
MF: Why are you joining this time? 
Student 2:  Because I want the education system to be changed.  
 
The next morning a statement was posted on the “Thanaweya-aama Students’ 
Revolution” Facebook page: 
Dear colleagues (those who were with us yesterday and also those who 
couldn't join us): As you know, yesterday during the event in front of the 
Ministry of Education for the whole day, around 7 pm we were asked to 
nominate three of us to meet with by a Ministry senior official to present 
our demands. Omar, Moustafa (myself) and Hana were selected to meet 
the Ministry representative who we found out later is an advisor to the 
Minister. We have presented all your demands. We got most of the 
demands related to this school year and this year's exams approved. They 
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promised that the rest of demands are now at the top of the Minister's 
priorities. 
My colleagues, we know that some of these promises are not going to 
become a reality and that we will need to take more and more action. But 
we are all proud that yesterday our voices were heard for the first time. 
Congratulations, and we will not stop here until we oblige them to change 
the useless education system.  
 
Historically, university students have dominated student streets actions and 
marches. However, for the first time, it was pre-university students who organised a 
collective street action in front of the MOE and occupied its vicinity. The Facebook 
page “Thanaweya-aama Students' Revolution” showed that it was the first time 
during the revolution's actions that “education” and “students” in particular were 
directly connected with the term “revolution”.  Young people utilised their virtual 
space related experiences and skills, particularly Facebook, in creating the online 
event, discussing the list of demands, coming up with the event’s slogans, and 
reaching out to different online student communities and groups to support the 
event. The demands that were discussed online among students revolved around 
notions of justice, dignity, rights, respect and scientific progress.  
In order to claim their educational rights, thanaweya-aama students deployed 
several of the techniques of the Tahrir occupation. Students could have organised 
their protests inside Tahrir Square or in their school; however, in their first 
thanaweya-aama street actions they strategically chose to head to the MOE 
headquarters as the state authority responsible for the education system. They also 
chose to start their march to the MOE from the heart of Tahrir Square. Inspired by 
Tahrir values, students' acclamations were very expressive about the extent to which 
they saw the current education system as useless for preparing them for university 
studies and for life.  
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7.7 Surviving the counter-revolution 
Following the fall of Mubarak, young people grappled with how to move forward, 
and their position as the real force behind the revolution, aiming to reach the 
outcomes they hoped for: dignity, democracy and equity. However, not long after 
the removal of Mubarak, these young people realised that they were facing a 
counter-revolution that was working hard at marginalising them and stripping the 
revolution of any real meaning or hope. They also realised the mistake of leaving 
Tahrir immediately after the fall of Mubarak.  So they chose to keep up a momentum 
of pressure on the interim military rule to make sure that the goals of their 
revolution were not left aside, and they went back to street actions of marches and 
sit-ins in Tahrir and other locations. In the name of allowing the country to return to 
the “production cycle”, the interim regime, supported by the Muslim Brotherhood, 
attacked all sit-ins and protests. These incidents involved the humiliation of 
protestors, such as the famous virginity tests for female protestors, and caused 
hundreds of injuries and casualties. Thousands of young people (even children) and 
other protestors were arrested and sent to military trials. Moreover, young people 
started to realize that all the political processes under way were marginalising them 
and that there were no intentions of real change. Consequently, young people 
engaged in major street actions that involved harsher clashes and even bloody 
battles with both the CSF and the military forces. The Mohamed Mahmoud street 
battle was considered the biggest after the fall of Mubarak. 
 
7.7.1 The battles of Mohamed Mahmoud 
The Mohamed Mahmoud (November 2011) first battle began when the military 
security forces raided a sit-in that was occupying Tahrir Square. After that, CSF kept 
using Mohamed Mahmoud Street, which is near the Ministry of the Interior, for 
raiding Tahrir and seizing activists. Protesters started confronting CSF along the 
street. Days of fighting erupted during which tear gas filled the sky above the square 
and several Tahrir clinics were established by many young doctors who were 
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volunteering to take care of cases of injury and suffocation. CSF snipers fired directly 
into demonstrators’ faces, and many lost their eyesight permanently. More than 40 
protesters died in the Mohamed Mahmoud battle.  
 
 
Figure 13: Mohamed Mahmoud battle front line. Photo by AP. Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20395260 
 
Thousands of Egyptians coming from different backgrounds (researchers, journalists, 
lawyers, photographers, celebrities, political activists and civil servants), mostly 
middle class, who had originally met in Tahrir not long before, decided to occupy the 
safe zone in the square, backing up the Mohamed Mahmoud fighters. Some of them 
were holding banners with slogans against the military rule, others were 
volunteering in the different clinics that were distributed at many spots of the 
square, a few were trying to get close to the entrance to Mohamed Mahmoud street 
to take some photos, and the rest were engaged in non-stop discussions about what 
was going on. A friend of mine tried to go deeper into the battle zone to try to take 
some photos. One of those young men who were fighting told him: 
You, sir, stay there in the safe zone and leave this to us. Even if we die, the 
country loses nothing. You and others like you shouldn't die. El-balad (the 
country) needs you but it doesn’t need us.   
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Here is how Mona and Amro narrated their memories about their engagement in the 
Mohamed Mahmoud battle: 
Amro: 
There was a call for a sit in on Friday November 18th close to the “Adha” 
feast in order to demand the rights of the martyrs and injured and demand 
the resignation of the Cabinet.  The injured and the families of martyrs 
were beaten severely by the police. The news about the attacking and 
beating of these people caused thousands of young people and 
revolutionaries to mobilize in Tahrir and Mohamed Mahmoud Street and 
resume the sit-in. Severe clashes erupted with the police forces in 
Mohamed Mahmoud street. I was on the front line, where tear gas and 
stones and khartoush were used all night and there were hundreds of 
injuries. The next morning, when many had left the square, the CSF 
attacked the sit-in and many young people were arrested. Later in the day, 
when the clashes were on hold, a group of us decided to go and talk to the 
officers to ask them to release our friends who'd been arrested. Fifteen of 
us walked into Mohamed Mahmoud Street, but we didn’t notice that the 
street was filled with security agents and their thugs. In a few moments 
the clashes resumed and we were arrested. They asked us to sit on the 
ground and wait. I tweeted to one of my friends that I had been arrested. 
One of the activists came in and like kidnapped me away from the clashes. 
The rest of those arrested were not released until late at night.  
Mona: 
I was outside Cairo, and when I returned, I was shocked by what was 
happening in Tahrir Square and Mohamed Mahmoud. I called one of my 
friends, and he said, “Don’t go, Mona, it’s very dangerous.” But I decided 
to go, and take a camera, any camera, to document what was going on. 
When I got there, I began to go deeper and deeper down Mohamed 
Mahmoud Street to where the worst of the fighting was. I saw some 
middle class youths among a majority of young people who were obviously 
coming from informal and marginal areas. They were falling down right 
and left from tear gas and from rubber bullets. Everyone was extremely 
tense. They were shouting: “No to the military, no to the police! We want 
to see the military go!” Motor cycles ridden by young people kept speeding 
back and forth carrying injured protestors to clinics inside the square or to 
ambulances for critical cases to be carried to hospitals. With the hundreds 
of fighters in Mohammed Mahmoud there were thousands of supporters, 
mostly older men and women, filling the square.   
Amro: 
The next morning, in the square, people were running away and leaving 
their tents behind. We were even chased outside the square to Kasr Elnil 
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Bridge and many people were beaten and arrested. We had to hide inside 
a coffee house and the guy closed the door so that we wouldn't get 
arrested. We left when the square was totally empty. Later on the military 
withdrew and we realised that another massacre had happened during the 
attack and that another big sit-in had started in the square and Mohamed 
Mahmoud. 
The following days, the clashes became harsher and other activists were 
arrested. They had been taking photographs. They were beaten by 
Islamists and later on they were arrested by the police. By that time I 'd 
met many of my colleagues from school and private lessons, in the middle 
of the clashes. With the presence of the Islamists and by creating a buffer 
zone, the military was able to build a wall in Mohamed Mahmoud between 
us and the police forces.  
Mona: 
There were a few women and girls on the front line, and when the CSF 
were attacking, they defended themselves with stones. Different types of 
people were arrested.  
Amro: 
I stayed in the square the whole time. I only left to go for a shower at home 
or to go to my private lessons. The Cabinet was dissolved and a new prime 
minister was named and that started a new sit-in in the vicinity of the 
Cabinet, rejecting the named new prime minister. They arrested one of us 
at night and the next morning they attacked all of us and the ugliest thing 
happened to the female activist who was beaten in the square and her 
clothes were ripped off completely by soldiers. 
 
The Mohamed Mahmoud Street battle was the peak of the after revolution 
resistance in which young people were completely involved as the only real force of 
resistance in the street, facing the so-called counter-revolution.  The battle started 
with a sit-in by young people in solidarity with the demands of the injured 
revolutionaries and martyrs' families. For young people, takreem – honouring those 
who sacrificed their lives and future for the revolution – could not be compromised. 
Instead of being able to attract the authorities' attention to their demands, they 
were beaten by the CSF. That made the young people so angry and caused the 
biggest and harshest wave of protests and clashes since the fall of Mubarak.  
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The front lines of the Mohamed Mahmoud battle were dominated by young men 
coming from the informal Cairo neighbourhoods. They represented the marginal 
young of unemployed and unskilled labour that held longstanding accounts against 
the police. Those front line fighters had been the fuel for the revolution’s street 
actions since January 25th.  The majority of the Mohamed Mahmoud front line 
fighters were the brothers, sisters, relatives and friends of those who were injured or 
died during the eleven months since the eruption of the revolution’s actions. Many 
Egyptians were puzzled about the insistence of those young people to fight the 
police and become injured and die inside Mohamed Mahmoud Street, and kept 
asking: Why don’t they just leave the street and stay inside the square?  
Mohamed Mahmoud Street had turned into a “symbolic space” (Ryzova 2012:2) 
where young people engaged in the production of a new spatiality where the battle 
over the space was actually for the sake of the battle itself. Ryzova argued that “the 
fight itself was the message” (2012:2). Helpless young people with stones in their 
hands facing CSF brutality were delivering a clear message that they would not give 
up on the blood and death of their revolutionary peers and that the old practices by 
the police forces were unacceptable.  
 
7.7.2 The woman's voice is a revolution 
Mona continued narrating her involvement with the Mohammed Mahmoud battle 
and arrived at the point when she was arrested: 
I reached the front lines facing the CSF. There were only about twenty 
metres in between.  There were maybe forty people there. I saw two or 
three other women there. But there was no talking in the chaos. I noticed 
that when the guys stopped throwing stones at the CSF, they would come 
forward with their tanks and try to arrest them. Or they would fire tear gas 
directly at them. I was trying to document things with my small camera. 
And in the middle of that, I found at least six or seven CSF soldiers had 
come at me — in just two seconds, they were very fast; people beside me 
ran quickly, but I couldn’t. They beat me on the head, and grabbed my hair 
— I was shocked, I didn’t know what to do. They broke my camera, and 
they were kicking me, beating me with sticks, everything. One of them, 
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wearing civilian clothes, grabbed me by the shirt and dragged me down 
the street. I was dizzy; I was going a bit unconscious from the beating on 
my head. He began to ask me: “How much do they pay you to do this?” 
And things like that. They dragged me to the Ministry of the Interior on 
foot.  
I was alone – they caught each one alone. There were officers who beat me 
once I entered the building. One high ranking officer – with three stars on 
his epaulets – used an electric stick on my arm, and he kept doing this 
again and again. I was saying “Stop!” – I was trying to get him away. Then 
they shoved me into a sort of a kiosk. They began to explore contents of my 
bag and throw everything on the floor. Within two or three minutes this 
space was full of guys – a lot of them teenagers, maximum seventeen 
years old. They had all been beaten – there was blood everywhere. My 
head was also bleeding from the injuries, and my lips and mouth too. They 
took our mobile phones, and our sim cards and everything. They took my 
ID. And they kept calling us names. Police soldiers outside the kiosk acted 
as if they wanted to grab me and drag me outside again to beat me again. 
They were saying to the officers, “Let her outside and we’re going to fuck 
her! We’ll screw her whole life!” 
After a while a van came, to deliver us to the police station. Those arrested 
in the van were something like forty men, and I was the only woman. I was 
the first one who got down. I told one of the CSF officers there, “Please 
don’t let anybody beat me again.” But inside the station, an officer who 
was standing on the stairs kept looking at me, up at down, and calling me 
names and threatening me. He kept saying, “Get her upstairs.  We’re going 
to fuck her, we’ll screw her life.” We all had to go upstairs, into an office. 
And there, they threatened me again: “We are going to hang you on the 
wall.”  There was blood everywhere on the walls.  We stayed upstairs for 
something like seven hours. We wanted to go to the bathroom: they told 
us it was forbidden. At 2 a.m. they got us all downstairs to go into the truck 
again, and go to the prosecutor. 
At the prosecutor's office we were put in a very small place like a cage, 
maybe three square metres. And when it was my turn I was called to stand 
in front of the deputy prosecutor. He acted very civilly; he told me, “Don’t 
worry, sit down, how did they arrest you? You are young, you’re a girl, you 
look peaceful. I have been in Tahrir Square myself.” He kept writing 
questions. And he was giving the answers instead of me, like: “No” -“I don’t 
know,” “It didn’t happen.” As if he was going to help me. We all waited for 
six hours to know what was going to happen to us. Another arrested group 
came, and there were something like 100 of us, or 150, and we were 
divided between two cages. I was still the only woman. They took me out 
of the cage, and let me sit on the floor in the same area, between the two 
cages. There was a lower-ranking policeman who kept harassing me all 
that day. I was completely terrified of him. While I was waiting between 
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the two cages, I was alone, and he entered the area, and was trying to 
touch me, and grab my body.  
At 6 p.m., they told me, “We’ll release you — you just have to go back to 
the police station to process the release.” We went back to the van, where 
that lower-ranking officer kept telling me, “I want you.”  The van kept 
making turns and detours—going in circles. We realised we weren’t going 
to the police station. People were singing at first, but then they started 
asking, “Where are we going? What’s happening?” Suddenly we saw 
through the cracks he’d entered a road to the desert. And we reached a 
military camp, and stopped. We were all so depressed and discouraged — 
really shocked. They’d tricked us. 
We entered the camp and there were many soldiers holding sticks and 
surrounding the car. The officers in the car were laughing and telling us, 
“These soldiers will screw your life; they will beat you to death.” I was so 
terrified. I asked one of the officers, “Please don’t let anyone beat me 
again.” And we all left the car. I told myself, “OK, it’s my destiny, I will stay 
here forever.” They beat all of them, but this time not me.  The police took 
off their belts, and used them to beat them, and punched them on their 
backs, and kicked them. They put me in one cage, alone, with everyone 
else (around 60) in another, and they kept a soldier with me. I asked him, 
“Please get me a blanket, it’s too cold for me” — I was sleeping on the 
floor. I was telling myself, “Mona, you are going to live here for days. You 
don’t know what will happen to you. There’s nothing you can do.” 
Suddenly at 10 p.m. they opened doors, and told me they would release all 
of us except seven, who would stay. Among those who stayed were people 
with very serious injuries. They took our fingerprints, and then they 
released us in front of the camp in the desert in eastern Cairo, and we had 
to make our own way back. 
 
At this point during the same meeting, Mona finished narrating her experience of 
her two days under CSF custody after being arrested in Mohamed Mahmoud Street.  
She continued reflecting about such an experience and what it had meant to her:   
I was amazed at how those officers were taking their role very seriously. 
They had all decided that this girl (referring to me) posed a threat to their 
own security and the security of state. I could understand that they were 
defending their presence there. But they chose to humiliate me.  Of course I 
couldn't do anything to them, but why were they beating me? Were they 
afraid that I was stronger, like the fierce animal that bites because it is 
afraid, not because it is stronger? The same idea came to my mind about 
the virginity tests that were done by the military police. Their idea was to 
humiliate the girls in every way possible. The presence of girls meant that 
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they were not afraid of them; facing them was the battle. They just 
couldn't accept the fact that a girl could say No to their face amidst all the 
beating, and that made them humiliate any girl that was arrested in such a 
situation.  
After being detained for 2 days; the question was in the eyes of my family: 
did they do anything bad to you? They had the right to ask, but they asked 
sensitively (but thank God, they couldn't do anything to me). As for the 
virginity checkups; I didn't know someone who had been through that 
experience, but I couldn't believe the idea itself!!!! It was directed at 
women, as if they were saying; we will humiliate you and make you feel 
ashamed. It was done by men in front of detained men and women. It was 
planned, and I think that they wanted to humiliate both men and women 
so as to make families feel that they wouldn't want this to happen again.  
Samira Ibrahim43 was one of the people who made me hold on to the 
country. She uncovered all the lies and broke all the taboos. She is an 
Egyptian girl from Upper Egypt, and she revealed what had happened and 
sued them. I knew her lawyer in November and he told me that she was 
threatened by the Egyptian Army, who were afraid that she might make a 
scene… she shook a lot of things inside me, her family supported her even if 
they didn't realize that. I also saw what the treatment was like inside 
prison: first they treated the girl as a girl, but then they treated her like a 
thing… I was arrested because I was taking photos in Mohamed Mahmoud, 
I was so furious and I was standing in front of them, so they arrested me… 
from the very beginning, they meant to insult my body by harassment. It 
was organised, not for pleasure, but for humiliation, and of course it is 
known what they said to the girl that was arrested, she was cursed with 
the worst words. This happened to me, and the threat I will never forget 
was that they would send a woman to the cell to beat me, and this could 
have happened, who knows!! But I must be lucky, as some people looked 
for me and worked on releasing me; but I was thinking, what about those 
girls that didn't know people who worked in Human Rights organisations!! 
What has happened to them? 
Mona was keen to mention all the details about being grabbed by her hair, and the 
threats of sexual abuse, isolating her from male detainees and then allowing a 
soldier to try to harass her, and humiliating her by reminding her that she was a girl 
and young.   After such an experience, Mona realised clearly what she constituted 
for this revolution. She realised that by being there in the street, on the front line, 
documenting what was happening, she constituted a threat to those in power. She 
                                                          
43
 Samira Ibrahim was a Tahrir activist who pursued legal action against the Egyptian military for 
allegedly forcing her to undergo a 'virginity test' when she was arrested in one of the revolution’s 
events. 
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made an observation that despite being arrested and treated with humiliation, she 
stood in front of those in power, defending herself.  Mona and many other young 
women who had been through such experiences and worse had broken many taboos 
about gender existence and roles within the public sphere and what Egyptian girls 
and women are capable of.  She had brought up the famous case of the virginity test 
of Samira Ibrahim, which for her was the biggest breaking of the taboo of shame 
when a girl faces sexual abuse.  
A slogan was created and used in many marches and events: “aalo sout elmaraa 
aoura!.. Sout elmaraa thawra thawra” (They said the woman's voice is a shame!  The 
woman's voice is a revolution, a revolution). The slogan was a rejection of the 
Islamist belief that the woman's voice is aaoura or a shame, which calls for the 
silencing and veiling women. The slogan was also a strong message to those in 
power that the abuse and humiliation practised against revolutionary females did 
not work and that they could not frighten them into withdrawing. Mona and her 
female peers had broken many such taboos and made a priceless contribution to 
gendering Tahrir and thus emerged as significant players in the street actions of the 
Arab Spring. 
Mona, Samira and other female revolutionary voices had contributed significantly to 
gendering spaces of the revolution and their claims to the right to the city.  The 
Tahrir front lines had been dominated in most events by young men. Female 
participants had been assigned low risk assignments such as street clinics. Yet their 
presence on the front lines, and subsequent arrest and humiliation, had unveiled the 
role of girls and women in the revolution.  
 
7.7.3 Martyrdom: negotiating meanings of life and death 
One year after the Mohamed Mahmoud first battle, many street groups and activists 
called for a celebration of the first anniversary of the battle.  Clashes in the second 
Mohamed Mahmoud battle erupted between protesters and the police in the 
Mohamed Mahmoud and Youssef Elgendy streets, off Tahrir Square.  Gaber Salah, a 
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17-year-old young man (known as Jika) and a friend of Amro, was shot in the head by 
the police. Two days later Jika was pronounced brain dead but his family kept him on 
life support in the hope that he would recover. After being hooked up to life support 
for five days, he was pronounced dead.   Shortly before joining the celebrations, Jika 
had written on his Facebook timeline: 
If I fail to come back, I ask the people to continue with the revolution and 
claim our rights. 
Amro kept silent after Jika’s funeral and decided a couple of weeks later to post a 
note about Jika on his Facebook page:  
I went to Mohamed Mahmoud Street and then to Youssef El Guindy Street 
where there were clashes that started around 8pm on the day of the 
Mohamed Mahmoud first battle anniversary. There I found many of my 
friends, and Jika was there too. I took the laser pointer and kept showing 
them the CSF soldiers who were standing on the roof of one of the 
buildings. I told them: “Let's get out of here.” Jika and another of my 
friends refused, but I left.  
I'd hardly ever prayed to God in my whole life and I was very stubborn 
about everything, but I prayed with the rest of the people and asked God to 
help Jika because he was Jika and because no way could someone else I 
knew die like Maryam, Galal, Karim, Ali Maher and Omar. At night, we 
went to Tahrir Square again, and we kept singing Jikkkkkkkkaaaaaaaaaa, 
and in the morning, a number of us returned to the hospital. I went in and 
saw him and I was shocked. Jika, the guy that I'd known – we'd both joked 
together and teased others together – was lying so still on the bed. I saw 
the pain and grief in the eyes of all my friends and in Jika's mother's eyes; I 
couldn't even tell her that he was going to be ok.  
A few days later they announced Jika's dead officially. On the day of the 
funeral, we were standing looking at one another and didn't know what to 
say. Should we say: “Farewell, you are going to a better place!! ” Or: “May 
your soul rest in peace;  we won't be able to avenge as usual”?  All I did say 
was: “You will look down at us and see us better people”, but in fact we are 
worse than ever.  
Jika was a companion of mine in the clashes, standing shoulder to 
shoulder. I didn't want him to die, because I couldn't bear to know that 
someone else of my friends had died.  I just hope this will come to an end 
when I die. We don't belong here. Unfortunately, farewell JIKA.   
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Young people, due to their engagement in the revolution, started to speak about 
their dead friends / peer revolutionaries / martyrs. The notion of “martyrs” carried 
meanings of grace and nobility. Amro’s narratives had repeatedly mentioned the loss 
of his friends during the clashes. Young people have to survive such new realities in 
their lives, which result from too many voices being silenced forever, the voices of 
friends and colleagues shot dead. 
The point here is how Amro and other young people are living with and making 
sense of the notion of “martyrdom”. Armbrust suggests that “in the early days of the 
Revolution, martyrdom was an actively performed rhetorical position — a kind of 
irresistible force in the eyes of those who took it up as a weapon in their continuing 
struggle” (Armbrust 2012:6). However, Amro's narrative and other young people's 
reactions to the death of their friends went beyond how the issue of “martyrdom” 
was monopolised for revolutionary goals. Young people came up with a slogan that 
started to be used in all the demonstrations as an expression of their attitude to the 
death of their peers: 
“ya ngeb haohom ya nmot zayouhom” (Either we avenge their rights or we 
die like them). 
Amro was deliberate about his feeling of “loss”.  Young people had engaged in the 
actions of the revolution, and their hopes for justice, or even basic human dignity, 
had not yet been reached. Instead they started to lose their revolutionary peers, one 
after the other. They started to lose those who used to stand shoulder to shoulder 
with them. All what was left to them, besides the feeling of loss, was that their peers 
were now called “martyrs”. For them, their martyr friends were those 
revolutionaries who died for the liberation and good future of the country and future 
generations. This meaning of “martyrdom” for contemporary Egyptian generations 
goes back to all those who have died in the different wars over the past 50 years for 
the dignity of the country.  
Amro sounded helpless and ambivalent in his farewell words to Jika. Surprisingly, he 
was not talking about revenge for his friend's death.  In fact he was telling Jika that 
“we wouldn't be able to avenge”. Surprisingly also, Amro was not posing the famous 
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question from day one of the revolution: “Who killed Jika? ” As if he already knew 
the answer.  His ambivalence stemmed from his inner conflict between Amro the 
courageous young man in the early days of the revolution who was engaged in 
almost all the harsh clashes and battles, and Amro the spectator, helpless in front of 
the death of his close friend and afraid that such death was in vain.  In his Facebook 
note he could not repeat the slogan: “Either we avenge their rights or we die like 
them". Instead he wrote that may be the solution was to “die like them".  
At the end of his note, Amro made an astonishing statement, that “we (young 
people) don't belong here”.  Through these simple words he brings back a pre-
revolution notion, referred to in the previous chapter of this thesis, when Ahmed (a 
student from one of the schools in Al-Basatin) said: “el-balad de msh mehtagalna” 
(This country does not need us).  Amro, at such a historical moment as that of Jika's 
death and realising the death of his friends one after another, engaged in 
renegotiating his future aspirations that started with hopelessness before the 
revolution and were turned to hopes for change with the removal of Mubarak.  Now 
in front of the death of his close friends, his future aspirations were reduced to the 
notions of life and death and whether he belonged to life or maybe to death instead. 
 
 
7.8 Reflections: cultivating a new self through resistance 
The three revolutionary young people, Amro, Karim, and Mona, were keen to talk 
about how they had changed as a result of their engagement in the revolution.  Their 
comments and observations showed the extent to which they were aware of their 
involvement in a self-production process through which they constituted themselves 
via critical resistance (Leask 2012:66)   
Amro was keen to explore the many revolutionary actions and engagements he had 
been involved in: 
My days were always like spending all day in the street or joining sit-ins or 
demonstrations after school and only leaving for lessons or to go home for 
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a shower and a change of clothes. In July 2011, after exams I joined the 
march from Tahrir to Abbasya.  My life was changed that day. I was hit on 
the head and had to be hospitalised, and had to have the bones in my face 
repaired with artificial supports. I then joined the Ramadan sit-in, and that 
was when I got more involved with more activities through Twitter and 
doing graffiti. In fact, doing graffiti changed my life choices and made me 
decide to study Art and Design. 
I joined the Egyptian Students' Movement for Change and I also joined 
many demonstrations in front of the MOE. In November we were 
demonstrating for the dissolution of the students’ union and its old bylaws. 
We led a strike for all schools against the military rule. I was invited with 
other colleagues to appear in a TV show with the Minister of Education 
about the strike. The Minister refused to appear with us. He told the 
presenter to choose him or us and she chose us. A deputy minister called 
during the show and accused us of causing trouble to the schooling system 
and threatened us on air. He defended the military and I told him on air 
that the military had killed my colleague, a student in one of the Ministry 
schools.  
I joined the 6th April Movement and I told them that those who made the 
revolution were those who stayed in the streets, not elkhwalat (pussies) 
who were competing to appear in TV shows every day. After I said that, 
they asked me to leave. 
We went to spray graffiti close to the military facility in Abbasia. Clashes 
erupted and I was injured and arrested that day. I made fun of the officer 
who asked me about my name. We were put inside a military car. They 
asked for IDs. I didn’t have one. We were taken to the Bulaq police station. 
I kept tweeting to friends that I'd been arrested. Finally I was allowed to 
leave after some time. I was arrested again in Jan 2012: we were drawing 
graffiti on Dar Merit in Qasr Eini Street, close to Tahrir. An officer had seen 
us and he asked me for an ID, and I said I didn't have an ID. He took all the 
stuff we had. He wanted to arrest one of us and release the rest and we 
refused. We decided that we would all stay together. After keeping all of us 
for some time we were released. 
After the incident of the female activist who was tortured and abused in 
Tahrir by CSF soldiers during the Mohamed Mahmoud battle, I joined a 
feminist group defending women and girls. Girls are serious in what they 
do. I learned a lot about women's rights and I realised how backward we 
are in the way we think about women in our society. Males in this society 
allow things for themselves and disallow them for females.  
Amro was engaged in an ongoing self-creation through his different experiences and 
engagements. Being in the street, learning and doing graffiti, getting injured, joining 
and leaving different groups, appearing on TV, going on strike, being arrested, and 
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attending the funerals of dead friends all involved nonstop decision-making, choice-
making, and risk-taking.  It was such an amazingly rich time for Amro that he 
admitted that it had changed his life choices and world view about gender roles and 
about his own future aspirations. 
 
Karim became involved in graffiti campaigns, and documentation. He faced dangers 
of attack and arrest:  
I joined all the demos and sit-ins. I loved the music of the revolution and 
the new bands. But my main activity was spraying graffiti in Shubra. One 
of our friends took the lead in the graffiti movement and I joined the group 
and agreed to go to Shubra to do graffiti: “No to Military trials for 
civilians”. We also did graffiti for individual revolutionists in custody. We 
did graffiti against the prime minister as well. People in the streets started 
to attack us and to accuse us of wanting to destroy the army, and we were 
characterised as traitors. In order to enable our colleagues to do the 
graffiti, we opened a dialogue with those who were attacking us.  People 
believe that sending those arrested to the military court protects the 
country, because it’s against thugs. After finishing the spraying, I had the 
role of documenting our activities by taking photos for our work. Some 
people arrested me and accused me of taking photos in order to publish 
them on the net in order to get money. I was almost beaten and my 
camera was almost taken from me. 
Before the revolution I was interested in the rights of the Copts and I 
thought that Muslims were very bad. I even believed that Islamists had 
committed the church bombing. After the revolution I didn't feel I was a 
minority and I felt able to express what I thought. I am an Egyptian and my 
religion is none of anyone’s business. They say we are kids and excited 
because of the clashes with the police. It’s so exciting to go against the 
authority. The feeling of fear has gone, and I won’t stay passive in front of 
any aggression any more. The revolution was an earthquake because we 
broke the taboo of the authority and we felt we owned the country.  
The self-production for Karim was about breaking taboos, both the sectarian one and 
the authoritarian one.  Karim had emerged into an “immanent cause rather than 
merely the effect of some transcendent power” (Deleuze 1988:37 quoted in Leask 
2012:64). Karim’s self-image emerged to be not one of a minority any more, and was 
not locked into his religious identity any more either.  
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Mona provided a more reflective stance on how her engagement with the revolution 
had changed her in various ways: 
Being in Tahrir made my hope swing up and down about what I was 
planning for my future, and the same with the feelings of hopelessness and 
despair that my friends and I had before the revolution. The majority of us 
come from average families: at that time we were aspiring to create a 
career path for ourselves, we had learned some good English, and our sole 
aspiration was to get out of the country to see the world and live our lives. 
The whole situation was turned upside down… we had the feeling that we 
wanted to push this country forward. Young people of 20+ years old had 
that feeling, and that was satisfying and comforting.  
At this age, our feelings change and reshape every day. You feel you are 
becoming a grown up human being… even in your personal life, love life or 
practical things. Decisions change from one hour to the other, according to 
the course of events.  I don't know whether for us that was rapid maturity 
or change? I really felt that the political scene changed our characters, a 
lot of things changed as well as our points of view. I started to become 
interested in politics, which I'd always avoided.  I cared about the whole 
scene and I realised that I had a role to play in one way or another. 
The consequent events and months were like a rebirth to me. So my first 
shock was the virginity tests that the army did. To me the woman came 
first and last. When those tests happened, everything for me was 
collapsing. I had to seek a balance, new principles and concepts for life.  
I had nonstop questions, reflections: What is the army? And what is a 
state? What is the role of the army? Who constitutes the army? What is 
the difference between what was happening and what terrorists do? What 
was legal and what was illegal? I had even more philosophical questions 
about war and politics.  I discovered all that and started to understand. 
What happened has seriously changed our lives forever, our plans and 
feelings, particularly as girls. All topics were renegotiated at such stages of 
change.   
Mona's account here is a rich narrative that explores how young people in the 
middle of the revolution's events and actions were renegotiating their notions of 
success, future and life choices at the intersections of critical resistance. Mona's 
account, like those of the other young people discussed earlier, brings to the 
discussion the notion of migration as “the grand paradigmatic strategy of escape and 
success” (Schielke 2009:173). However, Mona in this reflection negotiated the 
notion of migration as a pre-revolution strategy. Along with the notions of migration 
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and success, Mona had brought that of class to her reflective thoughts. As she 
explained simply, she and others come from average families where children were 
not expecting an inheritance. They would have to depend on themselves, fight and 
find their ways to success.  Discourses of migration and success were replaced 
around the time of the revolution with discourses of taghyeer (change).  In fact, 
Mona used words like rebirth, shock, and earthquake as expressions of the 
magnitude of change that accompanied young people's engagement with the 
revolution. For Mona, taghyeer intersected with the two key concepts of El-balad 
(the country), and the woman. Mona was shocked that after the revolution, with all 
the new hopes, women face such abuse and humiliation.  
 
 
7.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued for the emergence of young people’s political 
consciousness as manifested in their calls and engagement in the Tahrir riots and 
occupational actions through which they were making their own “claims to the right 
to the city”.  Young people had brought to Tahrir their disappointment with the 
state’s schooling, opposition to forms of corruption, frustrations about all forms of 
subordination, and their sense of hopelessness about the future. At the gates of the 
Ministry of Education young people had brought their thanaweya-aama case and 
the notion of “claiming the right to education” to the agenda of the revolution. They 
successfully utilised their online connectivity and virtual skills for mobilisation, 
disseminating information about routes of marches, safety precautions, and needed 
support for occupiers. 
The street actions and occupation of Tahrir Square were aggressively confronted by 
the state’s repression. Young people had engaged in the actions of the revolution 
with hopes for justice and basic human dignity.  Instead, they started to face 
humiliation and injury, as well as the death of their revolutionary peers one after the 
other. With such painful experiences, young people realised that by being there in 
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the street, they constituted a threat to those in power. This was particularly true for 
female revolutionaries who had broken many taboos about gender existence and 
roles within the public sphere and shown what Egyptian girls and women are 
capable of. 
 
I have also argued in this chapter that young people’s engagement in Tahrir 
contributed significantly to redefining the meaning of the city’s “abstract spaces”.  
Those spaces such as Tahrir Square, the Presidential palace, the Ministries of 
Education, the Interior, and Defence, and the main roads, all of which were 
supposed to manifest the states’ power hegemony, were turned into venues that 
reflected the fast-changing political scene and an evolving map of political 
participation and expectations that were dominantly young and female.  
Mohamed Mahmoud Street in particular was turned into a unique space for young 
revolutionaries. On the one hand, young people became engaged in the production 
of a new spatiality where the battle over the space of Mohamed Mahmoud Street 
was actually for the sake of the battle itself, thus reflecting the young 
revolutionaries’ obstinacy against the state’s brutality. On the other hand, young 
female revolutionary voices contributed significantly to gendering spaces of the 
revolution by their presence in the front line of the Mohamed Mahmoud battle and 
facing the dangers of arrest, humiliation, injury and death. 
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CHAPTER  8 
Conclusion 
This thesis examined the complexity of the coming of age for lower/middle class 
young Egyptians at the venue of the state secondary school and in the wider 
everyday life in Cairo’s low-income informal neighbourhoods one year before and 
during the Arab Spring.  With the increasing volume of educated unemployment and 
the growing socioeconomic disparities among Egyptian youth (Egypt HDR 2010), the 
thesis aimed to provide an understanding of the meaning of education for the new 
Egyptian generations and the role of the schooling system in shaping their potential 
and aspirations. I followed analyses (Levinson et al 1996, Kaplan 2006, Jeffery et al 
2008) that show the extent to which schooling could be a resource for 
“ambivalence” and “contradictions”. I used a “cultural production” (Willis 1983) 
approach to understand the ways in which young people negotiated and navigated 
their schooling, familial and communal discourses, relationships and pressures. The 
analysis of “everyday tactics” (De Certeau 1984) provided an understanding of the 
young people’s everyday actions through which they survived disciplinarian systems 
by both making use of the existing cracks and causing further cracks in the very 
foundations of the schooling system.  
Despite the centrality of education to Egypt’s nation-building, and the schooling 
system’s strong disciplinarian, nationalist and Islamic orientation, I have argued in 
this thesis that the lack of investment, together with the lack of employment for 
graduates, has undermined the educational structure. Young people navigate a 
highly contradictory reality in their secondary schooling, between the expectations 
invested into it from various sides, and its frustrating and confusing reality. Young 
people employ various tactics to make the best out of the highly unsatisfactory and 
contradictory situation of a collapsing school system, authoritarian disciplinary 
pressure, de facto privatisation of education, and various family pressures. As a 
result, young Egyptians construct spaces of cynicism and disaffection, whilst at the 
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same time maintaining some commitment to the value of education as a tool for 
social mobility.  
 
I conclude that schooling discipline and weakening, tensions about future potential, 
and forms of exclusion have generated young Egyptians’ feelings of hopelessness 
and ambivalence and enabled the articulation of critical dispositions, as well as, for 
some of them, triggering engagement in the Tahrir riots and occupational actions to 
demand their “right to the city”. Secondary school failure is an important indicator 
that the recent Egyptian education reform strategies, as part of the state’s economic 
reform, are not working either towards supporting Egyptian society’s current 
complex transition or in responding to young Egyptians’ ambitions and expectations. 
Falling short of its intended task of acting as an instrument of national security and 
neoliberal disciplining, the secondary school has instead ended up contributing to 
cynical and oppositional subjectivities. The current conditions of the state schooling 
system – combined with the rapidly increasing rates of unemployment, the also 
rapidly growing socioeconomic disparities, the prolonged state of “waithood”, and 
involvement in street politics since January 2011 among Egyptian youth – raise 
several warning flags that Egyptian society is likely to continue experiencing waves of 
protests and political actions by young Egyptians. 
 
By writing this thesis, I contribute to the anthropology of schooling and the social 
anthropology of Egypt which has recently emerged through the works of Mahmood 
(2001, 2005), Hirschkind (2001, 2011), Koning (2005), Herrera (2006, 2008, 2012), 
and Shielke (2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2011). Even though there is a growing body of 
anthropological work on Egypt which focuses on the tension between structure and 
agency, the connections between state schooling, youth and resistance have rarely 
been explored. The ethnography of this thesis raises critical questions on common 
theoretical metanarratives – especially those theories that sketch an image of a 
comprehensive state or moral and ethical discipline – and shows an ambivalent 
reality of weakening authoritarian disciplines and the extent to which young people 
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are navigating but not always finding course of meaningful action. This thesis also 
contributes an in-depth ethnographic focus on gender in the intersection with class 
and age. It provides an image of how young women's tactics of making the best out 
of the gloomy conditions in the low-income neighbourhoods in Cairo are more based 
on compliance and ambiguity, unlike young men, who are more able to make use of 
the local culturally idealised masculine trajectories of chaotic and unruly behaviour. 
Thus this thesis also provides evidence that it is possible to conduct an in-depth 
ethnography across the gender division in the Middle East. 
 
In order to formulate my argument, I structured the thesis into 8 chapters, creating a 
complex image of state schooling and the young people’s coming of age in 
contemporary Egypt.  In Chapter 1, I put forward the thesis argument, and explored 
the theoretical and conceptual materials on schooling and agency.  In Chapter 2, I set 
the context for the thesis by examining the history of what is today a deteriorating 
education system in Egypt, arguing that it had been produced by the three 
consecutive regimes of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak who utilised it to confirm their 
legitimacy and support their political agendas. Within the same historical context, 
Egyptian youth have emerged since the 1950s as a significant element of the 
Egyptian equation, either by being the target of appropriation and control or as 
significant players in the anti-regime actions. I continued setting the context in 
Chapter 2 by exploring how the city of Cairo with its middle class and informal 
settlements has emerged over the last five decades as Egypt’s capital, and discussing 
Cairo’s economic and social stark polarisation of very poor informal settlements 
(ashwaiyyat) side by side with very rich gated communities.  In Chapters 3 and 4 I 
drew a sketch of the physical elements and the everyday discipline and practices in 
three urban secondary schools which were supposed to produce citizens who would 
fit the state’s economic reform. Following that, I sought in Chapters 5 and 6 to 
understand the ways in which young Egyptians negotiate aspirations for social 
mobility at the intersections of their complex educational circumstances, and the 
forms of exclusion and subordination in their wider everyday lives. In Chapter 7 what 
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I sought to understand was the emerging political consciousness of young people, 
which was manifested in their calls and engagement in the Tahrir riots and 
occupational actions through which they were making their own “claims to the right 
to the city”. 
 
8.1 State schooling: a resource for contradictions 
This thesis has unveiled the everyday life in Egyptian state secondary schools that 
has been kept away from anthropological research. With the exception of a limited 
number of research endeavours – for example, the critical ethnographies by Herrera 
and Torres (2006) – Egyptian schooling either was not on the agenda of 
anthropologists, or was kept away from their reach. Commenting on the evolution of 
sociology and anthropology in Egypt, Abaza (2010) suggests that “there are 
insurmountable paradoxes that continue to loom in the professional and academic 
sphere due to the intricate relationship between intellectuals and the long history of 
the authoritarian military state” (2010: 187). As I explained in Chapter 1, I had to go 
through a long process of state security clearances in order to be allowed into 
schools. Conducting social research in schools was and still is considered 
unwelcomed by the state authorities and is only allowed in very limited cases. 
 
This thesis has shown how the spatiality and everyday life of Egypt’s state secondary 
schools intersect with the everyday complexity and ambiguity of the state’s 
economic reform. The state secondary school is an attempt by the state to prepare 
youth for the transition to higher education and eventually to fit with the 
requirements of the labor market as directed by the standards of economic 
structural adjustment. According to the Egyptian government’s statistics, the state 
secondary school is an urban phenomenon representing an important element of 
the Egyptian state’s reform project. The thesis has shown that the Egyptian state had 
produced secondary schools as an “abstract space” (Lefebvre 1991) to function as a 
disciplining system. With the deterioration of the state schooling system after thirty 
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years under Mubarak’s “fragile state” (Fuller 1991), its weakening was causing 
students’ withdrawal from schools and the flourishing of the private tutorial market.  
This thesis reveals the reality of actual relations of power and social becoming at the 
school that are manifested in very low attendance rates (less than 20 per cent of 
students attend secondary schools), and the schools' failure to achieve the aims 
assigned to them by the government. Accordingly, it has become evident that 
schooling within the Egyptian context can only be understood as part of a social and 
cultural (re)production and state project of creating loyal citizens. This thesis shows 
that the state secondary schools, despite the official reformist discourse, were not 
qualified either to maintain “national security”, or to fulfil the state’s agenda in 
preparing young Egyptians for the labor market. Instead, the Egyptian state 
secondary schools emerged as sites for the cultural production of young people’s 
cynical and oppositional subjectivities. At the same time, the thesis shows the extent 
to which higher education constitutes a cultural capital for Egyptian families. Young 
people's and their parents’ relation to the schooling system is neither a docile 
acceptance nor a general rejection. However, it is a relation that is characterised by 
strong ambivalence, as people try to obtain the best possible education for their 
children in a system that contradicts itself over what it promises and what it actually 
does, and often fails altogether in what it is supposed to achieve. 
 
This thesis has demonstrated the extent to which state schooling in Egypt, far from 
being a means of reproduction of social and economic inequalities, has evolved into 
a highly contradictory, fragmented and contested resource. Officially, as attested by 
the educational authorities, schooling should be an equal right that prepares 
enlightened citizens and promotes democracy, freedom and social justice. However, 
as manifested through its physical details and everyday rituals, the school is a mere 
reflection of the authoritarian state, and a venue for discipline and control. Young 
people despite being sceptical (due to increased educated unemployment), continue 
to consider education as a pathway to social mobility. They had withdrawn from 
school, declaring it to be a non-functioning structure that is hardly more than a 
venue for exam registration, and that real education occurs through private tutoring 
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arrangements. As for teachers and administrators, while expressing their resentment 
at a poorly paid job and a highly centralised system they are using the school venue 
for marketing their own private tutoring services. Thus this thesis provides further 
evidence in support of the growing global understanding that schools are flexible 
utilities that are incapable for the reproduction of inequalities.  
 
8.2 Agency: new meanings and ambivalences  
With regard to the younger generations of Egyptians, this thesis has demonstrated 
that their aspirations and fears about the future were integrated and fed into local 
frameworks of self and subjectivity, and that their individualistic subjectivities were 
developing at the intersections of notions of modernisation and consumerism in the 
city of Cairo where their dreams of a good job and luxurious lifestyle might be 
fulfilled.  Emerging into college life, thanaweya-aama leavers were constituted as 
young and educated while confronted by an unfair set of material circumstances, 
and hopelessness about future chances.  While navigating forms of patriarchy and 
the subordination of their wider everyday life, young people deployed tactics that 
were either confirming their gendered agency, thus causing cracks within systems of 
subordination, or were helping them to survive times of pressure and tension.  While 
navigating aspirations, fears, and forms of exclusion, they showed ambivalence and 
somehow ambiguity about their life choices.  Young Egyptians’ sense of hopelessness 
was significant among other factors that triggered their forceful involvement in the 
2011 street actions, as explored through the narratives of the three revolutionary 
young people presented in Chapter 7. At the venue of Tahrir Square, young female 
revolutionary voices significantly contributed to gendering spaces of the revolution 
by their presence in the front lines of demonstrations and clashes. 
 
This thesis contributes to the anthropology of young people in Egypt, the Middle 
East, and the global south. It specifically contributes to the knowledge about how 
young people coming from low income urban backgrounds come to perceive 
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themselves as young and educated, and navigate their life chances, challenges, and 
meritocratic possibilities. The thesis shows that young people from low-income 
urban Cairo are not trapped into acting in certain predetermined ways by their 
habitus (Bourdieu 1977) and/or discourses (Foucault 1979). It also contributes to an 
understanding of how young people’s self-perception is gendered, by emphasising 
how young women navigate forms of patriarchy and exclusion, negotiate aspirations 
and hopelessness in relation to social mobility, and break taboos about girls’ and 
women’s presence, participation and capacity to act in the public sphere.  
This thesis whilst revealing the many cracks that already exist in the structure of the 
school, also draws attention to the cracks which the young people themselves at 
times cause in the structure of discipline. When they turn a lecture on loyalty to the 
political regime into a critical discussion about the president, and a group of them 
call themselves “Al-Kofar” (the Infidels) in a school with an outspokenly Islamic 
appearance and identity, then it is evident that the projects of authoritarian and 
revivalist discipline are taking place under conditions of a near collapse of public 
services and social authority.  
 
The thesis also contributes to understanding that while young people navigate their 
everyday experiences of subordination they are sometimes ambivalent, fluctuating 
between submission and resistance to forms of subordination. Such ambivalence 
was apparent, for example, in how they were voicing criticism against wasta 
networks and the corruption these entail, while at the same time thinking of the 
potential wasta networks available to them for employment upon graduation, and 
swinging between the notion of “self-realisation” – with what it carries of western 
notions of individuality and longing to live abroad – and voicing idealised middle-
class trajectories of longing to benefit the country and make a difference.  
Young people’s navigation of forms of patriarchy and subordination of their wider 
everyday life showed ambivalence and somehow ambiguity about the direction in 
which they wanted to head. For example, young people at times showed ambiguity 
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in handling the forceful religious discourse when those discourses intersected with 
their individual desires. While young people wanted to abide by religious preaching, 
even the most conservative preaching, they sought ways out when such preaching 
went against their desires for fun and enjoyment.  
Young women, while longing for equity in the labour market, upon graduation 
submitted at times to patriarchal social norms by being willing to drop their 
educational plans, going for an early marriage and admitting that men have a better 
chance in the labour market. Some young women were also ambiguous about 
abiding by the Islamist rules of the good Muslim girl and their very individual choices. 
In the middle of their ambivalent and ambiguous positions, young women produced 
survival tactics that confirmed their gendered agency was causing cracks in the very 
foundations of patriarchy and posing questions about the effectiveness of political 
and religious structures to mobilise young people. 
 
This thesis provides what may be an important contribution to the anthropology of 
the Arab Spring. It shows in Chapters 3 to 6 how the seeds of the uprising of 2011 
could be observed in interactions between students and teachers and the 
pronounced generation conflicts that many of the students expressed. In Chapter 7, 
it explores young Egyptians’ engagement in the Tahrir actions during January 2011 
and beyond. It shows the extent to which such engagement in the Arab Spring’s 
street politics is dramatically contributing to redefining the meaning of the state’s 
“abstract spaces” in Egypt.  These abstract spaces, such as squares, main roads, 
government buildings, and particularly schools, all of which were intended to 
manifest the states’ power hegemony, are being turned into venues that reflect the 
fast-changing political scene and an evolving map of political participation, 
expectations, and socio-cultural changes that are predominantly young and female. 
At the gates of the Ministry of Education in February 2011 young people brought 
their thanaweya-aama case and the notion of “claiming the right to education” onto 
the agenda of the revolution. 
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In relation to limitations of the study (in other words, areas that I was not able to 
look at) and possible future studies, it should be noted that this thesis has not 
addressed state secondary schooling from the point of view of the state, its 
institutions and key officials in charge of leading the development and 
implementation of secondary education strategies and policies. Equally important in 
future studies of schooling in Egypt is a thorough examination of policies, processes, 
circumstances and experiences involved in thanaweya-aama leavers’ admission and 
transition to college life. Of interest too in future studies would be a critical 
ethnography of private secondary schooling and the extent to which young people 
coming from upper middle and upper class Egyptian families make meaning on their 
schooling experiences. Equally important would be an examination of the 
experiences, circumstances, tensions, and the sense of “otherness” involving non-
Muslim young Egyptians and non-Egyptian44 young people at the venue of the state 
secondary school. 
  
                                                          
44
 As reported by humanitarian agencies, thousands of Syrian refugee children are currently enrolled 
in Egyptian schools.  
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Epilogue 
 
Egypt’s face has been changing since January 2011 as have the lives of the young 
heroes of this research who are now supposedly two or three years into their college 
studies.  Two and a half years after the removal of Mubarak’s regime and in one year 
under the rule of Morsi the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) leader, the young Egyptian 
revolutionaries and other political forces realised that their revolution had been 
hijacked by the MB and that they had to go back to the streets again, to demand the 
removal of the MB regime. On 30th June 2013, millions of Egyptians took to the 
streets demanding Morsi’s removal, and on 3rd July 2013, General El-Sisi, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, announced Morsi’s removal. The 
latter development was perceived by many young revolutionaries as an indication 
that the country might eventually come under military rule again, although this time 
with the blessing of the masses. At present, many young revolutionaries have 
returned to protesting both in streets and in their universities in opposition to what 
they view as the return of the previous regime’s brutality and aggression. 
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